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CECIL D. ANDRUS: Welcome to this con-
ference on freedom and secrecy, which is jointly 
sponsored by the Andrus Center for Public Policy, the 
Frank Church Institute, and the Idaho Statesman. We 
have a very full schedule today. We will have the panel 
discussions, and the Vice President will speak to us at 
noon. Then tonight, we will end with an address by 
one of Washington’s best and most respected report-
ers, one of the deans of journalism in America, David 
Broder. Mr. Vice President, I know you’re leaving right 
after your speech, so I’ll protect you tonight if he says 
anything that needs response.
Let me acknowledge a variety of sponsors. You see 
them on the screen over here; they are also on the back 
of the program. Those people help us financially, and 
they give of their dollars and their time. When you see 
any of them, I ask you to thank them for their help. 
The Andrus Center is a non-profit, as you know, so we 
rely on the volunteers and the contributions.
Some people have asked: Why a conference on 
freedom and secrecy? Take a look at this morning’s 
newspaper. Many of the issues and concerns we will 
discuss today are literally right there in the headlines 
of your newspaper every day. The Andrus Center has 
always taken pride in contributing to the public dis-
cussion about important current issues, and we think 
this discussion today carries on that tradition. We 
have some truly outstanding participants with us 
today, genuine experts on all the issues we are going 
to discuss. 
You’ll have time for questions at various points 
during the day, but I respectfully ask that you be cour-
teous to people’s time and understand that a ques-
tion is not a speech. Dr. Freemuth, who is the Senior 
Fellow at the Andrus Center, is an academician and is 
experienced in the private as well as the public sector. 
He is very knowledgeable in his own right. He knows 
aspiring politicians by sight, and he is not going to 
hand the mike to you folks. He is going to hold the 
mike for you. Then if you don’t play by the rules, he’s 
gone. If anyone doesn’t understand that, please raise 
your hand. 
Not everyone in this audience is going to agree 
with what will be said. After all, this is America; we’re 
built on the differences of opinion we might have. But 
I’m asking you to be respectful of folks who have come 
a great distance at cost of time and money to partic-
ipate in this. Please give them the courtesy of your 
attention and respect that they deserve.
I mentioned before our other two major spon-
sors. Bethine Church, widow of the late great Senator 
Frank Church, is chair of the Frank Church Institute. 
She is here this morning, and I ask her to make any 
comment she would care to. Bethine Church. 
BETHINE CHURCH: One thing I’ve learned as 
life has gone by is that if you can get a helping hand, 
get it. I’m just so pleased and want to welcome all of 
you who have been staunch supporters of the Frank 
Church Chair over the years. It is now being called 
the Frank Church Institute because we are covering a 
lot more territory, and I think that joining with Cece 
Andrus would make Frank really happy. He liked 
working with him over the years. 
I see so many people that I dearly love, and I have 
to tell you that Frank thought this was an important 
thing to do. Long ago, just after he was out of the 
Senate, he said that people should have a chance to talk 
about the issues of the day, that it is not unpatriotic to 
question what your government is doing. You are the 
government. About the committee that he and the Vice 
President — then Senator — were on, he said, 
“The critical question before the committee 
is to determine how the fundamental liberties 
of the people can be maintained in the course of 
the government’s efforts to protect their security. 
The delicate balance of these basic goals of our 
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government is often difficult to strike, but it can 
and must be achieved.” 
 
I know Frank would be delighted to have the 
Statesman, the Andrus Center, and all of you here. 
Thank you. 
ANDRUS: Now, ladies and gentlemen, it is my 
pleasure to introduce to you the president and pub-
lisher of the Idaho Statesman, Leslie Hurst, who came 
to us just recently this year to head up the Statesman. 
She came out of Huntington, West Virginia, where 
she held the same office in the Herald Dispatch. Leslie, 
welcome. 
LESLIE HURST: Good morning, ladies and gen-
tlemen. The Idaho Statesman is honored to partner 
with the Andrus Center for the fourth year to spon-
sor a major conference on public policy issues. This 
year, we are privileged also to join the Frank Church 
Institute to bring you this day of discussion about the 
balance between freedom and secrecy. It is a key part 
of our mission to create forums that give you direct 
access to thinkers with great experience. You’ll hear 
them debate and struggle over some grey areas. You’ll 
have a chance to ask them questions, and I hope you 
will take that opportunity. It’s not often that you get 
direct access to experts like these. 
I also hope you’ll think about what these issues 
mean for us here at home. The balance between free-
dom and secrecy is not just a national issue. At the 
Statesman, we have written many stories and editorials 
about fights for openness in Idaho, and we have done 
some direct fighting ourselves to make sure informa-
tion is not held secret. If you saw my legal bills, you’d 
know what I am talking about. 
Some examples: There are audits underway right 
now at the University of Idaho regarding University 
Place. Should they be released to the public? How 
much detail should be released from the Boise 
ombudsman’s investigation of citizen complaints 
against the Police Department? Should the audit of 
finances at Boise City Hall be reported in an open 
meeting or behind closed doors? What checks and 
balances should be placed on the new Criminal 
Intelligence Unit in the Boise Police Department? 
Should the ombudsman be able to investigate com-
plaints against the CIU? 
As you listen and ask questions today, consider 
what balance of freedom and security you want — not 
just for our country but right here at home. Consider: 
If you get comfortable with secrecy at home, does 
it make you more comfortable with secrecy in 
Washington? The bottom line is, as you listen to these 
global discussions today, what can you do or should 
you do in our corner of the world? This is an impor-
tant discussion for our community and our nation, 
and I’m pleased that the Idaho Statesman is part of it. 
Thank you taking the time to participate.
ANDRUS: Thank you very much, Leslie, and 
thank you for your participation in this and other 
conferences. 
 As we considered how to begin a conference, 
we knew we wanted an individual who could speak 
thoughtfully to the issues of a troubled and dangerous 
world. We needed someone who possessed the experi-
ence, the perspective, and the knowledge of these dif-
ficult subjects. Ideally, we wanted an attorney’s ana-
lytical mind combined with a politician’s sense of the 
possible with a good sense of history thrown in. We 
found the right man just to the west of the Cascades in 
the Pacific Northwest: a former state attorney general, 
a three-term Republican United States Senator, a man 
known on both sides of the political aisle for his study 
and grasp of the issues. 
Senator Slade Gorton is now practicing law in 
Seattle but remains active in public affairs and cur-
rently serves as one of only ten members of the so-
called “9/11 Commission,” the National Commission 
on Terrorist Attacks on the United States. Please wel-
come Senator Gorton to start us off today.
SLADE GORTON: Thank you very much. After 
accepting this invitation and reflecting on my remarks, 
I became increasingly disturbed by the title of the con-
ference itself: Freedom & Secrecy: Trading Liberty for 
Security? In my view, not only is that an unnecessary 
question, implying that we are engaged in a zero sum 
game, it’s rather profoundly destructive as the answer 
to that question, for most Americans, would fall over-
whelmingly on the security side of the ledger. 
Let’s reflect back to our beginnings. Here is a 
relevant part of the Preamble to the Constitution 
of the United States of America: “We the people of 
the United States, in order to secure the blessings of 
liberty, do ordain and establish this Constitution.” 
“In order to secure the blessings of liberty.” That 
is to say that those two words or phrases go hand in 
hand. Fundamentally, without security, there will 
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be no liberty. People will ultimately demand secu-
rity first. Many of the troubles that the United States 
faces today in Iraq stem from the fact that the people 
there want security far more than they want the liberty 
that we have promised them. As we look at the effects 
on government of this question, I am reminded of a 
woman friend of mine who travels frequently from the 
west coast to New York City. She remarked that it is 
only in the last five years or so, both before and after 
9/11, that she has felt secure enough to exercise the 
freedom of walking outside alone after dark in that 
city, a city that now claims to be the most secure of the 
large cities of the United States. 
So our goal, it seems to me, is liberty and security, 
to do for our generation what those who wrote the 
Constitution did for theirs and for our own, to secure 
the blessings of liberty for all of us. It is not a zero-sum 
game. It is not the obtaining of one at the expense of 
the other. 
Now with that, the triggering factor for this con-
ference, of course, was 9/11 and the national reaction 
to that attack. 9/11, if it did nothing else, illustrated 
dramatically the failure of both preventive measures 
and of intelligence on the part of our multitude of 
national security agencies, particularly in the light of 
a clear and explicit declaration of war a good decade 
ago by Osama bin Laden against this nation, its soci-
ety, and its most fundamental cultural aspects. It was 
followed up by acts of war against us in Kenya, Saudi 
Arabia, and Yemen, each of which resulted in substan-
tial losses of American lives and none of which was fol-
lowed by any kind of dramatic response on our part. 
Query for me as a member of the 9/11 
Commission and for all of the people of the United 
States: Was 9/11 effectively inevitable, or were there 
relevant failures in U.S. foreign policy and its inef-
fectual responses to these earlier attacks? Or were 
their failures in discovering and interdicting the 9/11 
attacks themselves and in establishing and monitoring 
safety regulations, particularly with respect to airline 
security policies, failures that better and wiser policies 
might have cured?
Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, the Intelligence 
Committees of both the House of Representatives 
and the Senate of the United States mounted a joint 
inquiry into those facts. Their deadline was December 
of last year at the adjournment of that Congress. The 
report that they filed then was voluminous. I have all 
six or eight pounds of it in my brief case here. The 
great bulk of it was not declassified until July of this 
year, and even at that time, as we deal with the ques-
tion of secrecy, 28 pages dealing primarily with Saudi 
Arabia and its participation or non-participation in 
the 9/11 attacks, remain classified. 
That joint committee itself recognized, first, that 
its inquiry was incomplete and had not ascertained 
all of the facts. Second, given what the former Vice 
President and I can agree is a healthy pessimism or 
questioning about the objectivity of any Congressional 
investigation, it created an outside independent com-
mission to study the 9/11 failure and to build on what 
the joint Senate and House Committee had found.
In those findings, there are roughly ten factual 
findings or groups of closely-related findings with 
respect to intelligence facts discovered by some U.S. 
intelligence agencies prior to 9/11. There is at least 
the implication in the joint committee’s findings that 
if more attention had been given to them, had there 
been better coordination among agencies, we might 
possibly have prevented 9/11. 
What is not included in the report of the joint 
committee is the fact that those were ten facts or 
groups of facts out of perhaps ten million facts on var-
ious intelligence subjects discovered during those years 
by our various intelligence agencies. In other words, 
we were hunting for ten needles in ten separate hay-
stacks with an attempt to relate them to one another. 
The creation of the 9/11 Commission was highly 
controversial. The Administration didn’t like the idea; 
it wanted this to be all over. In that, I think it was 
probably like every other Administration with respect 
to problems it would prefer to solve itself. Congress 
probably would not have acted without the incentive 
of a demand from the organizations of the families of 
victims of 9/11 that more needed to be done than the 
joint Senate-House Committee did and that such a 
commission should be created. So in November of last 
year, it created one. 
There are ten members, evenly divided between 
Republicans and Democrats. My first reflection is 
how much of a role personality plays in these matters. 
The chairman was to be picked by the President of the 
United States, the vice chairman by the Democratic 
leader of the Senate. They made those choices: Henry 
Kissinger and George Mitchell, two of the most prom-
inent and perhaps opinionated and certainly articulate 
citizens of the United States. Within a week, they had 
decided that they didn’t want anything to do with the 
job for various reasons that are not particularly rele-
vant here. The second choices of the president and the 
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minority leader were former Governor Tom Kean of 
New Jersey, now a university president there, and for-
mer Congressman Lee Hamilton, for many years the 
chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. 
The contrast between the first pair and the second 
pair could not be more dramatic from the very begin-
ning. Chairman Kean and Vice Chairman Hamilton 
are soft-spoken, thoughtful, probably as non-partisan 
as two former elected officials of the two political par-
ties could conceivably be. They impressed me in their 
management of the commission as being, for all prac-
tical purposes, twins. There has never been the slight-
est disagreement between the two. Perhaps I have 
thought from time to time they don’t push the other 
eight of us as hard as they might. Certainly they don’t 
push us as hard as Kissinger and Mitchell would have. 
To the extent that there’s a chance that this bi- parti-
san Commission will truly act in a bi-partisan fashion 
and come out with unanimous or close to unanimous 
recommendations, it will be due very largely to the 
profound degree of cooperation and thoughtfulness of 
the now chairman and vice chairman. 
I had the distinction or the honor of having 
been the first member picked. My qualifications were 
basically that I was a close friend of then - Majority 
Leader Trent Lott. It may have been his last official act 
in that position. 
I did serve for about three years on the Senate 
Intelligence Committee, and because one of the sub-
jects of this conference will be the quality of legislative 
oversight of our intelligence activities, I can tell you that 
I left it in boredom and frustration after about three 
years, considering it to be an almost total waste of my 
time. I can put it in this fashion: I cannot remember a 
single significant fact that I heard in a closed hearing of 
the Senate Intelligence Committee that I didn’t read in 
the Washington Post within 48 hours. 
Legislative oversight in that field is particularly 
difficult. First, of course, it does take place behind 
closed doors. Second, to do it right takes an immense 
amount of time. Third, that immense amount of 
time conflicts with the more public and, in many 
respects, the more important duties of the members 
of the House and Senate. When I was a member of 
that committee, it was the fifth committee of which 
I was a member. There simply wasn’t time to do the 
job right. 
There are a few exceptions. Senator William 
Cohen, later Secretary of Defense, as chairman of the 
committee, spent a huge amount of time on legisla-
tive oversight of the intelligence agencies. The pres-
ent chairman of the House Committee, Porter Goss, 
congressman from Florida, does the same thing, but 
they are overwhelmingly the exceptions rather than 
the rule. 
The other seven members were picked in a man-
ner similar to mine. They were all picked by the 
Republican and Democratic leaders of the Senate 
and the House of Representatives. They include, 
on the Republican side, Fred Fielding, an old 
Washington hand and a lawyer in private practice in 
Washington D.C. He has been a significant part of 
several Republican Administrations, and he brings 
great experience and wisdom to the task. It includes 
John Lehman, the first Secretary of the Navy under 
President Reagan, and Jim Thompson, a former gov-
ernor of Illinois and former U.S. Attorney in Illinois. 
The Democratic side includes a former colleague 
of mine, Max Cleland from Georgia, who was defeated 
for re-election just last year; Tim Rohmer, a former 
member of the House of Representatives, who retired 
from the House last year, who was the bridge between 
the Commission and the joint committee. He was a 
member of the House Intelligence Committee and of 
that earlier House-Senate investigation. Richard Ben- 
Veniste, who gained fame as a Watergate lawyer and 
later represented President Clinton, one of the fin-
est cross-examiners during our hearings that I’ve ever 
come across. It included Jamie Gorelick, number two 
in the Clinton White House and before that, solicitor 
for the Department of Defense, and she is a particular 
favorite of mine. We have been paired as questioners 
of many of the witnesses, and I have a profound appre-
ciation for her skills, her intelligence, her thoughtful-
ness, and patriotism. 
We have not moved rapidly, perhaps not as rap-
idly as we should have, in this connection. One of 
the most intense elements of the debate over the cre-
ation of the commission was how long it would have 
to make its report. Our deadline is May 27, 2004. 
Personally, I think that was a great mistake. I think 
it should have been after next year’s elections, but it’s 
unlikely that Congress will extend that period of time. 
We will make every effort to finish our deliberations 
by then. 
But the first six months or more of the com-
mission’s existence have been spent almost entirely 
on procedural matters and on our own self-educa-
tion. As is the case with every administration, this 
Administration was very slow in coming up with the 
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documents and the papers that we needed. We had 
a public news conference on that subject about three 
months ago in which our chairman and vice chair-
man, particularly, criticized the Department of Justice 
and the Department of Defense. Within three days, 
we had almost a million documents that we had not 
seen before. Publicity does help and does count.
We are now in the position of having in our pos-
session more than two million pages of documents rel-
evant in one respect or another to our inquiries. We 
are still in a contest with the Administration over a 
handful of vitally important documents about the way 
in which deliberations take place in the White House 
— who knows what and when do they know it — and 
over a broader range of documents about the degree of 
our access to them and whether we can physically have 
them in hand or not.
I expect those questions all to be answered in our 
favor. It is clear that we have received far more than 
any other outside group has ever received in connec-
tion with an inquiry of this nature, infinitely more 
than the joint Senate and House Committee received, 
which was denied access to many Administration doc-
uments on the grounds of executive privilege, an exec-
utive privilege that they did not challenge. We have, 
in other words, a great deal of important information 
that was not available to our predecessor committee. 
We are charged by the Congress, by the law creat-
ing us, to investigate the facts and circumstances lead-
ing up to 9/11, to investigate the immediate response 
of our government on and immediately after 9/11, to 
report as thoughtfully as we can on the lessons learned 
from that tragedy and the improvements to the secu-
rity of the United States since 9/11, to examine the 
question of whether or not those improvements 
impinge on civil liberties in any respect, and to make 
recommendations for future reforms. This is all due 
on May 27 of next year. The task is a massive one. 
Now let’s get to substance. The great question that 
the ten of us have before us is the degree to which we 
can unite on coming up with a report on our delib-
erations. First, can we reach agreement on all the rele-
vant facts leading up to and taking place on September 
11th itself? In some respects, this is our most vital task 
because we will be writing history. Reaching unanimity 
on the facts is clearly within the realm of possibility. 
Every one of the ten of us, during our first meet-
ing, emphasized that it was vitally important that we 
do that and particularly that we not divide along par-
tisan lines. Does that mean, even if we reach a unani-
mous conclusion, that it will be definitive and unchal-
lenged? I think not. The Warren Commission is not. In 
fact, I read a review of a book in the last two months, 
challenging the received facts on the Lincoln assassi-
nation. That we will be able to succeed in satisfying 
everyone is unlikely. That we will be able to succeed in 
satisfying most people as to the pure facts leading up 
to 9/11 is clearly within the realm of possibility. 
The second question we have before us is: Should 
we characterize those facts? Should we attempt to 
assign blame or credit? Should we go so far as to sug-
gest that there are heads still in position that ought to 
roll as a result of the failures of 9/11? The joint com-
mittee did not make any such recommendations. A 
handful of its members, in a separate opinion, pre-
cisely did so, and none of those heads have rolled. I 
think unanimity on those characterizations will be 
much more difficult to reach on the part of all ten of 
us than on the simple facts themselves.
Next, a critique of the reaction, the changes in 
the two years since 9/11, and the results. Next, what 
should be done organizationally in the future? Let 
me for a few minutes discuss one aspect of that last 
question. What shall be done in the future? It is a 
question on which specific recommendations have 
been requested, at least by members of Congress. 
Perhaps the central question there is: How, in the 
future, should the United States handle the problem 
of domestic intelligence, domestic spying? Who is in 
charge of determining whether or not there are plots 
against the security of the United States taking place in 
the country? How should they conduct that activity? 
There are, I think, four alternatives in that con-
nection that the people in the Congress need to con-
sider. First: Let’s just let the FBI do it. Let me tell you, 
the FBI, which currently, in my view, is led by a very 
aggressive and very effective head, is industriously 
attempting to win this debate simply by doing it, sim-
ply by creating facts. It has already created a separate 
division for domestic intelligence. It has some but not 
much experience in the field, and it is going at it very 
aggressively.
Second, we could assign this responsibility to the 
new Department of Homeland Security and make 
it a division of that department as the FBI is of the 
Department of Justice.
Third, we could follow the example of the United 
Kingdom and many of the European countries and 
create our own separate and independent entity on the 
order of the British MI-5. 
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Fourth, of course, we could give that responsibility, 
a responsibility it has never had in the law, to the CIA. 
From a purely personal point of view — and I 
must say here that any opinions I express are mine 
alone, not necessarily those of any of the other nine 
members of the Commission — the advantage of the 
FBI is that it is an existing agency and one that has 
carried on its traditional responsibilities in a highly 
effective manner. It has certain intelligence capabili-
ties, and it is aggressively increasing them. It will fight 
very hard in Congress to keep them against any con-
trary recommendation. 
On the other hand, while the FBI is perhaps the 
most effective and efficient in the United States or per-
haps in the world, its primary duty has been to solve 
crimes after they have been committed and to build 
cases that are sufficient for United States Attorneys to 
take to a jury and prove beyond a reasonable doubt, a 
culture that is profoundly different from that of figur-
ing out what might happen in the future, from using 
forms of evidence that might not be admissible in 
court, and from preventing terrorist activities. It is my 
view that this function will always be secondary to the 
primary function of the FBI.
OK. The Department of Homeland Security, a 
logical agency. Homeland security is what it was cre-
ated to preserve, and it could easily take the domestic 
security commission. But of course it is a brand new 
department. Its existing parts don’t fit together very well 
yet and probably won’t for a number of years. It would 
create another problem of coordination with other 
related agencies, and where will it find the people?
Incidentally, that is one of the most profound 
questions that we face. Where do you find good intel-
ligence operatives and analysts? Certainly not in the 
Help Wanted ads in the newspapers. 
Third, an MI-5. It seems to work in other coun-
tries, all countries smaller than the United States. It 
would be independent and would have a single func-
tion. On the other hand, it will also create another 
problem of coordination, and clearly coordination 
among agencies was one of the great shortcomings of 
our responses before 9/11. To whom does it report? 
Directly to the President or to someone else?
Finally, and the least considered so far, the CIA. 
When the CIA was created in 1947, it was for foreign 
intelligence activities alone. Intelligence about things 
like terrorism are its business. They are its culture. It 
could probably get up to speed more quickly than any 
other agency, and it would be the least likely to lose 
information between the cracks. But I would have to 
say that the present CIA has rather poor leadership. 
This would be a violation of history and would be the 
most opposed by the general public. The CIA, by and 
large, does not get good coverage. 
Let me go back now to 9/11 itself, what we know, 
and whether or not we should have been able to pre-
vent it. Could 9/11 have been pre-empted with the 
intelligence that was actually gathered before 9/11, 
with the ten or a dozen facts or groups of facts known 
by one agency or another at the time? The joint com-
mittee implied that the answer to that question might 
possibly be yes. Personally, I doubt it. 
Take one example. We went through security 
checks in getting on airlines before 9/11. Those secu-
rity checks did not and would not have discovered the 
particular weapons the hijackers took on board with 
them. They weren’t violations of the law, had they 
been discovered. Why? To a certain extent, I suppose, 
that’s due to a lack of imagination on the part of our 
various agencies. 
But the United States for 20 years, with respect 
to airline hijacking, had the philosophy that hijackers 
were not suicidal, that they would take a plane and fly 
it to Cuba or some other place, use it for an exchange 
of prisoners and the like, and that they weren’t primar-
ily interested in killing the passengers on board the 
airplane or certainly in using it for suicidal and attack 
purposes. 
Were there one or two indications before 9/11 
that this might happen? Yes, but they were one or two 
instances among literally thousands. Our intelligence 
agencies thought that future terrorists attacks, like the 
ones leading up to 9/11, might be against American 
interests but would almost certainly be outside of the 
United States itself. 
Second question: Could 9/11 have been pre-
empted had our intelligence agencies previously 
been organized somewhat differently? What were the 
effects of the Church Committee’s 1974 reforms on 
our intelligence gathering? Had they not been so dra-
matic, had they not created a different culture in those 
agencies, might we possibly, with less inhibited intelli-
gence agencies, discovered more facts and enough facts 
to put together to prevent 9/11? Perhaps, but that is 
the purest possible speculation. 
Third, could 9/11 have been prevented had 
we reacted far more decisively to earlier attacks by 
al-Qaida and Osama bin Laden on American peo-
ple and interests overseas? I think there the answer 
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is almost certainly yes, had we, for example, before 
9/11, determined on an invasion of Afghanistan and a 
destruction of the sanctuaries in which most of those 
terrorists were trained. 
But let’s look at that as a practical matter. Does 
anyone here think that the Clinton Administration, 
an administration for which I have very little sym-
pathy, could possibly have made a decision some-
time in the year 1999 or 2000 to invade Afghanistan 
simply by publishing Osama bin Ladan’s declaration 
of war against the United States? Could the Bush 
Administration have done so in the first six months 
of the year 2001? I submit that was not remotely a 
possibility in either case, given public opinion at the 
time. The controversies that we have had in minor 
respects over Afghanistan and in a major respect over 
Iraq, when motivations were much much clearer, sim-
ply were not present then. In my view, while we could 
have prevented 9/11 in that fashion, there is no polit-
ical possibility, in a free society like ours, that there 
could have been created by either president the degree 
of unity that would have been required for such an 
aggressive form of preemption.
What and how do we think about the nature of 
the threat which we, as a people and a nation, are 
facing today? I must emphasize here that I am speak-
ing at this point for myself alone. Certainly it is not 
the threat presented by the Soviet Union for almost 
half a century of the Cold War. There are at least two 
major distinctions between this contest and that one. 
The first is, of course, however our dangers can be 
characterized, we are not faced with a nuclear-armed, 
sovereign power. We are not faced in any respect with 
a potential of a nuclear Armageddon that would 
simply end civilization as we know it.
Second, on the other hand, we are dealing with 
a much longer lasting and more firmly held anti-
Western philosophy. Communism, it seemed to me, 
did not last as a true believer’s philosophy or religion 
for more than about three generations. During the last 
twenty years of the Soviet Union, it was simply a cover 
for protecting the perquisites of a privileged class. 
Ultimately, it fell by its own weight.
On the other hand, militant Islam, in my view, 
has a history as old as religion itself, perhaps mostly 
or always a minority, but at least always a distinct 
minority. It is unlikely to disappear spontaneously. 
It certainly is impervious to western philosophical or 
political argument. It is likely to cease to be a threat to 
us only when it is a greater threat to the Muslim coun-
tries out of which it arises than those nations and those 
societies are willing to bear. 
Now, of course, most of them, including many of 
the elements of the ruling classes of those countries, 
blame the west for their relative decline. That decline, 
in my view, is not only not going to be arrested but 
will continue as long as so much knowledge and 
adaptability to measures run afoul of religious dictates 
and particularly so long as the female half of the popu-
lation of that culture is barred from significant roles in 
the society as a whole. 
 So I believe that elements of this will be in our 
final conclusions. Our defenses must necessarily exist 
on three distinct but related levels. First is the harden-
ing of targets. In one part of that imperative, we seem 
to have done a fairly good job. Aircraft security is now 
on a far higher plane than it was pre 9/11. Even though 
the cost has been great, greater security exists almost 
entirely with respect to aviation, not with respect to 
other modes of transportation, not with freight mobil-
ity in ships and the like.
One of the most profound scholars that has tes-
tified before us pointed out that for a free society to 
attempt to defend itself simply by hardening targets is 
to court the same bankruptcy the Soviet Union engaged 
in with its defense policies. It is just inconsistent with 
our freedom to protect effectively every single target. So 
we have to set priorities within that field. 
Have we been successful? Yes, in one narrow but 
vitally important sense, we have. There has been no 
repeat in the slightly more than two years since 9/11 of 
the 9/11 forms of attack here in the United States. 
It does not mean that terrorism has been made 
any less of a threat. What we have done in many 
respects has been to displace terrorism, and because 
targets of the United States have been more difficult to 
hit, we see nightclubs blown up in Indonesia, and we 
see attacks in Saudi Arabia itself. We see the kind of 
terrorism that took place fairly recently in Morocco.
Displacement, from the point of view of our own 
society, is at least a partial success. Displacement, it 
seems to me at least, is what Saudi Arabia has been 
engaged in for years, perhaps encouraging directly 
or indirectly the export of a philosophy that leads to 
terrorism on the grounds that financing it elsewhere 
might protect Saudi Arabia itself. 
So in some respects, the May attacks in Saudi 
Arabia may have been the most important single 
event since 9/11 as Saudi Arabia finds that it can no 
longer displace terrorism and must attack it directly. 
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I’m inclined to believe that its foreign policy changed 
profoundly a few months ago, making not irrelevant 
but less relevant some of the elements of our investiga-
tion as to its earlier participation.
Second, in addition to hardening targets, is the 
necessity for more aggressive and certainly more effec-
tive intelligence and preemption than we engaged in 
prior to 9/11. This whole question about how domes-
tic intelligence should be handled is a part of that. 
Training and recruitment of officers to engage in those 
activities are a part of it. 
A far greater degree of imagination is required to 
determine what comes next. From the hijacking of 
aircraft and crashing into buildings, what is required 
for the next time around? And most particularly, how 
does more effective intelligence, particularly here 
within the United States, relate to the liberties that 
they are designed to protect? 
The third level, of course, is preemption on the 
ground. It is the Afghanistans and the Iraqs. It was not 
terribly controversial when it was Afghanistan and a 
direct attack on Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida but 
more controversial when it took place in Iraq. 
So the questions we face in this connection are 
how each of those relates to one another. What are 
the relative effectivenesses and priorities of (1) hard-
ening targets, (2) more aggressive intelligence, and (3) 
preemption? How do you set the values and policies 
within each one of those? What impacts do those poli-
cies have here in the United States? 
To go back to my own duties. I have every hope 
that we can be unanimous in setting a factual back-
ground of what led up to 9/11 and the facts, minute 
by minute and second by second, on that disastrous 
and tragic morning. I hope that some of our proce-
dural recommendations can also be unanimous. Our 
setting of values for a free society and our comments 
on some of the questions I’ve covered here — if indeed, 
we make them at all — are very unlikely to be unani-
mous because there is nothing close to unanimity on 
the part of the people of the United States themselves. 
The best result we can have is to set out those ques-
tions and those value judgments as dispassionately as 
we can and try to help that debate so that an informed 
American people can come up with informed answers, 
which do not set liberty against security but provide 
for securing the liberties of the United States in the 
future as they have in the past. 
Thank you very much. 
ANDRUS: What did I tell you? Analytical, insight-
ful, constructive. Thank you very much, Senator. We 
appreciate your opening this conference. 
Now we have about 15 minutes for some questions. 
If you raise your hand, Dr. Freemuth will approach you 
with the microphone. No speeches, please. 
AUDIENCE QUESTION: You said that you 
wished your commission’s report would not be due 
until after the next presidential election. Why is that?
GORTON: It’s so easy for one side to say,” It’s all 
Clinton’s fault” and for another side to say, “It’s all Bush’s 
fault.” No matter what we say, unanimous or divided, 
the political parties in a presidential year are likely to 
try to pick it apart to make political points between 
May and November. If it’s to have any great and last-
ing value, it seems to me that if it were issued after the 
election is over, it would be judged more dispassionately 
than in the immediate run-up to an election. 
AUDIENCE QUESTION: Senator, your nee-
dle in the haystack analogy. Don’t you think that the 
rather detailed plans to fly planes into U.S. buildings 
— and I think the World Trade Center was among 
them — should have glinted a little bit more than the 
average needle in the haystack?
GORTON: Our hindsight is always 20-20. I can 
always say, “I wish they had been. I wish someone in 
the FBI had paid more attention to the report coming 
from Phoenix. I wish that the FBI had gone for a war-
rant to look at Moussaoui’s laptop. All of these things 
look extremely plain in the aftermath. Obviously, they 
didn’t at the time. As I say, it was a failure of imagi-
nation, but we were not imagining this kind of thing 
taking place. There was a plot from the Philippines to 
hijack airlines and to use them in a suicidal fashion. 
No one connected those dots, and I want to be very 
cautious about coming to a conclusion afterward that, 
in all of the huge numbers of findings on a wide range 
of subjects in which terrorism was only one for which 
are intelligence agencies are responsible, someone 
should have picked up on that. I wish someone had 
picked up on that. I wish someone had done some-
thing about it. 
My best guess is that even if someone had said, 
“Hey, I think this is going to happen, and we’d bet-
ter have the FAA tell all airlines to barricade doors, 
and we’d better create a federal agency for security at 
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our airports,” I don’t imagine that would have gotten 
through Congress. Both public opinion and the air-
lines would have killed those recommendations at the 
time. Just as I don’t think it’s appropriate to criticize 
President Clinton for not taking Osama bin Laden’s 
declaration of war as seriously as one would a decla-
ration of war by some sovereign power. I wish it had 
happened. In a perfect world with perfect intelligence, 
it would. I am very reluctant to come to the judgment 
that it should have. 
AUDIENCE QUESTION: So far, the Bush 
Administration has not had a reputation for paying 
much attention to the facts re the Iraq War, so what 
gives you the hope that this Administration would pay 
attention to the facts that you find in your committee?
GORTON: My opinion is that the Bush 
Administration has paid quite close attention to the 
facts and has taken a number of significant measures 
in the right direction. The nature of your question 
almost answers the first question I had. When we put 
this report out in the midst of a presidential election, 
it’s more likely to be misused than used. 
AUDIENCE QUESTION: I certainly agree 
wholeheartedly with your suggestions that an 
informed citizenry is the basis of this democracy, but 
I find it very very difficult to reconcile that advocat-
ing secrecy results in that informed population. As an 
Iranian immigrant, I find it very difficult to listen to 
our Administration advocating taking democracy to 
the Middle East, knowing full well the history of my 
two countries and the intervention of the CIA in sti-
fling democracy in Iran in 1953. My question is: How 
do we reconcile having covert operations and, at the 
same time, advocating an informed citizenry? 
GORTON: It will be impossible for us to deal with 
any kind of threat — it was impossible at the time of 
the Soviet Union and is impossible now — of terrorism 
without having covert activities. In fact, if our covert 
activities had been more effective pre 9/11, that in itself 
might possibly reduced or eliminated that threat. 
As for supporting democracy in the Middle East, 
I think that’s precisely what we ought to be doing. 
My own personal view, which has nothing to do with 
9/11, is that there is some very real promise in Iran. 
It seems to me that, in that nation at least, a majority 
of the people yearn for greater freedom and for greater 
democracy. We should be doing everything we can to 
encourage that movement against a repressive religious 
government. 
AUDIENCE QUESTION: Senator, do you 
believe that the United States, in the long term, can 
economically afford the kind of foreign military inter-
vention that the new foreign policy of preemption 
seems to involve?
GORTON: The answer to that question is yes. 
Just as a similar question in the Cold War — Could 
the United States afford to stay firm against the Soviet 
Union? — gets the same answer. It seems to me we 
couldn’t afford not to. 
AUDIENCE QUESTION: I think it’s fair to say 
that a great many Americans do not understand why 
the Saudis were given a pass on 9/11. Perhaps more 
important, do we face future threats from Saudi per-
sonnel and Saudi money that would attack American 
interests? If so, how is that going to be dealt with?
GORTON: It seems clear that much of the money 
and support for a particular form of Suni Muslim 
extremism, including Osama bin Laden, is centered in 
a religious philosophy in Saudi Arabia. Much of that 
religious philosophy is aimed almost as much against 
the Saudi rulers as it is against outsiders. I personally 
think it’s clear, without going into any classified infor-
mation and just based on the question you asked, that 
we certainly dealt with a very mixed bag. 
I think it’s appropriate to say that the Saudis 
rather consciously thought that if they exported it, if 
they displaced it, they would be protecting themselves. 
That’s why I think May 14th was such a profoundly 
important event. The Saudis have discovered now that 
displacement is not the answer. But was there Saudi 
money involved? Is there a Saudi philosophy involved? 
Were we too soft on it? I would have to answer all 
three of those questions very much in the affirmative. 
AUDIENCE QUESTION: During the Monica 
Lewinsky scandal and right about the time the Wag the 
Dog movie came out, there was an attack waged by the 
Clinton Administration on a terrorist target, which 
the public viewed cynically — myself included — as 
an attempt to divert attention from his personal cri-
sis. Wasn’t that, in fact, an attack on Osama bin Laden 
or an attempt on an al-Qaida network? The question 
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is: That wasn’t viewed very well in the public, so how 
could any intelligence really have been acted upon if 
that was, in fact, Osama?
GORTON: The last part of your question is the 
important part. Yes, that particular one-day attack 
was viewed with great cynicism by a large part of the 
American people. But doesn’t that prove the point I 
made earlier? What if President Clinton, under those 
circumstances, had said, “Damn it. We’re going to 
invade Afghanistan.” Could he have had any believ-
ability under those circumstances? It seems to me 
extremely difficult to say so. I don’t think, in the 
absence of a Monica Lewinsky in July of 2001, 
President Bush could conceivably have done that 
on the basis of what we knew at the time. Was the 
response inadequate? Yes. Could the response have 
been dramatically greater in this country at that time? 
I can’t see it. Would Clinton have acted any differ-
ently if there had been no Monica Lewinsky? I doubt 
that he would have acted much differently than that 
because that was the type of response we had to other 
similar provocations at the time. We certainly didn’t 
respond any more dramatically to the U.S.S. Cole. 
AUDIENCE QUESTION: Senator, I am curious 
about your thoughts on our new policy of preemptive 
strikes when the first preemptive strike in the history 
of the United States seems to have been founded on 
poor intelligence.
GORTON: To call Iraq the first preemptive attack 
by the United States is a wild exaggeration. We had 
a little one-day war in Grenada that certainly didn’t 
threaten the United States or its security. We went after 
Barbary pirates early in the 19th Century. Certainly 
Afghanistan was a preemptive attack. My own view 
is that the attack on Iraq was more than justified and 
has already paid positive dividends with respect to ter-
rorism and will pay more. But, can we reach a general 
rule from either one of those things? I don’t think we 
can. I think every set of circumstances is dramatically 
different from every other one and requires debate and 
judgment, based on those particular facts. 
ANDRUS: Please help me thank Senator Gorton 
for being here today and for sharing his knowledge 
and wisdom. 
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PATRICK A. SHEA: We will attempt to accom-
plish two things: To establish the historic context of 
the Church Committee and to consider its legacy to 
us today as we confront these issues. 
I thought to begin with Dr. LeRoy Ashby, 
Professor of History at Washington State University 
and biographer of several distinguished Americans, 
including Senator Frank Church. I’ve asked him to 
give us a sense of where Senator Church was in 1974 
and 1975. 
In regard to genealogy, it should be known that 
Bethine Church considers me one of her wandering chil-
dren, so I operate under her rules on occasion. Dr. Ashby.
LEROY ASHBY, Ph.D.: A couple of days ago, 
Pat called to give me my marching orders for this 
panel. He said, “I’d like to have you put the Church 
Committee in its historic context, and you have four 
minutes.” I am an academic, and academics speak in 
50- minute time slots, at the least. In four minutes, I 
couldn’t even read two pages of Loch Johnson’s excel-
lent history of the Church Committee. 
On September 11, 2001, I was stunned, numbed, 
and bewildered by the events. Then I began to worry 
that we might compound the tragedy in an effort to 
place blame for the attack by blaming Senator Frank 
Church for his work in the mid 1970s. Some said 
Church was to blame for the failures of the intelli-
gence community prior to 9/11. Among the critics 
was Senator James Baker, the Wall Street Journal, and 
novelist Tom Clancy, who said, and I quote: “The CIA 
was gutted by people on the political left. As an indi-
rect result of that, we have lost 5000 citizens,” a very 
serious charge. 
I want to step back initially, given the scapegoat-
ing, and look at why those investigations occurred in 
the mid-1970s. Very quickly, I want to just tick off 
some things that were happening:
1) The impact of the Watergate scandals. They 
revealed increasingly staggering kinds of infor-
mation on levels of corruption and conspiracy 
that Americans simply had not previously con-
ceived of;
2) Reports that the CIA had conducted a massive 
domestic spying campaign against U.S. citizens;
3) The Vietnam War, which had raised questions 
about the pursuit of a foreign policy based in 
secrecy, lies, and deception;
4) A growing concern in the country about the need 
to rein in what was increasingly called “the impe-
rial presidency”;
5) The recent findings of a subcommittee that 
Senator Church chaired regarding the conduct 
of multi-national corporations abroad. That 
subcommittee had discovered recently and shock-
ingly that the CIA had conspired with a huge 
corporation, ITT, to block the election of Chilean 
President Salvador Allende and, failing that objec-
tive, to de-stabilize and topple that legally-elected 
government.
 
It was against the backdrop of those develop-
ments that, early in 1975, the U.S. Senate, in a big vote 
(82-4), moved to establish that Select Committee on 
Intelligence Activities. It was supposed to operate for 
about nine months. It operated for a bit longer than that, 
as it turned out. Church was Chairman, of course. Ten 
senators were appointed, including Senator Mondale, 
and it was an ideologically balanced committee. The 
hearings lasted until December of 1975, and in the 
spring of 1976, a seven-volume report was published. 
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Newsweek described the report as “probably the 
most comprehensive and thoughtfully critical study 
yet made of the shadowy world of U.S. intelligence.” 
According to the Washington Post columnist Mary 
McGrory, “The Committee turned up some maggoty 
horrors,” what the New York Times viewed as “inex-
cusable products of an amoral secret bureaucracy that 
endangered democratic ideals, freedom, and a govern-
ment of laws.” Again, very compelling assessments of 
the Church Committee findings. 
Now controversy did surround the committee 
from the very moment it started and, of course, its 
findings. First of all was the issue of Frank Church 
himself. Critics claimed that his presidential ambi-
tions compromised the investigations. Another charge 
was summed up in a newspaper headline that said, 
“Senator Church Aids Reds.” Keep in mind, that 
was a cold war setting. President Ford, Vice President 
Rockefeller, Secretary of State Kissinger — all joined 
in that particular chorus, I might add. 
A quite different complaint came, though, from 
investigative journalists, such as Seymour Hersh and 
some staffers of the Intelligence Committee them-
selves. Their point was that the committee had veered 
down the most sensational paths and, by doing so, had 
been diverted from examining, as they saw it, more 
systemic issues regarding government and the intelli-
gence community. 
Early in the investigations, for example, Church 
received information about a CIA internal study, “the 
family jewels” as it was known. That study had some 
searing kinds of information and revelations, showing 
that, in fact, the U.S. government had plotted assas-
sinations of foreign leaders. Some staffers at the time 
urged Senator Church not to focus on those revela-
tions. They said this would lead the committee into 
a briar patch and turn the investigation into a kind 
of media circus. Church, though, believed he had no 
choice and that not to go into that briar patch would 
be a big mistake. 
Church also drew fire by raising the possibil-
ity that the CIA had been operating, in his words, 
like a “rogue elephant.” To critics, this suggested that 
this was an aberration in terms of legal conduct and 
not something that was more deeply involved in the 
processes of the whole intelligence community and 
the government. So a political storm enveloped the 
Church Committee from the outset and right on 
through. As we can see from the post 9/11 search for 
scapegoats, that particular controversy continues with 
the targeting, in this case, of Frank Church as the per-
son responsible for what happened on 9/11.
Such attacks don’t take into account why that 
committee came into being in the first place. That’s 
why I spent some time talking about the setting. There 
was an 82-4 vote to set up the committee to investigate 
some real problems in the intelligence-gathering com-
munity. The criticism ignored the accomplishments of 
the committee and its findings. Several people on the 
panel are going to talk in more detail about those. 
Most important, regarding the current situation, 
at the heart of Senator Church’s concerns were issues 
of government accountability and the perils of secrecy 
in a free society. These issues involve the sanctity of the 
legal and the political processes in a democracy and 
the idea that, under the U.S. Constitution, no one — 
I mean no one — is supposed to act outside the law, 
whether it’s under the rubric of national security or 
anything else. Church’s understanding of these issues 
bears directly on the topic that we’re looking at today. 
I thought I would take a little bit of time from 
Steve Emerson, who is not here, so I am over my 
four minutes. Time and again, Frank Church warned 
about the dangers and ironies of destroying basic free-
doms in order to save them. He noted that totalitar-
ian governments hide behind a veil of secrecy, but our 
society, Church said proudly, has drawn its inspiration 
from the old Biblical injunction, “Ye shall know the 
truth, and the truth shall make you free.”
In Church’s opinion, democracy depends upon 
a well-informed electorate. In that context, efforts to 
hide governmental efforts under cloaks of misinforma-
tion, intimidation, or the denial of civil liberties even-
tually subvert the very system they are allegedly pro-
tecting. The United States should not, Church argued, 
create a security system that was, in his words, “a mere 
image of the evil it is designed to combat.” Church’s 
words, of course, came during the cold war when 
Americans saw communism as the central threat. 
The Senator was well aware of that threat, and 
he advised Americans to reject the idea that since the 
Soviets do it, we must do it, too. Church often drew 
the analogy, a painful one, about Vietnam, when an 
officer said they had just burned the village in order 
to save it. Church made the point again and again 
that we have to be very careful in terms of protecting 
our own security and our own country that we don’t 
destroy it in order to save it. 
 Thank you. 
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PATRICK SHEA: Our next speaker is Mark 
Gitenstein. He is a partner at the law firm of Mayer 
& Brown in Washington, D.C. On the Intelligence 
Committee, there were 140 staff people, and my job 
was to be the fire person — some people said I was 
the fire hydrant — but there were a few people — and 
Mark was one of them — on whom you could always 
rely to give you very straight answers to often very com-
plicated situations. He went on to be, first, the minor-
ity counsel and then the Chief Counsel for the Senate 
Judiciary Committee and has had a distinguished legal 
career with a particular focus on civil liberties. 
MARK GITENSTEIN: Thank you, Pat. What 
I’ll proceed to do here is summarize this thousand 
pages in three minutes. The few little bullets I want to 
give you now I first gave to then - Senator Mondale, 
our member, in his Capitol hideaway, and I think he 
was a little surprised. 
Mike Epstein, a dear friend who unfortunately 
has passed away, and I summarized these facts along 
with John Elliff, another staffer who worked with me. 
He said, “You must present this to the Committee.” 
I don’t know if you remember this, Pat. It’s related 
in Loch’s story. Former Senator Phil Hart was there. 
I think he was so stunned with the result, he extem-
poraneously said, “You know, my kids used to tell me 
that this was happening — they are anti-war kids — 
and I never believed them.” 
Let me give you these facts very quickly. Number 
one: Between 1956 and 1971, the FBI engaged in a 
program called “Cointelpro,” in which they directed 
over 2000 actions against basically domestic politi-
cal groups like the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference, the direct purpose of which was to dis-
rupt their activities in seeking civil rights and in anti-
war activities. 
Number two: One particularly heinous example 
of that is what was done to Dr. Martin Luther King, 
in which he was covertly and illegally wiretapped from 
1963 to 1968. The contents of those wiretaps were 
then used not only to discredit him with the national 
media and the Congress but to be given covertly to his 
wife in an effort to force a divorce and, quite explicitly, 
to get him to commit suicide. 
Number three: The third item was a covert 
action against the Black Panthers, which, as some of 
you may remember, was a civil rights group. The pur-
pose there was basically to encourage gang violence 
within the Black Panther party so that they would 
kill each other.
Number four: The fourth example was an exten-
sive use of foreign intelligence informants. Indeed, it 
was our finding that in fiscal 1976, the FBI had twice 
as many domestic intelligence informants as they did 
organized crime informants. 
Number five: The fifth example is warrantless 
electronic surveillance, which went on basically on 
the signature of the director of the FBI until 1972, 
when it was prohibited by a Supreme Court decision 
known as the Keith case. As we were investigating in 
the foreign intelligence area, it was continuing basi-
cally unabated. 
Number six: The sixth example is warrantless 
entry, what was known colloquially as “black bag 
jobs,” which was basically breaking and entering into 
American citizens’ houses. We found examples that 
between 1948 and 1966, there were 200 of those that 
were unrelated to planting bugs or electronic surveil-
lance, a number of them directed at American dissi-
dents like Dr. King and anti-war dissidents.
Number seven: A seventh example is that between 
1940 and 1973, the FBI and the CIA opened approx-
imately several hundred thousand pieces of first-class 
mail of American citizens. 
Number eight: The eighth example was that the 
CIA engaged in a program between 1967 and 1974, 
directed at American anti-war activists and involving 
thousands of them, probably in direct contravention 
of the 1947 National Security Act.
Number Nine: The ninth example is that the 
National Security Agency, between 1945 and 1975, 
intercepted the international communications of 
thousands of American citizens by a watch list. The 
watch list contained “individuals whose activities may 
result in civil disobedience.”
So that’s what we found in the 70’s, and Senator 
Mondale did an excellent job of laying out this infor-
mation in the hearings with greater detail and greater 
eloquence than I can. Let me just say a thing or two, 
so I can stick to my four minutes, Pat.
The reforms that grew out of the Church 
Committee work:
First, we established a structure for permanent 
oversight of the intelligence community. That is still 
in force. Second, Attorney General Levy, after some 
polite and some impolite conversations with Senator 
Mondale, established the Levy guidelines on domestic 
intelligence, which endure to this day. 
Third: I don’t know whether the Senator remem-
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bers this, but he and I testified before the Senate 
Judiciary, together with David Aaron, on the need to 
establish a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the 
so-called FISA statute, which also endures to this day. 
I would make the case that those three legs of the stool 
still exist. None of the abuses that we talk about today 
could really occur today if they are honestly enforced. 
Notwithstanding what Senator Gorton said, I think 
a good and aggressive oversight committee can make 
that system work. 
What is interesting about this period is, despite 
what the Wall Street Journal and others said about 
how the Church Committee reforms caused all this, 
after everything was said and done, nothing was really 
changed as to the core legs that I’ve described. Those 
structures still exist. The Patriot Act basically nib-
bled at the edges. That is not to say that there are not 
some problems, especially with the next version of the 
Patriot Act, but we’ll get into that later. 
My bottom line is that I believe, as Senator 
Gorton suggested, the problems that we have post-
9/11 with the FBI and the CIA are structural prob-
lems within those agencies. We’re going to have to deal 
with them, but they probably have little or nothing to 
do with the Church Committee reforms. We can talk 
more about that later. 
SHEA: Thank you, Mark. Loch Johnson is a 
professor at the University of Georgia. He has writ-
ten extensively on the intelligence community and 
the activities there. It was interesting that, as we went 
through the process of setting the agendas for the dif-
ferent public hearings and eventually the reports, one 
of my jobs was to inform the different members of the 
committee about the identity of the witnesses and the 
responsible staff person. When Loch’s name came up, 
great attention was paid because good quality always 
came. With most of the staff, that was certainly true, 
but there were a few notable exceptions. That always 
caused us some heartburn. But Loch was a great staff-
person. Professor Johnson, take it away.
LOCH JOHNSON: Thank you very much, Pat. 
How wonderful to be in Boise, one of the great places 
in the United States. I’ve missed it very much, and it’s 
good to be back. 
Pat asked me a couple of days ago what we were 
about and to do so within the famous four-minute 
rule. We were about helping to restore the government 
of the United State to its founding principles. Frank 
Church was a dedicated student and articulate propo-
nent of these principles. He well understood a com-
ment from James Madison that has been etched into 
the wall of the Library of Congress: “Power lodged, as 
it must be, in human hands is ever liable to abuse.”
The gift of the founders, Frank Church said, lies 
in the safeguards they gave this nation to prevent the 
abuse of power. Senator Church, Senator Mondale, 
and others on the Church Committee had witnessed 
the erosion of these principles and these safeguards, 
the mendacity of the executive branch during the war 
in Vietnam, and the Watergate cover up. Newspaper 
reports on CIA spying at home seemed to be the final 
straw. Something had to be done, and for sixteen 
months in 1975-76, the Church Committee took up 
that challenge. 
As you’ve heard, what the committee found was a 
Pandora’s box of horrors: spying at home by the very 
agencies created to protect us, not only by the CIA but 
by a host of military intelligence agencies as well; secret 
harassment by the FBI against Vietnam war dissenters 
and civil rights activists; assassination plots against for-
eign leaders; and efforts to topple the democratically 
elected leader of Chile. None of this information came 
easily. It had to be fought for, and Mr. Church and Mr. 
Mondale carried the banner into that battle. 
Eventually the committee was able to establish 
genuine accountability through the creation of a new 
oversight committee. Congress would be a co-equal to 
the executive branch when it came to intelligence. The 
CIA would become a part of the American govern-
ment with all of its checks and balances. The commit-
tee set guidelines for the FBI and the CIA and struck 
a much better balance between liberty and security. 
Above all, the Church Committee created a new atti-
tude in Washington. We would have security, yes, 
but we would have it under the rule of law and with 
accountability. 
Did it weaken our intelligence agencies? Absolutely 
not, no more than cleaning out some pockets of cor-
ruption in a police department would weaken the 
department. It strengthened the intelligence commu-
nity. If you dig into the antecedents for 9/11, you’ll 
find it has a lot more to do with our failure to focus on 
the Middle East and South Asia during the Cold War, 
our lack of human intelligence in that area, and a lot 
of much more complicated matters than the likes of 
Tom Clancy either admit or are aware of. 
We did not create a perfect system. After all, Iran-
Contra came in the 80’s. But the Church Committee 
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took a giant stride forward, it took a strong stand on 
behalf of civil liberties, and it set statutory boundaries 
for intelligence operations. It established rigorous over-
sight — not the “overlook” we had experienced before. 
These reforms have stood the test of time. There has 
been a lot of research on these matters since 1976 — a 
couple of books even this year. They reinforce and add 
to the Church Committee findings but don’t challenge 
them in any serious way or change them. 
I just came from a conference in Norway where 
people, including parliamentarians and others, from 
all over the world gathered to talk about intelligence 
oversight. What everyone was talking about was the 
Church Committee as a model of what they hoped to 
adopt for their own countries. 
Robert Gates, a director of the CIA appointed 
by the first President Bush, summed up quite well 
the value of the approach taken by the Church 
Committee. I am reading from his recent memoir:
“Some awfully crazy schemes might well 
have been approved had everyone present not 
known and expected hard questions, debate, 
and criticism from the Hill. And when, on a 
few occasions, Congress was kept in the dark and 
such schemes did proceed, it was nearly always to 
the lasting regret of the presidents involved.”
 
That can be said more succinctly. The purpose 
of accountability is to try to prevent the executive 
branch from doing something stupid. That remains 
a worthy goal. 
SHEA: Thank you, Loch. George Lardner has 
been with the Washington Post since 1963. He has 
written several interesting and revealing news arti-
cles on the committee. One of my other jobs was to 
attempt to be the plumber, to figure out where the 
leak had come from, and then to inform the commit-
tee. There were several reporters in Washington with 
whom it was like a cat-and- mouse game. I was always 
the mouse getting pounced upon, but for a reporter 
you could go to, talk with, and know he would never 
reveal sources or method, George Lardner was the 
guy. The Washington press corps was well served and 
is well served by him. So George, give us a sense of 
where the press was.
GEORGE LARDNER: Well, I was minding my 
own business, covering the Watergate trial and the 
windup of it when Sy Hersh broke his great story in 
the New York Times about domestic spying and the 
CIA. So the trial ended, and the next day I was told, 
“Get busy.” So I covered the investigations of the CIA 
and the FBI and other government gumshoes in the 
70’s and for some years thereafter. 
I have what may be a contrarian view of them. 
They were a great revelation of government lawless-
ness, but they were also a failure, a failure that was not 
appreciated then and, I’m afraid, is not appreciated 
now. The investigators, as Loch Johnson has pointed 
out, were quite properly shocked at the abuses they 
discovered. 
What they passed over too lightly, I think, was the 
fact that excesses in the name of national security are 
as old and ingrained as the republic itself. They weren’t 
going to be cured by the creation of Congressional 
committees that inevitably come to look and think 
like the people they are supposed to regulate. What 
was needed was new law, even a charter for the intelli-
gence community. We didn’t get it. What we got were 
bits and pieces. 
Let me emphasize first that Frank Church should 
be the last person to blame for this unfortunate out-
come. I personally think he could have been president 
if he had not stuck with the investigation for so long. 
Once he finally got in the race, late in 1976, he beat 
the pants off Jimmy Carter every time they had a face-
off, but it was too late. He lost, and I think the nation 
was a loser, too. Instead of winning his party’s nomina-
tion, Church was vilified again and again by the whin-
ing intelligence community that still likes to attribute 
their failures to him while ignoring their own incom-
petence and by complaining endlessly about the few 
and too feeble restrictions that have been put upon it. 
The FISA Act was mentioned. Not once has a 
judge denied a warrant under the FISA law, except 
maybe once. 
But back to the investigation. It would be a mis-
take to think they were supported by a sustained 
nationwide burst of indignation at the disclosures 
of domestic spying by the CIA and lawlessness by 
the FBI. The crusade was much more tenuous, con-
fined in large measure to that minority in official 
Washington and around the country that is genuinely 
dedicated to civil liberties. 
The tensions between those advocates of liberty 
and the advocates of order and secrecy have always 
been with us. To those who wrote the Constitution — 
in secrecy, remember — a strong central government 
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was the overriding goal. They saw no need for a Bill 
of Rights until it became plain they would not have a 
constitution without one. 
Frontiersmen and rural folk had a different view. 
To them, the Revolution was or should have been a 
victory for liberty, freedom from far-away rules and 
onerous taxes, no matter whether they were imposed 
in London or in Philadelphia. The huge forces dis-
patched, for example, to crush the Whiskey Rebellion 
and an even milder uprising a few years later ham-
mered them into submission. So did the Alien and 
Sedition Acts, which purported to counter “pro-
French subversion” and which made it a crime to criti-
cize the president. 
Those salute-the-flag tendencies were in remis-
sion when the investigations of 1975 and 76 came 
into play, but careful handling was still required. What 
the Church Committee ignored was the importance 
of the educational function, the need for lights, cam-
era, action day after day until the lessons were driven 
home. Some Senate hearings were held in public, but 
they had the flavor of hastily-organized afterthoughts. 
Decisions about what incriminating documents 
would be made public were made at the last minute. 
The records were excessively censored. In the end, the 
investigators were left with a tangle of loose ends. 
The Senate Committee was blunt enough about 
the illegalities and outrages of the FBI, but it was 
almost sycophantic in some of its assessments of the 
CIA and the presidential involvement in some of 
those assassination attempts. Even the Rockefeller 
Commission, the executive branch’s investigator, had 
flatly branded aspects of the CIA’s domestic spy work 
“unlawful and improper.” Not once did a Senate staff 
report go that far, instead calling it “a step toward the 
danger” of a domestic secret police. 
So what do we have now? What we had in the 
mid-70s was a normal Constitution, operative in 
days of a strong desire for peace and shock over the 
Watergate scandals. What we have now is what histo-
rian Robert Higgs has called “the Crisis Constitution,” 
which always overrides the normal Constitution in 
times of emergency, making the government’s exer-
cise of power far more important than the protection 
of individual rights. And all this under a suffocating 
cloud of secrecy that reaches now into every corner of 
the government. 
We’re almost back, I’m afraid, to the early days 
when excesses in the name of national security became 
as American as apple pie, when immigrants were 
suspect, and when criticisms of the president were 
denounced as acts of disloyalty. 
We are in trouble.
Thank you. 
SHEA: What I’d like to do now is have some ques-
tions among the panelists. The question I would throw 
out, just at the beginning: If in 1976, as we were wrap-
ping up the final report, Senator Church or Senator 
Tower had called the staff together and said, in the 
Utah tradition, “I’ve had a thought about the future, 
and I’m going to tell you that the staff director of the 
Intelligence Committee is going to become the director 
of the CIA,” what would your reaction have been?
LARDNER: Outrage. You’re referring to George 
Tenet. I think that would have been unacceptable. 
It wouldn’t have been done because the staff of the 
Church Committee was much more bent on curing 
the excesses in those agencies and never would have 
had a chance. The appointment of Tenet goes to the 
point I was making. The committees come to look 
and think too much like the people they are regulating 
over a few years passage of time.
JOHNSON: I would disagree markedly on that 
point. I think it’s very healthy to have someone from 
Capitol Hill who understands the accountability pro-
cedure to be at the top of the intelligence community 
and bring that understanding to those thirteen agen-
cies. One of the biggest problems we have had in the 
past is that the people in the intelligence community 
think that Congress is an alien entity and don’t under-
stand what its purpose really is. They would like to see 
it float off down the Potomac River into the Atlantic 
Ocean, never to be seen again. So it’s good to have 
someone from the Hill there. 
LARDNER: Tenet, for example, is the one who 
recently blocked, after a couple of years of success, the 
publication of the intelligence budget in total and in 
some component parts. He’s gone over.
GITENSTEIN: I’m afraid I’m more in the Loch 
Johnson school on this one. I would like to use this as 
an opportunity to respond to one thing George said 
about FISA. I think it illustrates a larger point. 
I’m not surprised that the court has not denied a 
single FISA warrant, but it could have something to do 
with the fact that the FBI and the Justice Department 
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don’t take cases to that court that wouldn’t be 
approved. I can tell you that I am absolutely dead cer-
tain that warrantless surveillance of Dr. Martin Luther 
King would not take place under this FISA court. 
As an example of why it’s important: You said that 
part of the purpose of this committee was to educate 
the American people. I certainly agree, and I think we 
did a good job of that in terms of the FBI. Incidentally, 
this whole report, which I summarized, was public. 
The second point is that another function of the 
Committee was to educate the intelligence agencies. 
Barbara Bannock and I were interviewing the deputy 
chief of the intelligence section of the FBI about the 
King investigation. About 2/3 of the way through the 
interview, after he had told me about trying to get 
Dr. King to commit suicide and what the purpose 
was and showing me a bunch of documents, I asked, 
“Did it ever cross your mind that this might violate 
the First Amendment of the Constitution?” At that 
point, he asked me what the First Amendment of the 
Constitution was. Now, I don’t think that would hap-
pen in today’s world. Indeed at that point, we warned 
him of his rights because clearly the guy did not know 
that he was violating the law, the civil rights of Dr. 
King. He really didn’t understand that. That is a big 
change from 25 years ago.
 One of the arguments that I’m sure Senator 
Gorton is going to hear is not so much that any partic-
ular rule affected FBI agents but that they were scared 
to do things because they thought it might be a viola-
tion. I think there is some truth to that. I don’t think 
there was any particular provision of the Levy guide-
lines that restricted them, but they were anxious. A lot 
of us believe that’s healthy. A certain amount of skepti-
cism is healthy; too much may be dangerous. We saw 
that in the Phoenix example. 
Anyway, I would fundamentally disagree with 
George’s point about that. 
ASHBY: It’s always important to have people 
involved on down the line after an investigation, 
people informed about the issue, people who might 
have been involved in pursuing the information. The 
problem historically has been that those various com-
mittees or commissions or bureaus that have been set 
up have eventually, in effect, become then part of the 
whole system that they are supposed to be surveying 
and watching. The watchdogs become the lap dogs, 
as someone has put it. I think that becomes the real 
danger — the danger of being co-opted and becom-
ing part of the system, the lobbyist making the laws, 
in effect. 
GITENSTEIN: The structure of these commit-
tees is rotation. No one can stay on these committees 
more than six years. Maybe we should have greater 
rotation of the staff, but the members themselves, if 
they exercise their jurisdiction, can certainly fix that 
problem.
SHEA: But I think Senator Gorton was quite 
honest in saying that most members of the Senate 
Intelligence Committee — and I think this is true for 
the House — found that if you were actually going 
to spend the necessary time, you could not spend any 
other time. Senator Cohen is a good example of some-
one who did make that choice and obviously did a 
very good job. 
 There is another complexity I want to raise 
here. I had the fortune of serving in the Clinton 
Administration and had to go through the confirma-
tion process. So instead of being behind the Senators, 
handing them cards to ask the nominee questions, I 
was the nominee. In 1969, when I first worked on the 
Hill, there were about 2500 Senate staffers, and at the 
time of my confirmation, the number of Senate staff-
ers had grown to 11,000. So there was this constant 
barrage of information from the supposed watch dogs, 
who had become more publicity dogs than watch 
dogs. Any thoughts about what might be done to 
change that?
JOHNSON: One thing that certainly must be 
done is to increase the public’s understanding about 
the role of accountability. When most Americans think 
about the legislative process, they think about law-mak-
ing. They don’t think so much about people sitting in 
rooms, going through budgets, and holding hearings. 
This is the hard work that must be done in order to 
make sure that the laws we do have work properly. It 
doesn’t get enough credit. I’d like to see the Church 
Institute and the Andrus Center give an annual award 
to a legislator in Washington and maybe to one at the 
state level as well for doing a good job as a watch dog for 
accountability, not just passing another law. 
SHEA: Any other questions you’d like to ask each 
other before we go to the audience?
ASHBY: Senator Gorton noted the frustration 
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that he and others on the 9/11 Commission felt early 
on when the information and documents you hoped 
to get were slow in coming. I’d like to hear from those 
of you who worked on the committee and observed 
directly at the time how you felt about some of the 
things you encountered, the reluctance on the part of 
the Administration to give documents you needed, a 
kind of stonewalling that took place. Could you com-
ment a little bit on that?
GITENSTEIN: We faced exactly the same prob-
lems that Senator Gorton did, and I think Senator 
Mondale and Senator Church did a very good job of 
going public when they needed to in order to put the 
pressure on Attorney General Levy and the President 
at the time. So we got the documents; otherwise, we 
could never have told the story. This is just endemic to 
the separation of powers. 
JOHNSON: I can remember some horror stories 
about stonewalling by the Ford Administration during 
our inquiry. For instance, we had requested a number of 
key documents from the Defense Department. It took 
months, and nothing ever happened. Finally Senator 
Church weighed in, and the next day, a half-ton truck 
came over to our building, filled with documents. We 
were elated, and we spent the next several weeks going 
through them. There wasn’t a single useful document in 
the whole bunch, so I wouldn’t be too impressed by the 
two million documents you’ve received. 
By the way, it seems to me there are two keys 
for effective accountability. Number one is execu-
tive branch cooperation. The Congress only knows 
about executive branch operation to the extent 
that branch wants it to know. So we have to get the 
executive branch in the mood, unlike this current 
Administration, of comity, of sharing with Congress. 
The second ingredient is member motivation. 
Some members of these oversight committees have 
been truly dedicated to accountability, and others, 
frankly, have not. What one would like to see is more 
members of these committees putting their shoulders 
to the wheel. 
GITENSTEIN: I would add one thing, and 
I’m sure the 9/11 Commission has found this to be 
true. Documents are important, but there is nothing 
like interviews. I can remember going with Senator 
Mondale up to New Hampshire when we interviewed 
Bill Sullivan for the first time. That’s when we first 
learned about the King story. We didn’t have a single 
document at that time. In that interview, he identified 
documents that we were able to get our hands on. 
Look, I want to say something about FBI agents. 
I found them to be largely people of great integrity. 
The ones that were doing the domestic intelligence 
work were under a tremendous amount of pressure 
to do what they were told to do by the hierarchy of 
the Bureau. When you sat down with them and laid 
these issues out, they actually were quite honest with 
us about what had happened and helped us to iden-
tify documents and programs that eventually were 
revealed. I’m sure Senator Gorton will find the same 
thing in the agencies he’ll be talking to. 
SHEA: I did want to mention also that there were 
several instances when Director Colby, then the direc-
tor of the CIA, in cooperation with Senator Church, 
Senator Mondale, and others, was very thorough in 
getting CIA individuals to be helpful. 
In fact, a native of Idaho, who was the head of 
counterintelligence, Mr. Angleton, was very uncoop-
erative when it came to investigating counterintelli-
gence, and it was only with Director Colby’s interven-
tion that a modicum of information was obtained.
What I was suspicious of — and maybe it was 
simply where I was seated in the committee staff 
— was that there seemed to be at times something 
thrown over the transom at a very important time, 
something that everybody knew they would go after. It 
was almost as if there were an orchestration going on. 
That is, they knew the “family jewels,” and then you 
laid them down on the table in a poker game sort of 
way: the dart gun, the botulism to assassinate Castro. 
Indeed, in the case of Bill Sullivan, that interview 
probably wouldn’t have happened had there not been 
some agreement within the hierarchy of the bureau.
GITENSTEIN: Sullivan wasn’t even at the Bureau 
any more. We found that less to be the case at the 
Bureau than I think you did at the Agency. I found that 
when you finally confronted some of these agents with 
some of the allegations that we had, they were quite 
forthcoming. There was a different level of sophistica-
tion within the Agency, and I agree with what George 
has suggested. The CIA was much more effective at 
manipulating the oversight than the FBI was. 
SHEA: John, do you have some questioners? 
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AUDIENCE QUESTION: In regard to abu-
siveness, competence, and other things you have 
mentioned in regard to the CIA and the FBI, how would 
you gentlemen rate the National Security Agency?
LARDNER: I would rate it as the most secretive, 
and so the least known of any of the agencies. They do 
surveillance, satellites, things like that. They spend a 
huge amount of money, much more than is indicated 
in the $30 billion or so budget that the intelligence 
community is usually thought to be spending, because 
they have all these thousands of military people all 
over the world, helping their surveillance networks. 
That, I don’t think, is counted in the $30 billion.
But they can see into people’s homes from huge 
distances. One doesn’t know except for the glimpses 
we did get in the days of the 70s about what they 
could do. They raided the files or telegrams of various 
telegraph companies. They were held to account for 
that, but they escaped pretty much the review that the 
FBI and the CIA have gotten.
GITENSTEIN: My job was primarily with 
the Bureau, but my last year at the Intelligence 
Committee, I did an extensive amount of work with 
the NSA over the Panama Canal Treaty and the allega-
tions involved in the Treos brothers. We got tremen-
dous access then, but then - President Carter directed 
them to give us access. They gave us extremely 
valuable information, which was ultimately very help-
ful in getting the treaty confirmed by the Senate. 
The difficulty with oversight of NSA is that the 
disclosure of information related to NSA can truly 
jeopardize sources and methods because the disclosure 
of a bit of sentence that actually could be totally legiti-
mate could disclose to the foreign power exactly what 
link you’ve intercepted and will do tremendous dam-
age to our national security. So it’s a very difficult thing 
to do. I found NSA, in my years in that particular epi-
sode, quite helpful. What they did with the intercepts 
of foreign U.S. citizens was bad, but the FISA statute 
does basically regulate that. That is subject to federal 
statutory control, which did not exist at the time. 
JOHNSON: I think you asked for an evalua-
tion of NSA, and I would say that signals intelligence, 
which it carries out, is extremely important to this 
nation’s safety. Intercepting what our enemies are say-
ing obviously can be very valuable. The NSA has three 
major problems though. Processing, processing, and 
processing. That is to say, they gather so much infor-
mation that it is overwhelming, and they have to sort 
through it and pick out what’s really important. 
 On September 10, 2001, they intercepted a 
message from two al-Qaida operatives that said, 
“Tomorrow is zero hour.” That message was translated 
on September 12. Getting the right information, get-
ting it translated, and acting upon it is extremely diffi-
cult but so important, and NSA plays a major role.
AUDIENCE QUESTION: I’d like to ask the 
panelists how they believe the things that were put 
into place 28 years ago to regulate the intelligence 
community have been affected by the Patriot Act that 
was passed and the current proposed Patriot Act.
LARDNER: I think that new abuses have come 
up that weren’t contemplated or dealt with 28 years 
ago. I’m not talking about the Patriot Act in particu-
lar. For example, the FBI has now developed a habit 
of designating “persons of interest” and surveilling 
them, hounding them. What is that? What law says 
you can be a “person of interest” and then surveilled 
day and night? 
Then we have the secret detentions of Muslim 
people without any warrants, without any notice. 
About a year ago, I came across some FBI affidavits 
that justified holding people in detention because they 
were “persons of interest.” The Bureau just held them 
and held them until they were completely, 100% satis-
fied that they had committed no crime. The burden of 
proof has been completely turned upside down.
ASHBY: I think we may be watching an histori-
cal maxim working out. Way back in 1917, a writer 
named Randolph Bourn said, “War is the health of the 
state.” I think again and again, we’ve seen examples of 
that. In the name of security, which is understandable, 
there is a sense that we have to protect ourselves almost 
at all costs. Almost invariably, even if the laws are in 
place and protections are in place to protect civil lib-
erties, the tendency is to give ground. Beyond that, if 
you then criticize the giving of ground, you, yourself, 
are labeled as disloyal.
Unfortunately, we’ve seen that all too recently. Just 
a few weeks ago, here in Boise, the Attorney General 
implied that the people who would question the 
Patriot Act basically were helping the enemy. That’s 
where you get this vicious cycle underway, so even if 
the laws are in effect and the protections are in effect, 
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I see slippage. I worry, frankly, about Patriot I and 
Patriot II even more.
GITENSTEIN: I was consulted to some extent 
on the drafting of Patriot I. I was troubled by some of 
the provisions, but for the most part, not terribly trou-
bled by the Act that was finally passed. I am troubled a 
considerable amount by the second version, Patriot II, 
especially the administrative subpoena section. 
I think Senator Gorton touched on this. The 
problem that we’re facing now is essentially the same 
problem we faced after Pearl Harbor. We have bits and 
pieces of information all over the government, and we 
don’t know how to get our hands on it at the right 
moment. That’s really why they created the CIA. 
With computers, we have tremendous technologi-
cal capability to analyze enormous amounts of infor-
mation very quickly. I think what you’re seeing in 
Patriot II and the dilemma that the 9/11 Commission 
and policy makers generally are facing is the notion 
of “data mining.” We have the technological capabil-
ity now to gather tons of information and bring it to 
policy makers and enforcement people very rapidly. 
It also requires us to gather a lot of personal infor-
mation about people. You’re seeing this in the airlines 
now with the Caps I and II Project, which has got-
ten some notoriety. When I flew out here to Boise, I 
wanted to know that the guy sitting next to me really 
was the guy he said he was. I’d just as soon land at the 
airport instead of flying into the hotel. So I think there 
is some legitimacy in gathering that data and sharing it 
with the right people. 
The problem that Patriot Act II will face — and I 
predict that you, Senator Gorton, will face — is: How 
do you balance that? How do you allow that informa-
tion to be gathered and analyzed? Huge databases are 
now housed in some private corporations, and they 
want to share them with the Bureau. The Bureau and 
the Agency want to have access to that information. 
How do you share that information, some of which 
is public, and some of which is not? How do you get 
it to the right policy makers and get it to them on 
September 9th instead of September 12th? That is 
very, very difficult. 
It’s easy for us, as civil libertarians, to say none of 
that should happen, but we are going to have to face 
that problem both at the borders and at the airports. 
SHEA: I tell the story that when I was at the 
BLM, we faced a very serious problem. BLM had 
bought analog radios, and the Forest Service had 
bought digital radios. When they showed up at the 
same fire, they couldn’t communicate unless they 
pulled out a cell phone and talked to one another. 
Oftentimes in Washington, the jurisdictional battles 
get in the way of doing the data mining. The data is 
there, but there are such intense rivalries between dif-
ferent agencies of government that we, as a society, fall 
victim to those jurisdictional jealousies. Half of what 
government does — and this is where Vice President 
Mondale was so effective — is finding ways of getting 
those jurisdictional disputes not to become so intense 
that they can’t operate. 
GITENSTEIN: Pat, some of those issues are 
jurisdictional, and some relate to civil liberties. We 
don’t have the FBI and the CIA seamlessly sharing 
data because one is an enforcement agency and one is 
an intelligence agency.
SHEA: I do think the point, though, about not 
having a charter is important because that debate 
went on and on. In my judgment, the attention of 
the American public and therefore their tolerance for 
change diminished over time, and there were people 
in those respective jurisdictions — both FBI and CIA 
— who did not want a charter and knew that time 
was on their side. Some of the problems we’ve been 
discussing today would have been avoided had there 
been a charter. 
AUDIENCE QUESTION: I have a question on 
the federal Privacy Act and the Freedom of Information 
Act. In 1978, I had the Navy Investigation Desk, and 
we had to respond to public requests on air crashes, 
deaths, fires, explosion, but we also had to first screen 
and redact not only Social Security numbers but 
unduly sensitive matters, which, under the Privacy 
Act, should not be released. As we cope with the ter-
rorism, do any of you foresee a legislative contraction 
of the Freedom of Information Act and possibly even 
a legislative expansion of the Privacy Act?
LARDNER: The Act has already been retracted 
legislatively and even more in the courts. For exam-
ple, I think in the Homeland Security Act, there is a 
provision for “sensitive but unclassified information” 
— whatever the hell that means — that can be with-
held. There is a also a provision for “critical infrastruc-
ture information” that is voluntarily supplied by pri-
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vate industry — let’s say plans for a power plant. Well, 
that could be used by a terrorist to plant a bomb there. 
It could also be kept secret because the power plant 
wasn’t built right, and nobody can get to it. Those 
problems, laws, and administrative regulations are 
causing increasing difficulties. 
The FBI is supposed to be a law enforcement 
agency, but it is a law breaker when it comes to the 
Freedom of Information. I speak personally from that. 
Twelve years ago, I asked for information on a bunch 
of top hoodlums. The FBI had a “Top Hoodlum 
Program” in the 1950s when Hoover was pretending 
that there was no Mafia. I thought it would be inter-
esting to get those, and I got about eleven volumes, 
hugely redacted, after eleven years. I am suing them 
now. They even took out the names of gangsters who, 
according to the very documents, were being pros-
ecuted, and there were public indictments against 
them. It’s mind-boggling.
SHEA: I’d like to ask each of you to give a one-
minute summary. Just to start it off, the one thing 
I would observe is that oftentimes on the Church 
Committee, we seemed to go from process, which I 
think we were very good at, to personalities because 
the media could cover the personality and tell the pub-
lic the story, based on a face, based on an individual, 
when in fact the more important systemic question 
related to process. At times, particularly under the 
pressure of deadlines at the end, we slipped into the 
personality mode more than the process mode.
 Loch?
JOHNSON: I would say that from 1789 until 
1974, we were living in the Dark Ages when it came to 
intelligence. Intelligence was considered exceptional. 
It would not be a part of the government. The pro-
grams were too sensitive for legislators to be involved 
with. I think the Church Committee brought these 
secret agencies more into the open, at the same time 
protecting the necessary secrecy that we had to have. 
I think George [Lardner] is exactly right: It has 
been an imperfect system, and we do need an intel-
ligence charter. I think Senator Gorton is right: The 
committees can be frustrating and boring, and some-
times they don’t work the way we, back in 1975, had 
hoped. But keep in mind that this remains the dif-
ference between night and day. We have genuine 
accountability in the United States, and it’s very rare 
around the world.
LARDNER: That was one of the problems that Pat 
has pointed out. With all the meat that you got – the 
dart guns, the botulism, and all that — we tend to for-
get that there was another committee over in the House 
that did try to get into process. I think the CIA was 
much more frightened about that and did a hatchet job 
on the Pike Committee. Dan Schorer’s great discovery 
of that report and his publication of it after the House 
voted to suppress it meant that most of us have never 
seen that report. You can’t get it at a government book-
store. That committee was genuinely trying but didn’t 
have as good a staff to get into process.
GITENSTEIN: The most disturbing thing I 
have heard today — and I think it was honest, and it 
does genuinely bother me — is what Senator Gorton 
said about the ineffectiveness of oversight. I think the 
role of conferences like this and the media generally, 
George, is to help the American people understand 
what the consequences of bad oversight are. That’s 
partially a political problem. People on the Hill need 
to be more aggressive in making this a political issue. 
Patriot One sunsets in December of 2005, so that’s 
an opportunity for a genuine debate, and I hope we’ll 
have a good, solid debate before then about this issue. 
One issue that is clearly going to come to the fore-
front is the controversy over libraries that we’ve heard 
a lot about. People on the Hill — a lot of Republicans, 
too — are trying to press the Justice Department, the 
Bureau, and the CIA to disclose more information on 
various provisions, how often they are being used. I 
hope the press will do the same. That’s a form of over-
sight that has a very positive effect on the agencies 
themselves. It deters them from abusing the provisions 
because they are literally held accountable because they 
have to disclose the numbers. That’s very valuable. 
I worked a little bit on the FBI Charter. I found 
that reducing all this to statutory language became a 
political nightmare. It is not a productive area, at least 
in this environment. I think we’re going to have to 
deal with pieces and parts of this, like the FISA statute. 
One thing that has a huge impact is disclosure itself 
and greater accountability for the number of times 
and the circumstances in which these provisions are 
being used.
One last point: I’ll bet you a lot of what is done 
behind closed doors could be disclosed. The Church 
Committee did closed-door hearings, then redacted 
the really sensitive stuff, and disclosed them. You see 
very little of that now in the oversight committees. 
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That would be a productive thing. I hope the 9/11 
Commission could recommend that.
ASHBY: Ideally, as Senator Gorton said this 
morning, we should have liberty and security. There 
shouldn’t be those tensions, but in fact, historically, 
there have been those tensions, again and again. 
Civil War, World War I, World War II, Cold War. 
Invariably there have been conflicts between, on the 
one hand, the quest for security and, on the other, the 
need to protect First Amendment freedoms. It’s part of 
the historical animal. It was in that context that Frank 
Church’s committee operated.
Frank Church understood the importance of 
intelligence. Here was someone who had been an 
intelligence officer in World War II, serving in south-
east Asia, so he recognized that it is not a perfect world, 
and you have to have information on your enemy. 
At the same time, here is why the Church 
Committee became so important. A kind of paradigm 
shift took place, at least for a brief moment, from the 
old idea — don’t ask what these various agencies are 
doing — to one in which suddenly the focus, the tilt 
at least, was more toward openness, toward trying to 
find out what in fact we’re doing to protect ourselves.
It was a remarkable moment, a kind of opening 
of a window. What bothers me is that under the pres-
sures of what is happening now, we may start clos-
ing that window more and more. What the Church 
Committee tried to do was to say, yes, we have to have 
these processes, but let’s make sure those processes 
work around straight corners. We don’t cut corners, 
and you get back to the matter of accountability. Who 
is doing what and when? It’s a tough question to deal 
with, but we have to deal with it, we have to be aware 
of the dangers of the ways in which we protect our 
security, ways that can, in fact, threaten the very things 
we are trying to defend. 
AUDIENCE QUESTION: I would like to ask 
what the role of the media is in regard to this ques-
tion. I’m particularly concerned because so many peo-
ple these days don’t even take the newspaper. Could 
you explain what you think the media’s role is at this 
point. Does it make any difference whether it is the 
electronic or the print media in general?
LARDNER: It shouldn’t, but if you’re on TV, it’s 
easier to get your phone calls answered. I don’t think 
there is any basic difference in what the media is all 
about. In terms of government, it’s holding govern-
ment accountable and trying to see how power is 
exercised, whether it’s being exercised well or being 
abused. It’s as simple as that. That’s the role of the 
media in reporting on any segment of society: govern-
ments, non-profits, institutions, corporations. That’s 
its basic job, and it will never change. 
SHEA: I’ve spent 20 years defending the media, 
but with the consolidation of the media, where indi-
vidual companies now own 600 radio stations and 
potentially will be owning television and newspapers 
in the same market, we are faced with a real dilemma. 
Chris Matthews of “Hard Ball” fame started at Capitol 
Hill the same time I did. We were house mates for a 
short time, and he, as my own 18-year-old son says, 
has become a specialist at interrupting people. Chris is 
a very bright guy and well- intentioned, but the media 
has moved, in many instances, to rating raves rather 
than substantive news. 
It also reflects a bit of the change in the environ-
ment in Washington. Senator Gorton, Vice President 
Mondale, and Governor Andrus are certainly experts 
in this area and saw a Washington that, in my judg-
ment, was much more civil. People could disagree but 
still sit down and have lunch or dinner together or 
share some thoughts. 
I used to go on the overseas trips because the 
Foreign Relations Committee had jurisdiction on 
that, and many times, I saw senators with exactly 
opposite political views being able to share five days 
or a week and come to have better understanding of 
each other. There was a holistic view of the Senate or 
the body politic at Capitol Hill that they needed to 
work out. We’re now into these five-minute, hard-hit-
ting political advertisements that don’t allow serious 
people to come up with policy positions as they would 
otherwise.
The media does reflect what we as the audience 
want it to show us, so maybe we need to have orga-
nized efforts to reward quality newspapers. The Idaho 
Statesman, the Washington Post, and the New York Times 
are all good examples, but they are fewer and fewer in 
number. You have people in this White House, as you 
had in the previous White House, whose only role in 
life is to figure out how to get their person on the news 
that night with a particular message. 
GITENSTEIN: One thing about the media and 
the current environment. I can’t remember where I 
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saw the story about the abuse of the Patriot Act in 
respect to libraries, but that created a lot of energy in 
Washington. It actually resulted in a vote in the House 
of Representatives to restrict the expenditure of funds 
under the Patriot Act with respect to Section 215, 
which, in turn, prompted Attorney General Ashcroft 
to go on his grand tour of the United States to save 
the Patriot Act. The media deserves credit as does the 
natural common sense of Americans. It had a political 
impact even in this environment. The librarians them-
selves were politically active on it. 
I’m just saying let’s not give up here. I think the 
media has done a good job on the Act and needs to do 
a lot more. 
JOHNSON: I spent the last year at Oxford and 
read a lot of British newspapers. I found them rather 
disappointing because they have become advocacy 
journals. There was very little objective reporting in 
my view. I see a little of that creeping into our own 
journalism in this country. That’s a great danger. 
SHEA: Let me raise one other question, and it has 
been a pet peeve of mine: the notion of a “war on ter-
rorism” is almost an oxymoron. A war, in political the-
ory at least, is between organized states, and terrorism 
by its very nature is not an organized state. It seems to 
me that, if you look at speeches that have been given 
both on Capitol Hill and in the Administration, there 
is constant use of the war metaphor because it does 
rally popular support and a willingness to go along. 
Terrorism is, at its heart, an illegal act. They are crim-
inals, and they ought to be prosecuted as criminals, 
using a law enforcement model. 
I agree with Mark. In the FBI, the CIA, and the 
NSA, the people that were doing the operations had 
enormous intelligence and great integrity. It was gen-
erally the people above them in political positions that 
caused the abuse, or as Senator Gorton said, had not 
thought through the process, thereby creating bad 
policies. If we had used the post-9/11 environment to 
mount a truly significant and sustained international 
law enforcement activity against terrorists, would we 
be in a better position today than we are?
JOHNSON: What you say has a lot of merit to 
it, but it’s also a war in my view. When another coun-
try or group flies an airplane into your buildings, that’s 
an act of war. We have responded in that way, and I 
think we have to. In my opinion, we have gone too 
far. I really worry about predator, unmanned aerial 
vehicles going into these countries where supposedly 
there are terrorists — as happened in Yemen earlier 
this year — and firing missiles from a height of 10,000 
feet at automobiles, thinking there might be terrorists 
in those automobiles. In that particular case in Yemen, 
one of the six passengers in that automobile was an 
American citizen. When did he get his day in court? 
Where was his counsel? He was murdered by a preda-
tor, unmanned aerial vehicle. 
GITENSTEIN: I’m not terribly troubled by the 
war metaphor. We have a war on drugs, a war on crime, 
a war on energy during the Carter Administration. 
One of the things that has worked during this period 
is greater awareness on the part of the American peo-
ple of the dangers and more partnering with local law 
enforcement. In effect, it’s the citizens hardening their 
own targets, which is probably a healthy thing as long 
as it doesn’t go overboard. 
I return to the point I made earlier: We’re not cop-
ing with the difficult problems yet, which is how to bet-
ter coordinate these agencies without jeopardizing civil 
liberties. How can we better share this data — private 
data or data within these agencies — so that we find out 
things on September 9th instead of September 12th? 
Those are difficult issues that lie ahead for us, issues that 
I hope Senator Gorton’s Commission will address. 
Creating a Homeland Security Department 
doesn’t solve that problem because it doesn’t say where 
the FBI and the CIA are and how they are going to 
share data. We tried to grapple with this issue in the 
Church Committee, and we didn’t resolve that issue. 
We dealt with the Bureau, and we dealt with the CIA. 
We didn’t deal with the CIA and the Bureau.
ASHBY: You used the right word: complex-
ity. Terrorism is such an amorphous term, and you 
think of the blowing up of the Murrah Building in 
Oklahoma City. That was done by domestic terror-
ists, but it wasn’t terrorism. You can find all different 
shapes and forms, and in that sense, if you’re having a 
war against it — getting back to your point, Pat — it’s 
awfully difficult to know who is out there. 
LARDNER: I would agree with you. The “war” 
is against whom? To immigrants in this country, it’s 
against them. To the law enforcement agencies and/or 
the intelligence agencies, it’s their job now, they per-
ceive, to suspect everybody and to hold them account-
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able until it’s proven that they’re innocent, not until 
they are proved to be guilty. I think that’s the tendency 
we have to avoid, but that’s the direction we’re going. 
SHEA: Thank you very much. Please thank the 
panel for their time. 
ANDRUS: Thank you very much. A very stimu-
lating and enlightening morning, and the afternoon 
session will be equally stimulating. Let me make one 
introduction before we go to lunch. Dave Broder has 
arrived. Thank you very much for making the effort, 
Dave. We are looking forward to listening to you this 
evening.
END OF MORNING SESSION
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CECIL D. ANDRUS: We used to work it around 
with Air Force 2, which didn’t leave until the Vice 
President was on board. Now the Vice President needs 
to be out of here by 1:00 PM to catch a Northwest 
flight.
I’d like to introduce the lady who will introduce 
Vice President Mondale, the grand lady of Idaho, 
also the chair of the Frank Church Institute, Bethine 
Church.
BETHINE CHURCH: This morning reminded 
me. Frank came home one night, and he said, “I 
talked to Everett Saltonstall, [a United States Senator 
from the northeast], and I said, ‘How do you conduct 
intelligence oversight because I am going on the intel-
ligence committee?’ Saltonstall said, ‘Oh, Frank, there 
are things gentlemen don’t want to know.’” 
How can you do justice to an introduction of such 
a well- known statesman as Walter F. Mondale? Having 
served in the U.S. Senate and on so many important 
committees with Frank, especially on the Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence, he will always be 
“Senator” to me. However, he has been Vice President 
of the United States, and he added to his accomplish-
ments by serving as United States Ambassador to 
Japan, one of our most critical diplomatic posts. He 
didn’t stop at that. He is a diplomat extraordinaire. 
He was President Clinton’s special envoy to Indonesia 
to meet with President Suharto regarding the Asian 
financial crisis and economic reforms in Indonesia. 
He went on to chair the National Democratic 
Institute for International Affairs, an important 
Washington, D.C. organization that conducts non-
partisan programs and often oversees elections in for-
eign countries, thus helping to build and, when they 
have a chance, maintain vital democratic institutions. 
This just touches briefly on his accomplishments 
from the U.S. Army service early to his wonderful 
marriage to Joan. They have three children and three 
grandchildren. It’s my special honor and joy to intro-
duce two special friends: Joan Mondale, a supporter of 
the arts and crafts all over the country and a wonderful 
Vice President’s wife. 
Now to your special enlightenment, I will intro-
duce Walter Fritz Mondale, a fisherman, a tennis 
player, a skier who, like Idahoans, enjoys reading and 
a good barbecue. Welcome Senator, Vice President, 
Ambassador Mondale. 
WALTER F. MONDALE: Thank you very 
much, Bethine, for inviting Joan and me to be with 
you today. Thank your for those kind words and for all 
those wonderful years we had together in Washington 
D.C. When we received your letter, inviting us to this 
event, unlike most invitations for me these days, I 
immediately called Joan, and we had an acceptance 
on its way within about 35 seconds. We wanted to be 
with you, and also this subject is so crucial to all of us 
and to our nation.
I really enjoyed the speech this morning by Senator 
Gorton. It’s great to have someone who has been on 
these committees recently, giving us their reports. The 
panel this morning talked about events 25 years ago. 
In addition to being enlightening, it was just like being 
born again. I loved all of it. Then to be able to do this 
in the name of Frank Church, certainly one of the most 
gifted, effective, and caring public servants of our time, 
makes the whole event truly exciting.
In the early 70s, we saw the recurrent strug-
gle between faith and fear played out in our pain-
ful national debate on Vietnam, the revelation of the 
government’s public deceit in support of the war, and 
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the Watergate scandal, which ended in driving a presi-
dent out of office. Then came the shocking news, dis-
closed in Sy Hersh’s New York Times story, accusing 
the CIA of a massive spy operation aimed at American 
citizens here at home. Almost immediately, Senator 
Pastore moved to create a Senate Select Committee 
on Governmental Operations to Investigate the 
Intelligence Agencies, and of course that committee 
became the famous Church Committee, which we are 
discussing today.
That committee and its work marked the first 
time in the history of this nation or any other nation 
that intelligence agencies would be subject to this kind 
of thorough investigation. Frank Church asked me 
to serve with what he called a “domestic task force,” 
charged with investigating the intelligence communi-
ty’s abuses against Americans here at home: the FBI, the 
CIA, the NSA, the Army, the Post Office, and the IRS.
The earlier panel this morning has already dis-
cussed much of what we uncovered. Our final report, 
just on the domestic part, was 396 pages. All told, the 
Church Committee issued 13 separate volumes of evi-
dence as a result of its hearings and 96 recommenda-
tions for reform. 
It’s important to remember that none of the intel-
ligence agencies ever questioned the accuracy of our 
findings, which is a remarkable thing. After all this time 
and all these facts, not one of them — even today — has 
ever been questioned. I think we did our work well.
As we’ve heard this morning. These agencies 
targeted Americans from every walk of life: women’s 
groups, veterans organizations, academic, religious, 
environmental, civil rights, anti-war — almost any-
thing was subject to being reviewed. During this time 
when we were holding these hearings, I was often 
asked about it when I came home. “Get away from 
that. If you aren’t doing anything wrong, you don’t 
have anything worry about. These people are looking 
for bad guys, so leave them alone.” In fact, what we 
found were a lot of good guys and good women who 
were targeted and hurt by these activities.
The most shocking of all, which reveals the dan-
gers of unaccountable governmental power more 
powerfully than anything else, is Hoover’s secret 
war against Dr. Martin Luther King. Dr. King had 
violated no law. He was the nation’s greatest civil rights 
hero, an apostle of non-violence, a religious leader act-
ing from deepest beliefs. In fact, by insisting that the 
civil rights movement adhere to non-violence, he may 
have saved our nation. 
Yet, under the Cointel program (the Counter-
intelligence Program mentioned this morning), King’s 
Southern Leadership Conference was classified as a 
“black hate group.” King himself was described as 
“the most dangerous Negro leader in America.” The 
Bureau’s campaign against King involved wiretaps, paid 
informants, and agents who shadowed his every step.
It didn’t end with spying. The Bureau set out to 
destroy his career and his marriage. At the height of 
the campaign, the Bureau mailed an anonymous let-
ter and embarrassing tapes to King in what is widely 
regarded as an effort to get King to commit suicide. 
Whatever the reason for Hoover’s anger, he hounded 
King for years and subjected him to vindictive and 
relentless harassment. 
After all of those 48 years as FBI Director, Hoover 
had gained far too much power and was armed with 
a personal collection of secret files, kept in his own 
office. Hoover collected embarrassing information 
and gossip on nearly everyone in Washington. No one 
— not even the Attorney General under whom he was 
supposedly serving, not the President who appointed 
him — dared challenge him. With time, Hoover 
became a very twisted man. Respected reporters, who 
knew about the FBI attacks on Dr. King, later admit-
ted that they were afraid to write about it.
But it is too easy to just talk about Hoover 
because he was not the sole villain. Lyndon Johnson, 
the Kennedys — our committee found that every 
president from Roosevelt to Nixon had pressed these 
secret agencies to go beyond the law. This was a bipar-
tisan problem. These presidents saw the intelligence 
agencies as extensions of their own personal power as, 
indeed, they were. In an office that has driven every 
one of its occupants crazy, the temptation to use these 
secret organizations to accomplish agendas unre-
strained by others is almost too much to resist. And 
that’s what happened. 
What those presidents and Hoover shared was 
also the fear that we might not be able to protect our-
selves from our enemies without breaking the law. But 
these fears were always exaggerated. Hoover fed the 
public fears of widespread American disloyalty. When 
Williams, whose name came up earlier today, told 
Hoover that his agents could find no evidence that Dr. 
King was under the influence of Communists, Hoover 
angrily rejected his report and forced him to rewrite 
it. As we have just learned since they opened up the 
KGB files, the Soviets as well were targeting him 
because they thought he was too modern and wanted 
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to undermine him. 
Throughout the long hearings, we asked govern-
ment officials again and again this question: What 
happened to the law? The one example I will give 
was repeated many, many times. This was a question 
to Mr. Buffman, who was with the National Security 
Agency, when we were asking about their abuses: 
“Were you concerned about its legality?” Answer: 
“Legality?” Question: “Was it legal?” Answer: “In what 
sense?” Question: “Whether that would have been a 
legal thing to do?” Answer: “That didn’t enter into the 
discussions.” My following question was: “I was ask-
ing whether you were concerned about whether that 
would be legal and proper?” Answer: “We didn’t con-
sider that at the time, no.” We heard a similar answer 
from many, many agency chiefs.
Unfortunately, what we were seeing, the victory of 
fear over faith, was nothing new for America. We saw 
it in the Alien and Sedition Acts of the 18th Century, 
in the notorious red-scare Palmer raids following 
World War I, and in the disgraceful internment of 
Japanese-Americans in World War II. It’s what Joe 
McCarthy and the House UnAmerican Activities 
Committee were all about. We now know that all of it 
was based on unfounded fear. We disgraced ourselves, 
and we hurt a lot of innocent Americans. 
The efforts by Frank Church and the Committee 
were astoundingly successful. In fact, later FBI and 
CIA directors have repeatedly said that these com-
mittee reforms helped their agencies do their jobs. If 
we were successful — and I believe we were — it was 
for many reasons. First of all, our chairman, Frank 
Church. He was a superb chairman, he picked a gifted 
staff, and he handled a very strong bi-partisan com-
mittee and kept it working together. Our House coun-
terpart committee blew up a couple of months after it 
was created. They couldn’t keep it working together. 
Church kept us working together all the way through 
our efforts. We did disagree, but we got it done. While 
we had our differences with the Ford Administration, 
it also should be said that they, too, wanted to work 
out something acceptable. Attorney General Levy was 
a very strong, positive force in all of our efforts. 
Another factor, not widely mentioned, was the 
largely undisclosed concern to be found within the 
FBI, within the CIA, and across the board among 
the officers of these agencies, who were worried 
about what was going on in their own agencies and 
knew that their agencies were losing public support. 
Something had to be done.
The vastness of our findings, facts now replac-
ing suspicion, drove a profound national demand for 
reforms. Most important, both houses of Congress 
created permanent intelligence legislative committees 
with sweeping powers to hear and investigate and to 
authorize appropriations. Our reforms all sought to 
strengthen the most fundamental of Constitutional 
principles: Government power must be accountable 
to the Congress, to the courts, to the press, and finally 
to the American people. Every president has resisted 
that principle. 
The current Administration has an almost unprec-
edented contempt for the idea of its accountability. 
I have heard reports from friends that members of the 
Intelligence Committee, on which Senator Gorton 
sits, often feel that they are hearing only screened 
information. Some members of the special 9/11 joint 
committee have made that complaint, and part of 
its report, recommended by the committee, remains 
censored by the executive branch. The Kean 
Commission, on which Senator Gorton also sits, has 
recently issued a report on cooperation with the exec-
utive branch but mentioned that key executive docu-
ments have not yet been produced.
Ashcroft is proposing to substitute administra-
tive warrants, free from court oversight. The newly-
imposed blackout of presidential papers, that rich 
source of history that is so crucial to our understand-
ing; the essential unavailability of the president to 
probing news conferences; the contempt often shown 
to Congressional inquiries — all should worry us. 
We should also worry that Mr. Ashcroft lays claim 
to power to detain indefinitely any American citizen, 
arrested on American soil, without access to any attor-
ney, based solely on the government’s unchallenged 
allegation that the detainee is an ”enemy combatant.”
The future of these citizen detainees is now 
decided in private by the same government that put 
them there. If ours is a government of and by the 
people, as Lincoln said and as I believe, then the high-
est priority must be placed on public information. 
I spent years in the Senate, working with the Bureau 
and the intelligence agencies. I spent four years in 
the White House at the center of the nation’s most 
sensitive information. I respect these agencies and 
admire many of their leaders, but I believe a vast 
amount of what should be public information is 
routinely suppressed. 
After a lifetime of public service, let me say this. 
Never underestimate the lengths Administrations of 
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either political party will go to protect themselves 
from public disclosure of erroneous, unethical, or 
illegal behavior — or just plain embarrassment. The 
instinct for self-protection is often disguised in the 
name of national security.
Nevertheless, there are secrets that must be kept. 
One of the greatest challenges facing these intelligence 
committees is to handle that information in such a 
way that it can drive policy without disclosure during 
that period. 
When you place American history beside the 
history of the great nations that were in being at our 
beginning, it is striking that all of those systems are 
gone, many of them a long time ago. But America 
remains free and is becoming stronger all the time. 
The great difference between the two examples was 
that America was based on freedom and accountabil-
ity of government. 
You read the Federalist papers, and they wanted 
to make certain that public servants in America had to 
account. They wanted to make certain that power was 
separated and divided. It was a document very suspi-
cious about what happens to people when they are in 
power, and they wanted to make certain that they had 
to account.
The other proud nations thought that they could 
be made strong by imperial fiat. It turned out instead 
that it was freedom and equality under the law that 
drove the reforms, built the trust, expanded our oppor-
tunity, and built the strength of this great nation. We 
must never abandon the Constitution in the futile, 
self-defeating search for security by an unaccountable 
government. In fact, the abuse of Constitutional rights 
will inevitably weaken our nation by undermining our 
respect for the law at home and diminishing America’s 
global stature. 
One issue kept coming up this morning, a good 
issue. What happens when these Congressional intel-
ligence committees have trouble getting information 
out of the executive branch? I think that will be a 
continuing problem. We bet that what the found-
ing fathers had in mind — that is, pitting ambition 
against ambition — would result in Senate and House 
committees constantly pressing whoever was the presi-
dent to disclose this information. We need comity, but 
we need those members of the Senate and members of 
the House constantly pressing, pushing to try to get 
the real story.
The success of the Church committee was possible 
only because we got the facts. If we had been refused 
the information that you find in those reports, which 
drove our recommendations, we would have failed. So 
it’s not just an interesting situation; it is fundamental 
to the success of the whole accountability program.
Another thing that has struck me in recent 
months is this: What is the role of leaders of our intel-
ligence committees when they advise the executive 
branch on issues of grave importance? Why is what 
they have stated as facts somehow not stated as clearly 
to the public? 
In England recently, they had a judicial inquiry 
into how Prime Minister Blair shaped his arguments 
for going into the war in Iraq. It was an unbeliev-
ably searching review of inside papers and inter-
nal documents within the Prime Minister’s office. 
You saw what happened. What happened was an 
Administration wanting to make the decision to go 
to war and trying to increase and extend justification 
beyond what information they had in order to make 
the people of England believe they would be in imme-
diate peril if they didn’t do it. It turns out that a lot of 
that was exaggeration, and the judge has said so. 
What is the duty in the United States of our key 
intelligence committee officials? When they believe 
certain fundamental facts, they’ve talked about being 
ignored when they are in the middle of a debate like 
that. What are the rights of the American people? 
What are the rights of the committee to hear what 
we’ve paid for in these intelligence committees and 
hear it clearly so that it can be a part of the debate at 
the time when it is most useful?
Our nation will continue to struggle, as we have 
from the beginning, to balance our often very real fears 
with our belief in the strength of the law as a protec-
tor. As we do so, thanks to Frank Church, America has 
now before it a priceless record never before available, 
describing how unaccountable secret government can 
lose its way, how human beings can be tempted by the 
lack of accountability, what it can cost us, and what we 
can do to remain free and strong. 
Frank Church had a long, rich, incredibly pro-
ductive public career, and Bethine was right there 
with him all the way. The achievements of the Church 
Committee will go down as the most valuable legacy 
of all.
Thank you. 
ANDRUS: To you and Joan, thank you very, very 
much for being here with us today. We will make cer-
tain that you will make that airplane, but the Vice 
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President has consented to respond to questions for 
about 12 or 13 minutes. If you have a question, John 
Freemuth will come to you with a microphone. 
AUDIENCE QUESTION: Please comment on 
Pat Shea’s last point: the appropriateness of a war on 
terrorism as opposed to a police-type operation. 
MONDALE: The word “war” has been used in 
all kinds of ways. We had a war on poverty, etc. I don’t 
want to get involved in the semantics. What I want 
to get involved in is finding a clear understanding of 
the difference between a war between nation states, 
which we can win all the time — we’re the strongest, 
most unbelievably powerful military nation on earth 
— and a war against terrorism — this amorphous 
dark spooky threat that can come from any source at 
any time and that thrives on failed nations and weak 
governments elsewhere to find their haven. We should 
be careful that the word “war” doesn’t confuse us so 
that we believe it’s the same thing. It’s much more 
difficult; it involves different strategies; and it also 
involves America behaving in a way that we make 
friends every day. We must build support around the 
world, so that nations find it more comfortable to 
cooperate with us because intelligence is very impor-
tant, and that cannot be ordered all the time. Even 
America has to have friends. 
AUDIENCE QUESTION: Several years ago 
when there were problems in the nuclear industry, 
particularly in the matter of waste, the bureaucrats 
at Hanford used children in their ads, trying to gain 
support. The children were saying, “Our dads work 
at Hanford, and we trust them. They wouldn’t do 
anything to hurt us.” Isn’t there a parallel with our 
Attorney General making this grand tour, telling us, 
his children, to trust him because he wouldn’t do any-
thing to hurt us?
MONDALE: I believe in public trust. We need it; 
we need comity. But our system is based on account-
ability. Let us hear the facts, and then we’ll decide 
what to trust. It’s not just a general pitch for trust that 
American people need to hear. It’s the facts, ma’am. It’s 
what is really going on. That is why accountability is 
crucial to the future and the vitality of our society. 
AUDIENCE QUESTION: I’d like to hear 
whether you have any views on the rather surpris-
ing allegation that high government officials in the 
White House would out CIA agents. Is this surpris-
ing to you? 
MONDALE: I read the same stuff you do. Bush 
doesn’t call me as much as he could. We’re at the 
early stages of that. I know what the allegations are. 
I’m hoping that there will be an investigation of this 
serious charge and one conducted in a way that will 
inspire public confidence. Traditionally, over the last 
four years or so, when a sitting Administration gets 
into a potentially embarrassing place where they are 
investigating themselves and the public might not 
believe it is a true investigation, they reach out for 
some distinguished person outside the government to 
conduct it. I hope they will do that this time because 
in that way, if in fact it is without foundation, the pub-
lic will accept that more readily than if it is conducted 
under the current Attorney General. 
AUDIENCE QUESTION: Our Attorney 
General, John Ashcroft, has just completed a road 
show where he spoke to law enforcement but not to 
the public, and he didn’t engage the public. Earlier, he 
spoke to a Congressional committee, saying that those 
who questioned the Government’s reaction to the war 
on terrorism aid terrorists. President Bush continues 
to try to give the Attorney General more powers to 
conduct his war on terrorism. You commented on 
J. Edgar Hoover’s legacy. To what extent do you see 
parallels? To what extent does our current Attorney 
General’s behavior concern you?
MONDALE: I should have left 15 minutes ago. 
Too late now. I don’t know what it is about Ashcroft. 
He has this idea almost every day of pushing, pressing, 
demanding more things related to freedom for him to 
do what he wants beyond the law. As Mark Gitenstein 
said this morning, his rhetoric is almost worse than 
what he is doing.
Now he is talking up the Patriot II proposal, which 
would expand government access to private data, 
allowing federal agents to issue subpoenas for private 
medical, financial, and other records without a court 
order. Lack of judicial oversight removes an important 
check on government misconduct, and record holders 
would be required to comply with those requests or 
face prison. They would be barred from telling anyone 
about the subpoena. 
This is la-la land. This will not strengthen us. This 
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will not allow us to go after those terrorists more effec-
tively. This is the sort of thing that divides Americans, 
produces suspicion. The agents in the FBI hate it. One 
of the problems we found in our investigations is that 
many agents hated what the politicians were order-
ing them to do. That’s why you need laws and regu-
lations that make sense, so that agents can say no to 
their higher-ups when silly, dangerous stuff like this is 
being proposed. No, I don’t agree with that. 
ANDRUS: Fritz and Joan, thank you for being 
here. You can feel the affection in that applause. Let 
me ask the audience: Let them leave through here, and 
don’t stop them for autographs. Planes don’t wait any-
more.
Marc Johnson will start his panel a little earlier at 
1:15. We will reconvene in the other room, and then 
meet for the afternoon panel.
30 31
FREEDOM & SECRECY: Trading Liberty for Security?
October 2, 2003
Boise State University Student Union
Presented by:
The Andrus Center for Public Policy
The Frank Church Institute
The Idaho Statesman
AFTERNOON PANEL: Freedom and Secrecy: The Clash of Values
CECIL D. ANDRUS: Let me introduce the mod-
erator for the program this afternoon, Marc Johnson. 
Marc is one of the senior partners of the Gallatin 
Group, which is a public affairs/management issues 
corporation with offices in Boise, Portland, Seattle, 
Helena, and Washington. Marc has a journalism 
background and graduated from South Dakota State 
University. He has experience in radio, television, the 
print media. When I enticed him away from journal-
ism in 1986, he was then with the Public Television 
station here in Idaho. He joined my attempt for my 
second life in politics. I cut him a deal. I said, “If I’m 
elected, you’ll have steady employment. If I don’t win, 
you’re done.” I thought he was smarter than that, but 
he agreed to it. He joined me and served me as Chief 
of Staff, an all round outstanding gentleman, Mr. 
Marc Johnson. 
MARC JOHNSON: Thank you, Governor. 
Good afternoon everyone. We heard a lot this morn-
ing about a delicate balance in the American system. 
Our system is built around a whole series of deli-
cate balances. The balances are designed to moder-
ate among often - conflicting values in our system, 
values that we hold, generally speaking, very dear. 
They are such values as a free press, fair and speedy 
trials, public trials. Other values that we hold dear are 
openness in our system, and we’ve heard a lot of dis-
cussion today about the value that we place on being 
secure in our country, secure from internal as well as 
external threats. 
But it’s in that clash of values where the delicate 
balance brings about controversy. It’s not a new debate 
in the United States. We’ve had it many, many times 
before in our history, but it’s always an extraordinarily 
important debate. We’re going to join that debate in a 
slightly different way this afternoon. We have assem-
bled a truly outstanding panel, and I’d like to take a 
moment to introduce each one of them to you. There 
are more complete biographies in your conference 
packet.
Starting right here is Andrew Malcolm. Mr. 
Malcolm was for 26 years a correspondent with the 
New York Times. He now works for the Los Angeles 
Times and is a member of the editorial board. In 
between those two newspaper stints, he served as the 
communications director for Republican Governor 
Marc Racicot in Montana and worked on the Bush 
2000 presidential election campaign. 
Judge Kevin Duffy is seated next to Andy. Judge 
Duffy is a federal judge for the District of New York 
and has been since his appointment by President 
Nixon in 1972. He has presided over many high-pro-
file cases. One that I will mention is the first World 
Trade Center bombing case in 1993 and 1994. 
Tom Moss is next to Judge Duffy. He is the United 
States Attorney for Idaho, a former prosecuting attor-
ney, a former state legislator, appointed by President 
Bush to his current job in 2001. 
Carolyn Washburn is the executive editor of the 
Idaho Statesman and, as you’ve heard throughout the 
day, the Statesman and Carolyn in particular have 
been enormously helpful in staging a number of our 
conferences over the last several years.
Next is Dr. John Deutch, former director of 
Central Intelligence from 1995 through 1996. In his 
long and distinguished public career, he has also served 
stints as the Deputy Secretary and Under Secretary of 
Defense. Dr. Deutch has been on the faculty of the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology since 1970.
David Broder, Pulitzer Prize-winning correspon-
dent and national political correspondent of the 
Washington Post. Mr. Broder’s extremely well-regarded 
column is carried in over 300 newspapers around 
the globe, and we are particularly delighted that he 
is doing double duty by sitting in on this panel this 
32 33
afternoon. Mr. Broder, of course, will speak at 7:00 
PM tonight.
Senator Gorton, whom many of you met earlier 
today, probably needs no more introduction from me, 
but I will digress just long enough to say that there are 
lots of things in Slade Gorton’s career that deserve hon-
orable mention, not the least of which is that, probably 
more than anyone else, he kept the Mariners in Seattle. 
I personally want to thank him publicly for that.
Judge Steve Trott has been a member of the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals since his appointment by 
President Reagan in 1988. He worked in the Reagan 
Justice Department as the Associate Attorney General, 
which is the number three job in the Department. His 
responsibilities included, among other things, inter-
national terrorism issues. Judge, you haven’t set aside 
any elections today have you? Just for the record, the 
judge was not on the panel that decided the California 
recall case. 
Jim Brosnahan is a very prominent trial attor-
ney from San Francisco with the firm of Morrison & 
Foerster. He is a noted First Amendment authority 
and is respected for his defense work, including pro-
viding defense for the so-called “American Taliban,” 
John Walker Lindh. 
Pat Shea, whom you met earlier today, has a very 
checkered past. He is a lawyer in Salt Lake City now, 
former Interior Department official and Intelligence 
Committee staffer. 
Last, but certainly not least, Pierce Murphy, 
Boise’s Community Ombudsman, the first person to 
hold that position. Please welcome the panel
This is not going to be an entirely conventional 
panel discussion, but rather a dialogue based on a set of 
circumstances that I will outline for the panelists, cir-
cumstances that I hope they will respond to — based 
on their experience, their perspective, and frankly how 
far they want to press the moderator. When we run 
the course of that dialogue, we’ll have a more conven-
tional discussion about many of the issues that we’ve 
been probing so far today. 
So let me set the scene for this hypothetical. Put 
yourself in the not-too-distant future in the United 
States. It is a very, very tense time. The global war 
against terrorism is continuing and so are violent 
attacks on American soil. 
The most recent attack occurred just a month or 
so ago in San Francisco. A bomb was set off in a transit 
station. There were many casualties. There was appar-
ently a related series of incidents in a number of com-
munities all across the western United States. 
The political response in Washington, D.C. by 
the Administration and by Congress was to heed 
the call for additional law enforcement and judicial 
efforts against terrorism. Among the changes pro-
duced by the Congress — and I promise I didn’t steal 
Vice President Mondale’s line here — was administra-
tive subpoenas, which did not require the approval of 
a judge or a grand jury. There was a provision addi-
tionally to routinely deny bail in order to keep terror 
suspects in custody, pending trial. Broader definitions 
were created for when the death penalty might apply 
against terrorists.
Pat Shea, very much out of type, is the FBI 
Director today. Mr. Shea, your agents have deter-
mined that the suspect, who could be the bag man, 
the financial brains behind this recent terrorist activity, 
has been located. We know he is somewhere in Every 
City, USA. We’re not quite sure where he is in the city, 
but we think he may be holed up there somewhere. 
You’re going to go after him, aren’t you?
SHEA: Absolutely.
JOHNSON: How are you going to do that?
SHEA: After 9/11, we, with the approval of 
the Attorney General, implemented what we call 
SOILHTT, which stands for State Operation 
Intelligence with Librarians, Hotels, Truckers and 
Taxi Drivers. We believe that digital and advanced 
technology is very useful, but at the end of the day, 
we needed to rapidly expand our human intelligence 
capability. So we have activated the SOILHTT net-
work in every city and believe that through the report-
ing from the hotels and taxi drivers, we will get infor-
mation. We also brought in a group of young hack-
ers, who have done an extraordinary job for the FBI 
in being able to access digital records for credit cards. 
We have put that operation into effect in the city and 
are now able, in real time, to keep track of every credit 
card that is used, as is required at all the hotels now, 
of who is checking in and who is checking out, when 
they checked in and when they checked out. 
We are trying to expand it to the telephone opera-
tion, but given the confusion with the cell telephones, 
we are not as successful there. We believe, however, 
that within the next ten hours, we will be able to iden-
tify the hotel. 
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JOHNSON: But to get this man, Mr. X, are you 
going to talk to John Deutch at the CIA? He may have 
some information on this fellow. 
SHEA: Well, he may, but that’s another agency, 
and we’re having a little problem up on the Hill about 
our budget. Quite frankly, I think the FBI is the 
agency that needs to handle domestic intelligence, and 
if I start asking for favors from the CIA, I think they 
will begin asking favors from me that I am not will-
ing to fulfill.
JOHNSON: Let’s assume that this terrible sus-
pect has dual citizenship. He is a U.S. citizen, but he is 
also a Saudi citizen. Would that make any difference?
SHEA: If I went to the CIA? Yes. They would 
have better resources on Saudi Arabia, although since 
World War II, the Bureau has been very successful at 
placing our agents overseas as a preemptive measure 
because we need that intelligence overseas before we 
can do an effective job domestically. 
JOHNSON: Mr. Deutch? Can you help the FBI 
here?
JOHN DEUTCH: Mr. President, in the way 
you’ve posed this problem, I don’t see a basis for 
involvement by the Director of Central Intelligence. 
I’ve heard nothing about serious foreign involvement 
in what you’ve said . . .
JOHNSON: This guy is potentially the bag man 
for a whole network of terrorists. 
DEUTCH: Let me finish, Mr. President.
JOHNSON: I still run the cabinet meetings. 
DEUTCH: It’s important for directors to speak 
out. You haven’t laid the basis for an act of catastrophic 
terrorism involving foreign subnationals or states 
involved directly in the security of this country. I’m 
perfectly happy, in this instance, to step aside to what-
ever capacity the FBI may have in this matter, which I 
suggest to you may be quite little.
JOHNSON: The Attorney General really wants 
to go after this Mr. X, Mr. Shea and Mr. Deutch. Why 
don’t you call the U.S. Attorney in this particular juris-
diction and cut him in on what your intelligence tells 
you about this fellow? Talk to Mr. Moss?
SHEA: I’m a little worried, Judge Trott notwith-
standing. Every city is in the Ninth Circuit, so we’re 
never quite sure what the standard is. But I have good 
evidence that the bag man has financed the explo-
sion in San Francisco; we’ve traced that money. Our 
librarian was good enough to give us some informa-
tion about some books that the bag man’s family had 
checked out, and they were on financing explosive 
activities, so we think we have that done. As the U.S. 
Attorney, what other directions would you give me, 
given that you’ll be the one prosecuting this case?
THOMAS MOSS: Well, Mr. FBI Director, since 
you haven’t given me very much, it doesn’t sound to 
me like you have a direct link to this person. If you 
have information that can help identify the bag per-
son, I suggest that we have him picked up, advise him 
of his rights, and see if he’ll talk to us. 
JOHNSON: We know he’s in the city. We just 
don’t quite know where he is. Why don’t you use this 
new administrative subpoena and subpoena all the 
hotel records or all the airlines records of people mov-
ing in and out of the city, for example?
MOSS: Well, because the administrative sub-
poena wouldn’t give you that broad an authority. If 
we’re operating on today’s law, you couldn’t use an 
administrative subpoena to go after this person. 
JOHNSON: Well, let’s put up the new law. This 
is the new law we are operating under. It says, “In any 
investigation concerning a federal crime of terrorism, 
the Attorney General may subpoena witnesses, com-
pel attendance and testimony of witnesses, require 
the production of records, books, papers, documents, 
electronic data.” Why couldn’t you go after the hotel 
records under that power? 
MOSS: If we had probable cause to believe a cer-
tain hotel had records to lead to this person, that is 
what we would recommend they do, but you don’t just 
go out and get subpoenas for every hotel in the city to 
see where everyone is staying. That would go beyond 
the authority that we consider vested under this law. 
JOHNSON: OK. Let’s assume for a moment that 
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we have a good indication that he is at a particular 
location. Then what would you do, utilizing this new 
tool that Congress has just given you? 
MOSS: When you say a particular location, are 
you talking about a large hotel?
JOHNSON: Let’s say for the sake of the discus-
sion that he is in a large hotel.
MOSS: If he is in a large hotel, I would recom-
mend that the FBI go to the hotel, talk to them, and 
see who is at the hotel. They may or may not volun-
teer the information because people in those situations 
are concerned about civil liability. The administrative 
subpoena authority was created largely to protect peo-
ple who wanted to give law enforcement information.
JOHNSON: But time is of the essence. This guy 
is very mobile. He might be gone by the time you do 
all that. 
MOSS: Well, that’s the way the system works. 
You’re going to have to go in there and see what you 
can find out. If you arrive at some specifics, then you 
go after that specific information. 
JOHNSON: Mr. Shea, as an aggressive FBI 
Director, are you satisfied with that?
SHEA: I might try to see if I could find another 
U.S. Attorney in another jurisdiction, but I think I 
could persuade him with the evidence our agents had 
brought together from our group of hotel, taxi, and 
truck operators, and I probably have a few things on 
the hotel manager that would help her cooperate. 
JOHNSON: Mr. Brosnahan, does any of this 
bother you?
JAMES BROSNAHAN: Not until I hear some 
evidence. I haven’t heard any evidence yet. Sometimes 
when you hear a discussion like this morning, it’s 
almost like we’re getting ready in America to say that 
having actual evidence — witnesses, documents, vid-
eos, things that prove things — has become a kind of 
outmoded technicality. I’m with the U.S. Attorney on 
this one. He’s not ready to move on this one, and I 
understand. More credit to him. 
The second thing is that if Attorney General 
Ashcroft has declared in a public way on national 
television that the person has done something, then I 
know he is innocent. 
JOHNSON: I wonder if you would feel dif-
ferently if these were the facts. Let’s assume for the 
moment that we have found Mr. X in this hotel. We 
have an administrative subpoena that has collected up 
his laptop, his cell phone. He didn’t have much else 
with him. Those would be potential pieces of evi-
dence, would they not? 
BROSNAHAN: Yes.
JOHNSON: Is there anything wrong with that?
BROSNAHAN: It would depend on how they 
are obtained. Every officeholder in the United States 
takes an oath to follow the United States Constitution 
and to protect the country from enemies foreign 
and domestic, and that would include anything that 
they’re doing. If you ask me, under present law, it 
would depend on how they obtained it.
JOHNSON: We’re operating under this law that 
says the Attorney General can just issue one of these.
BROSNAHAN: Well, that’s a good start for the 
government. The question is: Is there a Constitutional 
argument that can be mounted against it? Maybe 
the most important aspect, seriously, will be the 
atmosphere in which the request is made. You have 
described the decimation of the city in which I prac-
tice, and I am in front of a judge who is a human 
being, surrounded by the mourning, which is occur-
ring there as it occurred in Virginia and as it occurred 
in New York City. Will I get a judge to throw it out on 
a technicality? The answer, seriously, is no. 
JOHNSON: We use these administrative sub-
poenas all the time in civil cases. Would it make any 
difference to apply them to criminal cases? 
 
BROSNAHAN: I think there is a big difference. 
I’ve thought about this. Is this a serious problem that is 
being proposed? I think it is a problem. A civil matter 
is for a certain purpose. Here the purpose is to conduct 
a criminal investigation, which is a much more seri-
ous thing. One of the great cases in the U.S. Supreme 
Court came right out of this part of the country where 
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the government tried to go into a meat packing plant 
without a subpoena, without a proper process. This 
part of the world — as you know because you all live 
here — breathes freedom, OK? This is going to be the 
last place to go, right here. So you’re safe here. But 
the meatpacker said, “Hell no!” Which is what, in the 
past, America has sometimes said. It went to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court said, “You’re 
right. You can’t do it. It’s not lawful.”
JOHNSON: Judge Trott, what’s going on here?
STEPHEN TROTT: The administrative sub-
poena, I think, is a major mistake because one of the 
structural ways that we deal with the inclination of 
human nature and people to do the wrong thing for 
the wrong reasons is by putting in a series of checks 
and balances, and we’ve always required in almost 
every respect to require one branch of government to 
oversee another. The administrative subpoena basi-
cally gives all the power to a single branch of govern-
ment, and were I a United States Attorney, I wouldn’t 
use an administrative subpoena. I would go the old 
route of getting court approval, even if those were 
on the books, until I had a definitive decision from 
the courts saying that those were Constitutional and 
appropriate under certain circumstances. 
If you’re faced with an emergency, of course, you 
don’t have to wait for any subpoenas. The Supreme 
Court has made it very clear, as Justice Jackson said a 
long time ago, that the Constitution is a not a suicide 
pact, and if law enforcement is faced with a dire emer-
gency, they can run into a house and grab the bomb 
or the dying child or whatever it is. So I would be very 
wary of administrative subpoenas until I had a defini-
tive decision from the United States Supreme Court 
telling me whether they were appropriate or not. 
JOHNSON: Judge Duffy, stay with me for a 
moment. Let’s assume this administrative subpoena 
has been issued. Mr. X’s laptop has been taken into 
custody. All of this has happened without anybody 
going in front of a judge. I thought judges were sup-
posed to issue subpoenas. 
KEVIN THOMAS DUFFY: Judges at times can 
issue subpoenas, but I agree with Judge Trott. Who 
is going to use this thing if it is really unnecessary? 
In the factual situation you have given us, it is really 
unnecessary. The U.S. Attorney can appear and make 
an application, or he can get the Grand Jury to issue a 
Grand Jury subpoena for the same purpose. Why do 
they need an administrative subpoena? 
JOHNSON: I’m concerned that might not move 
fast enough.
DUFFY: Who? The judge or the Grand Jury?
JOHNSON: Either one. 
MOSS: When I was a state prosecutor, we ran 
into that quite a lot, trying to find a judge after 5:00 
PM, and they were all gone. A lot has been done with 
telephonic warrants and all the rest, but I’d restruc-
ture the system so that if law enforcement is going to 
be required to go to a judge to get assistance, there are 
judges that are easily accessible by telephone or in per-
son 24 hours a day. I think that’s a necessity, especially 
after September 11th. 
DUFFY: Well, you know, that is very surpris-
ing to me because I sit in a District Court where we 
have a fair number of judges. I was just on the 
Emergency Court. I was available 24 hours a day, plus 
a magistrate. 
MOSS: That’s what I mean about one of the 
changes, but that isn’t true in a lot of the jurisdictions, 
and it’s especially not true in state courts where you 
still can’t find judges after 5:00 PM. 
DUFFY: I’d like to say something about state 
courts, but my wife is a state court judge, and I 
wouldn’t dare. 
BROSNAHAN: So is mine, and she is working 
all the time. 
TROTT: If you’re going to have to go to a judge, 
the judge better be available all the time. I agree 
with you. 
JOHNSON: Mr. Brosnahan, are you as sanguine 
as these two judges that no prosecutor would ever use 
this administrative subpoena?
BROSNAHAN: No, I’m not, although I will say 
that if you get right down to it, there are so many pros-
ecutors in this country who go to work every day and 
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do the job right. There are people in the Department 
of Justice who are terribly concerned about the issues 
you’re discussing in this wonderful gathering here 
today. So I don’t know. If it’s Dave Kelly from New 
York City, I’ll talk to Dave. He may not do this. He 
may think this is not appropriate, but more important 
is the competence issue, which we weren’t able to dis-
cuss after 9/11 because it was too serious and it’s our 
president and we have to win. 
The competence issue is: “How good a job is being 
done? How many people speak Arabic or Pashtun, if 
necessary? Not that we should know this, but it should 
be done. What about the detectives on television 
who solve crimes in one hour. One hour, OK? The 
anthrax case is a very difficult case. The Unabomber 
took 17 years. You have to be honest about it. It’s not 
easy. How good a job are they doing with what they 
have? And Washington — I speak as a way outsider in 
California — is best at distracting attention from the 
key issue. The key issue is — and great Americans are 
back there working on it as we speak — how good a 
job are they doing with what they have? We’re all talk-
ing about what they need to do the job.
One more thing, which I have thought about. 
The other things I hadn’t thought about. This issue 
is so interesting because every other issue divides us 
– race, age, economics, whatever. There is one group 
on one side, and one group on the other. Everybody 
in this room and everybody in the United States has 
a personal interest in their personal security — that it 
be done right and that we really find out what’s going 
on. You get the sense sometimes that there are people 
in Washington who don’t understand that we are fol-
lowing this pretty closely. 
DEUTCH: I would like to say a word about 
competence, which I think is at the core of this. We 
all want to be protected, and the fact of the matter is 
that there are really two issues here. One is how do we 
build the best competence? The other is how do we 
protect the rights of people? 
Let me say a word about competence. The notion 
that the law enforcement system is going to develop 
competence in this area is, in my mind, suspect. Let 
me give you an example. 
In 1995, we had an explosion in the barracks in 
Saudi Arabia, the Khobar Towers. The reaction was 
that this was a crime. We sent Louis Freeh, the director 
of the FBI, to Saudi Arabia to investigate this crime 
with his Saudi counterpart, — no Thomas Jefferson 
— and to look at it as a legal collection, not only a 
collection of information but understanding how to 
protect the American people. You can’t do it with a 
national security rubric on one side and a law enforce-
ment rubric on the other side. The law enforcement 
piece is (a) important to protect American rights and 
(b) important in those cases where you want to bring 
somebody to a court of law. But the principal thing is 
to build competence, and it can only be done if you 
build one organization that will collect the intelligence 
for you, subject to the rules that are set out by the 
judges here and others about what is proper behavior. 
But we don’t have the competence because we 
have two different systems, and the FBI, for all of its 
greatness, is never going to be able to collect informa-
tion on complicated foreign terrorist groups because 
they have a culture, an education, and a capacity 
which goes to law enforcement and bringing people to 
justice, not collecting information which, over time, 
will accumulate to understanding catastrophic threats 
to the people of this country. I would be happy to help 
my friend, Director Shea, build a system for compe-
tence, but I think there has to be one national system, 
whether it is in the FBI or the CIA or somewhere else. 
Competence is the issue here. 
MOSS: I think there are a couple of things that 
we need to clarify. The administrative subpoena is the 
subpoena the FBI uses. There is a good chance they 
wouldn’t even come to the U.S. Attorney and ask for 
an administrative subpoena. They know they can do 
it, but it’s very limited in the situations in which they 
do it. It’s limited to four circumstances: health care 
fraud; sexual abuse of children; false claims against the 
United States; and threats against the president. Those 
are the only cases in which, currently, an administra-
tive subpoena can be used. 
Take health care fraud. One of the reasons that 
they allow it for those cases is that you have a criminal 
aspect and a civil aspect to that case. If you go strictly 
with a Grand Jury subpoena, then that’s secret, and 
you can’t use the information you get there in a civil 
case. You can’t use it because it’s a secret procedure. I 
think that’s why the law developed in such a way that 
you can get the information, and the government can 
go after the dishonest doctor, who is defrauding the 
government. At the same time, the criminal side can 
look at prosecuting him. I think that’s important to 
recognize.
My experience with the FBI is that they only use 
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subpoenas to get information they could probably get 
without any subpoena. But they have a person there 
who wants to cooperate with them but is afraid they 
will get in trouble civilly, so the administrative sub-
poena guarantees them immunity from a civil suit if 
they give up the information. 
In other words, you could walk into this hotel and 
say, “Is there a guy staying in your hotel by the name 
of such-and-such?” That person could tell you that 
without violating anybody’s rights or any rule of law. 
Often they don’t want to do it. So you give them an 
administrative subpoena; then they do it. The penalty 
under the current law, if you don’t give up the infor-
mation in response to an administrative subpoena, is 
the FBI then has to go to the U.S. Attorney, go to the 
court, and petition for an order to require the person 
to give it. There is no penalty for not coughing up the 
information in an administrative subpoena. 
The new law is simply applying a law to terrorists 
that now applies to fraudulent doctors and people like 
that. I would suggest that if it’s good enough for doc-
tors, it ought to be good enough for terrorists. 
JOHNSON: I want to come back to Dr. Deutch’s 
point about competence. Dave Broder, it seems to me 
that the crux of at least some of this argument turns 
on the concern on the part of some of the American 
people that the government will go on some kind of a 
fishing expedition, that your personal information will 
be too readily accessible to the government, that they 
will have access to things they really don’t need and 
that aren’t going to help us in the war on terrorism, 
but that might reflect badly on me, John Q. Citizen. 
Is that part of the debate?
DAVID BRODER: Of course, it’s the heart of 
the debate because people know too damned much 
about us already, and we don’t particularly want the 
government messing around in our lives, sopping up 
even more information. We do want to be protected, 
and that’s the conflict, of course, that you’ve been deal-
ing with all day here. 
JOHNSON: How about this question of com-
petence? You all seem to be discounting the fact that 
these administrative subpoenas, should they become 
law — and the language I put up on the screen a min-
ute ago, by the way, is right out of the law that has 
been introduced in the House of Representatives — 
could be used in these circumstances. 
Dr. Deutch is making the point that we really 
ought to be talking about the competence of our intel-
ligence-gathering organizations. 
Senator, where do you come down on all this? 
You touched on all that this morning in your opening 
speech, but is it a question of competence more than 
differently applying the law?
GORTON: First, I’m a bit restless with your 
entire hypothetical because I don’t know any of the 
background of the individual who is suspected of hav-
ing engaged in this activity or how it is that immedi-
ately after he’s done it, we now know what hotel he’s in 
and in what city, but we didn’t know enough to stop it 
in the first place. There was obviously a failure there at 
some point because the primary function of our gov-
ernment and of our agency should be to keep it from 
taking place. 
In some respects, your hypothetical might be 
more difficult to deal with if we simply suspected that 
this guy was about to engage in an activity of this sort. 
Having given you those provisos, I agree completely 
with the former head of the CIA, Dr. Deutch. We do 
have a serious question of competence, but we also 
have a natural and probably healthy American view, 
perfectly expressed by Mr. Brosnahan: We know a 
lot here, and those fools in Washington don’t know a 
damn thing and simply get in the way. 
I don’t think that’s true. There is a question of 
competence, but we live in an extraordinarily complex 
world. The qualities of foresight and imagination, 
which are perhaps the most important characteris-
tics of people who will work for an intelligence agency 
— as against a law enforcement agency trying to put 
together what happened after the fact — and of seeing 
the world from a different perspective are very difficult 
to find. One of the most important duties of the peo-
ple who are there to protect us is to find those people, 
to recruit those people, to give them enough recogni-
tion so that we do have highly competent people. If I 
were to exhibit a prejudice, as I have, it would be that I 
would put an even higher value on the people who are 
trying to prevent these happenings than I would put 
on the police officer or the FBI officer who is going to 
catch them after it’s done. The very fact that he has to 
catch them after it’s done shows we failed. 
DEUTCH: I think I have another way of helping 
Pat Shea…
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JOHNSON: He needs lots of help. He’s an 
inexperienced FBI Director.
DEUTCH: …partly because I’m an MIT guy as 
well. It is possible that we can construct a computer 
system to do overnight data mining. Basically, every 
night, we will know where everybody is registered at 
every hotel, Hertz, airlines — so that when a question 
like this comes up, especially for an anticipatory act, 
there will be a database we can mine which will inevi-
tably mix foreign and domestic individuals and which 
will be quite thorough, exhaustively so. 
JOHNSON: Sounds like a great federal grant 
for MIT. 
DEUTCH: Let me tell you that even in the more 
conservative parts of the country like Massachusetts, 
as opposed to here in Idaho, this is not a popular 
thought, but it is a potential reality. 
What I want to stress in the most severe terms 
is that I do not want any FBI or law enforcement or 
prosecutor anywhere near such a system if we chose to 
put it into place. I want those guys to watch the peo-
ple who are running that system, but if you start put-
ting that kind of a collection strength in the hands of 
the law enforcement community, I think there is a real 
conflict. I would much prefer, if such a system were 
put in Mr. Shea’s hands in order to protect Americans 
from perhaps catastrophic acts, that there be a separa-
tion of that activity from what the right rules are and 
whether they are being followed. 
That’s the core of my point: Get the FBI out of 
this intelligence business, let them do what they are 
good at, which is law enforcement, and, we hope, 
the Justice Department will worry about the rights of 
Americans. That’s where I am.
JOHNSON: Mr. Shea, it sounds like the DCI 
is not going to give you the password to his new 
computer system.
SHEA: Let me ask a question then for the DCI. 
Once you’ve generated that information, how do you 
choose to present it to the policy makers who then can 
direct the FBI to follow up as a prosecutorial matter or 
to the U.S. Attorney for his follow up?
DEUTCH: I care about protecting American 
lives, and it is a very second order for me as a DCI to 
bring him into a court of law. I care about protecting 
American lives. Bringing him to justice a long time 
after an act has been committed doesn’t seem to me 
to accomplish that. I can’t square those two notions 
in my head, but my primary purpose is protecting 
Americans, not bringing people, too late, to a court 
of law. 
SHEA: So you take that information to the some-
body in the White House you’ve been designated to 
give it to, and you let them run with it. What you see, 
in your judgment, is an abuse of power. Do you go to 
them a second time? 
DEUTCH: You are kind to say that I go to the 
White House. I just don’t do it on my own, which is 
another story of the past. The answer is, yes, I quite 
strongly believe that, as the DCI, I work for the 
President of the United States. The director of the 
FBI has a slightly different circumstance. I report 
all my activities, as required by law, to these Select 
Committees. But if I go and I find a bad person in the 
White House, I don’t go to him again. 
BROSNAHAN: I want to make a couple of 
points. What is it we didn’t know before September 
11th that requires a restructuring of the government 
and the creation of an entity that we need to make sure 
does not become a secret police? We have to be very 
careful with that. 
MI-5 was mentioned this morning as “work-
ing.” Anybody out there of Irish-American extraction? 
That’s a whole different subject, but here did we not 
know that Osama bin Laden had declared a fatwah 
against the United States? Did Judge Duffy not sit in 
a case in New York that had something to do with it? 
Did President Clinton not send missiles in 1997 into 
one of the camps in Afghanistan? What is it that we 
didn’t know that requires administrative subpoenas, 
holding Mr. Padia in jail without a lawyer, which is 
unprecedented. 
A great book to read, by the way, is Nazi Saboteurs 
on Trial. It will cheer you up. The Nazis that were 
arrested in World War II got lawyers, and they had 
evidence. Then they were electrocuted. The process we 
are grasping for here today was met. The lawyers felt 
good. Justice Stone felt OK. He had helped Roosevelt 
do what they wanted to do, but there had been some 
process in accordance with the Constitution. 
My only background and knowledge about 
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Afghanistan comes from representing one individual, 
none of which information is privileged or secret. The 
Saudis were all over Afghanistan. They were every-
where. There are charities in Chicago. They have 
money. That’s going to be one of your problems in the 
hypothetical. Was this guy working for a charity? He’s 
raising money for people. There are these issues. 
But it’s interesting to me, just as a citizen, that 
we are distracted from the real issue. The real issue 
is how to protect ourselves. We knew everything 
we had to know. That’s my opinion. It’s not classi-
fied. We knew everything we needed to know. That’s 
true of the Clinton Administration and the Bush 
Administration. It’s not a partisan remark. So before 
we say that throughout the United States the govern-
ment is going to have roving wiretaps that you might 
be on, and that they may have a problem with that, 
you should remember that this issue is not a specta-
tor sport. You may speak to someone about a confi-
dential matter, and it may be not only listened to by 
agents but recorded. Have you said anything on the 
phone in the last two years that you would not like 
us to play now? So this is for all Americans, and it’s 
serious stuff. 
JOHNSON: I’d like to know how the judges here 
feel about Dr. Deutch’s computer system and whether 
it could be made to work in the way he would like to 
see it work to protect Americans but also to protect 
civil liberties. Judge Duffy?
DUFFY: I’m fearful of it, but we almost have one 
of these systems set up. When was the last time you 
used your American Express card? Every time you use 
it, it enters into a computer. My wife and I got an 
American Express Delta card because she likes to get 
miles. Everything is recorded: every place we go, every 
time we fly, every time we go to a hotel, every time we 
have dinner out. It’s all there; it’s just a matter of who 
gets to use it. You think American Express isn’t using 
it now? I think they are. That’s why you get those 
annoying phone calls, just when you sit down to din-
ner, telling you how to do better on your next flight. 
TROTT: To be facetious, why don’t we plant a 
computer chip in every child at birth and every immi-
grant that comes into the United States? Then we 
could have a satellite and a printout, and we could tell 
where everybody is with a computer chip. Obviously, 
by reducing it to that absurdity, it raises the question 
of how much are we going to distort who we are, how 
we got here, and what we enjoy in terms of the bless-
ings of liberty to cope with these problems?
It’s easy to over-react and to sell out the principles 
that make us a great nation. I think we have to be very, 
very careful when we use anything that intrudes on 
our personal liberty, that it’s carefully balanced against 
these principles, that it’s not unreasonable, and that 
it’s not overkill. 
Vice President Mondale mentioned a while ago 
that we locked up all the Japanese-Americans during 
World War II. That was a reaction of fear, and fear 
caused us to do something that we look at now and 
say, “Gee, that probably was a really big mistake.” 
With the lessons of history clearly in our minds, 
we have to look at every one of these proposals — 
computer systems, computer chips, administrative 
subpoenas — and ask ourselves, “Is this absolutely 
necessary to protect these principles, or is it over- 
reaching, and are we selling them down the river?”
So far, terrorists have done more than anyone 
I can think of to take away our liberties. We had a 
tremendous thing going for us prior to 9/11, and 
we’ve dropped back a couple of notches. If you go 
to the airport now, I think you’ll see what I mean. 
I showed up in San Francisco the other day with a let-
ter in my suitcase “We searched your suitcase while 
you were eating a hamburger in the airport,” or some-
thing like that. It’s true. I think we’re now feeling very 
edgy. The Attorney General — and I don’t say this 
in a negative way — is on the tube and many people 
in Congress are saying, “We need this, and we need 
that.” Every one of us gets nervous when we hear these 
things. They sound like they are invading our liberties 
and our private lives. To a degree they are. You have to 
look for that balance. 
As I said before, the Constitution talks about 
unreasonable searches and seizures. What is unreason-
able depends on the circumstances. Right now, we 
have a difficult task on our hands. It’s called “prevent-
ing these kinds of terrorist attacks.”
By the way, terrorist attacks can touch off world 
wars. Look back at history. If the September attacks 
had gone down as planned, it’s probable that there 
would be no White House, no Capitol Building, and 
five planes might have hit on the west coast at the 
same time. I suggest that, under those circumstances, 
if that had been pulled off the way it was originally 
planned, somebody may have very well have launched 
a nuclear attack on Afghanistan. 
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So it’s not only important to prevent these attacks 
simply because they are terrible, but they lead to terri-
ble things including the erosion of our own basic civil 
liberties. So we have to be very careful that we don’t 
overreact and sell these rights down the river and that 
we respond appropriately to the challenges that we 
face as we try to stop the next one. It’s a tough task. 
I might add one thing: I’m nervous about that 
word “competence.” I’m not sure what is meant by 
that. I worked for 23 years in law enforcement, and 
I never ran into any more competent people in my 
entire life than the agents of the FBI. I won’t stop here 
and waste your time with all the attacks that were pre-
vented or all the arrests of terrorists and others that 
were made all over the world. I thought they were 
tremendously competent and also had a remarkable 
store of information on the various terrorist groups 
that we took apart. Using the rule of law and using 
prosecution, I personally was involved in driving 
two terrorists organizations out of the United States 
because they figured everything they did was under a 
wiretap or some kind of surveillance, so they left the 
country and went elsewhere. So you can use the rule of 
law and law enforcement to prevent terrorist attacks. 
JOHNSON: Dr. Deutch, I want to go to the 
reporters and editors on the panel. 
CAROLYN WASHBURN: It is a mess out there. 
We have rallies down the middle of Main Street 
against the new law. We have somebody tied to the 
flagpole on the top of the Statehouse in protest. 
Complaints are pouring in to credit card compa-
nies because somebody has hacked in and is charging 
things on somebody’s credit card. 
We do know something about the suspect because 
one of our FBI sources outed one of the hotel agents, 
and we know who the person is and where they are. 
We’ve done a little homework on them and can’t 
figure out how in the world they could have done 
anything wrong. They are foreign nationals, they are 
in the country, they are here for education. As far as I 
can tell, they haven’t been out of the city for about a 
week. We’re confused about that. 
Now the FBI knows that we have been on it, so 
they have come and subpoenaed us, which we’re fight-
ing because we don’t want to share our notes, but they 
want our notes. We’re pursuing all of those angles as 
well as the mess of the investigation. 
As much as we’re worried about violations of 
everybody’s privacy, credit card fraud, and all of that, 
we’re worried about reporting on the quality of the 
investigation. This terrible thing has happened, there 
is a legitimate threat out there, and as much as we 
want to protect individuals’ rights, we want to make 
sure that our government is doing the proper kind of 
investigation. The FBI and the CIA aren’t talking to 
each other, aren’t sharing anything. We think our local 
criminal intelligence unit has some stuff, but they’re 
not talking to anyone either. It’s a mess. 
JOHNSON: Just another day in the newsroom. 
Andy?
ANDREW MALCOLM: The first thing I’d do is 
take the guy’s name and run it through Google, which 
has the capability, unlike the CIA and FBI, to process 
a lot of information in 3/10 of a second. I was at the 
Little League game, watching my son play, when I saw 
the U.S. Attorney get a cell phone call and leave just 
before his kid came to bat, so I knew there was some-
thing up. I called the Chief of Police, and he said, “I 
don’t know what it is but they told us to bring in the 
SWAT team right away.” Then I would call him on his 
cell phone and say, “Now about the SWAT team…
what’s going on?” He wouldn’t want to talk, and we 
might go back and forth a little bit. Then I would 
say, “OK, this is a big story, and I don’t know all the 
details, and I don’t want to mess up what you’re doing. 
If you promise to tell me everything that’s going on 
tomorrow or what went down last night, I won’t put 
it in this morning’s paper.” But I couldn’t find my 
editor because she is out playing golf with the judges. 
(I’m just joking about that.) 
JOHNSON: One of the delicate balances here 
is the job that the press wants to do, which Carolyn 
helped articulate quite well. On one hand, you want to 
understand the scope of the investigative powers of the 
government, how they are proceeding to find these ter-
rorist suspects, what kind of techniques they are using. 
At the same time, Mr. Shea at the FBI and other agen-
cies of the government think they have a legitimate 
need to keep a lot of that information secret. They don’t 
want to tip off other suspects out there that they might 
find. How do we strike that balance?
BRODER: Well, we start with our basic busi-
ness: to help people understand what is going on. 
As Carolyn said, a lot of people are aware already that 
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something big is going on here. This is not a story we 
are going to keep out of the paper, so when I go to 
Mr. Shea, what I am going to say to him is essentially, 
“We are going to write about this story tomorrow 
because it is the talk of the town. You can make a deci-
sion as to whether what we write is as well informed as 
we can be or whether we are going to have to speculate 
a lot about it. If you are cooperative and make a case 
to me that there are some parts of this story that we 
should not write about, I am prepared to listen to that 
argument, but ultimately it will be our judgment, not 
your judgment, about what we put in the paper.”
DEUTCH: Isn’t that great? First of all, I don’t take 
calls from reporters, but I will tell you what decides 
what goes in the paper is the publisher. Every time I’ve 
seen a serious problem, you call the publisher and say, 
“There is a life at risk,” rather than a policy embarrass-
ment. The press respects that. If you’re in public office, 
my recommendation is: Don’t talk to the press. It will 
get you into trouble.
JOHNSON: Mr. Shea, it sounds as though 
Broder has pretty good sources here. He is really going 
to work the story. Maybe we ought to wire up his 
phone and see whom he is talking to.
SHEA: A better idea would be to talk to his 
neighbors and probably have his garbage collector 
go through his garbage and see what we might find. 
There is another thing we ought to think about. The 
Attorney General has approached me, as director of 
the FBI, and indicated that his deputy is going to be 
leaving and that I ought to be thinking about applying 
for that position. He really is looking for some good 
examples of where, in the field, a good U.S. Attorney 
would prosecute with vigor the right to have these new 
administrative subpoenas. All those award systems are 
in place. 
With Mr. Broder, what I would do is call him 
up. Unlike Mr. Deutch, I do return reporters’ calls 
because I have ambition. What I would tell him is that 
we have three incredible leads into a potential future 
terrorist event involving threats to life and that if he 
goes with the story the next day, that will disappear. 
We would like him to cooperate and when we have 
the three identified to the point that the U.S. Attorney 
will begin to announce, he’ll have an exclusive for the 
entire process.
JOHNSON: I thought you were going to say you 
would give the story to the Los Angeles Times then. Are 
you comfortable with that, Mr. Broder? 
BRODER: I’m not comfortable with it, but it’s 
the kind of transaction that I’ve seen play out. At that 
point, I would probably want to talk to my editor and 
publisher, because it is a little bit above my pay grade 
to make that decision. 
DEUTCH: I have to ask a question here. So in 
fact, what happens here is that the reporter who origi-
nally called you will tell you, “I got this from a leak in 
your own agency.” So when you then call the publisher 
and editor and say, “Please don’t print this because a 
life is at risk,” or “You’ve interrupted an important 
operation,” they will say yes, but they will worry, usu-
ally correctly, that the leaker will go to another paper, 
and it will get published. Also a very important part 
of this is that the information often comes, for reasons 
we don’t know, from leaks within the agency. A very 
serious matter. 
MALCOLM: I was working for the Governor 
of Montana at the time, but when we arrested the 
Unabomber, we knew about it three hours before 
because the FBI had alerted CBS. There was a satellite 
truck sitting a half mile down the road from his house, 
and the sheriff was clueless. This is not necessarily the 
press making trouble. Internal things are the cause.
JOHNSON: Let’s examine two other aspects 
of the power that the government could have under 
some of these changes that are proposed. Let’s say that 
Mr. X’s computer does turn up some suspicious e-mail 
traffic and that the FBI does arrest him as a likely par-
ticipant or a bag man for the attacks that took place 
a month ago in San Francisco. Mr. Moss, you don’t 
want him out on bail, do you?
MOSS: Well, based on what you’ve told me, I 
don’t know whether I do or whether I don’t. I need 
more information. 
JOHNSON: He is thought by the FBI to be the 
specific bag man, the financier, for this network of terror-
ists that helped stage these attacks all across the west. 
MOSS: I don’t care what the FBI thinks. I want to 
know what their evidence is of that fact. 
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SHEA: Let me give you the evidence we have. 
There is a bank transfer from Saudi Arabia to the 
Dutch Antilles. From the Dutch Antilles, we have five 
leads into U.S. banks, and this individual is the only 
signator on the accounts. Two of those banks have 
money that went to San Francisco, and we have cash 
receipts at stores that carry the material to build the 
bombs. We think that there are three other sites in the 
United States where similar transactions are about to 
occur, and we don’t want him to have access to any of 
those accounts. 
MOSS: Then you’re telling me that you can actu-
ally show that the money that came to him was used 
for the terrorist attack?
SHEA: The material that our explosive labs have 
demonstrated was used originated from the purchase 
with his money. 
MOSS: With that kind of information, you bet. 
Let’s keep him in wraps. 
SHEA: And would you keep his wife?
MOSS: No
SHEA: Or any of his neighbors?
MOSS: No, not unless they are involved. If you 
could show a connection, that’s another matter. But no.
SHEA: Well, in one instance, we found that there 
was another signature card. It had never been used, 
but his neighbor had signed and was of the same 
ethnic background. They were in the same charity for 
that ethnic background. 
MOSS: That wouldn’t rise to the level of bringing 
criminal charges. 
DEUTCH: The charity cover is a big problem in 
this issue right now. A big problem.
JOHNSON: Mr. X really needs you right now, 
doesn’t he, Mr. Brosnahan?
BROSNAHAN: Well, he might. Am I being 
asked to represent him?
JOHNSON: Yes, sir. He’s on the phone. He says, 
“They’ve got my computer. They’re detaining me. It 
doesn’t look like they are ever going to go in front of 
a judge with any of this information relating to the 
computer.” What do you do?
BROSNAHAN: Let me tell you what my stan-
dards are, and they are very low. But they’re relevant. 
I remember Ed Williams saying in Washington, years 
ago, “If you don’t control the case, you shouldn’t be 
in it.” I can’t tell you how many times that has helped 
me. So is this somebody seemingly related to the 
Saudi family? Will I ever find out what’s going on in 
the case? Will I control the case? If I’m not going to, 
I hope that I have the wisdom to let someone else do 
this case. That’s number one. 
Number two, which might be number one, is: 
Am I getting paid? Is this pro bono? Am I going to 
be cursed and threatened for no money? What’s going 
on here? 
Number three. It’s an important scene. I would 
go down to the jail and take the metal out, take the 
shoes off, schmooze up the sheriff, go up into a little 
cell where this person sits where the government has 
put him. That’s a scene that the defense lawyers see. 
When everybody is finished with all the policies and 
all the stuff, it comes down to somebody in a cell, and 
I would talk to him. I would find out whether this 
is somebody I want to represent. Is this somebody 
in trouble? 
It is amazing to me, after 44 years, how often the 
defendants in criminal cases are not guilty of what they 
are charged with. They may be guilty of a lot of other 
things, but they are not guilty of what they are charged 
with. So is there a role that I can play for this guy? 
The other thing I would do is talk to my part-
ners and prepare them once again for this crazy 
Brosnahan effort, and I would be guided by their 
thoughts, including people in the New York office and 
the Virginia office. Here, your hypothetical is in San 
Francisco. 
Here is another thing. If I emotionally couldn’t 
do it, I wouldn’t do it. This might not be the case for 
me. There are certain types of clients I just can’t do, 
just for personal reasons. You’re saying downtown San 
Francisco, where I commute and where my buddies 
are, and everything has been blown up. If I think I 
can’t stand on my feet, question the government, and 
fight like hell for this person, then I’m not the person 
to do it, and I might say no. 
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SHEA: Director Deutch, a quick question. Using 
your model of pure intelligence, would it be appro-
priate — if you had seen the evidence that there was 
a very clear link between the money and the activity 
that caused the explosion in San Francisco — then for 
intelligence purposes only, to bug the interrogation 
room where the lawyer was going to be conferring 
with the defendant?
DEUTCH: The use of the word “pure” in relation 
to intelligence is certainly not a connection I’ve ever 
made. I don’t believe there is any circumstance where 
I, as Director, would encourage, approve, or allow 
that kind of activity to take place without follow-
ing the law. I’d have Jamie Gorelick tell me whether 
I was good shape or not, since she was my Counsel of 
Defense.
BROSNAHAN: I accept that and have in mind 
when you served. It is being done now. My colleagues 
in the law are being listened to in their conversations 
with clients.
DEUTCH: It is certainly not being done by the 
intelligence community. 
BROSNAHAN: Oh, no. 
DEUTCH: What those other guys do…
BROSNAHAN: OK, I understand your point.
DEUTCH: It’s a very important point because 
I felt very strongly this morning that — everybody 
knows this — as a result of the reforms that have been 
put in, these activities don’t take place by the intelli-
gence community.
BROSNAHAN: I agree with that.
WASHBURN: But you’re getting big pressure 
from the community because this terrible thing hap-
pened. Everybody seems to want to do the high-road 
right thing, but you’re getting enormous pressure. We 
came into this incident with already two-thirds of 
Americans saying that government intrusion on their 
lives is perfectly justified, given terrorist activity... 
JOHNSON: …as long as we go after the bad 
guys.
WASHBURN: …as long as we go after the 
bad guys. Two-thirds of them are saying the media 
shouldn’t question you, so the letters to the editors 
are flooding in, abusing us for asking questions and 
abusing you for not using all of these new tools at your 
disposal. Especially if you have ambitions, how do you 
respond?
GORTON: Oh, come on. If you can’t stand the 
heat, get out of the kitchen. I spent more than thirty 
years getting abused by letters to the editors. That is 
so minor that it shouldn’t even rise to something that 
causes you to consider a different course of action. 
WASHBURN: I didn’t say that we were consid-
ering a different course of action, but I suggest that I 
have seen public officials consider different courses of 
action under big public pressure. 
GORTON: At one level at least, perhaps they 
should. Public officials are supposed to reflect the 
views of the people they represent. We do, obviously, 
have a Constitution that says that some things aren’t 
subject to the majority view, but a hell of a lot are. A 
public official who doesn’t respond to public criticism 
or public points of view probably doesn’t belong as 
a public official. You’ve got to make judgments as to 
whether or not it is valid under the Constitution, but 
it’s perfectly appropriate for people to say, “I want you, 
Congress, or you, State Legislature, to change the law 
and to provide me with more protection than I feel 
that I have now.” And you’d damn well better respond 
to that.
BROSNAHAN: I was just going to say that dur-
ing the Lindh representation and reading history 
about the internment of the Japanese-Americans, 
many of whom were citizens, one of whom now sits 
on the Ninth Circuit, the First World War, and the 
Lindh matter, you could feel it. The image that came 
to mind is a very disturbing one, depressing even. 
What would it be like in this country after the third 
attack like New York? What would be the picture? The 
only thing I could think of to do — just to try to do 
something — was to talk to lawyers, the ABA, and to 
think about what that might be like. We have to cap-
ture the psychological imperatives on our leaders and 
on our judges. The most distinguished judge in the 
Third Circuit, whom I know and respect highly, wrote 
an opinion deferring to the executive. 
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These pressures are real, and they are enormous. 
If we don’t handle them right as a people, they will 
sweep aside what we were trained as kids to believe was 
part of our country.
GORTON: That validates much of what John 
Deutch has said. The concentration should over-
whelmingly be on the side of preventing these 
events from happening in the first place, so that we 
don’t have to face that. Mr. President, I was deeply 
disturbed earlier in this conversation when you said, 
“We had all the knowledge we needed before 9/11.”
BROSNAHAN: We did.
GORTON: We did not. 
BROSNAHAN: This is my fantasy. People are 
really listening to me. I’m not just sitting in my 
kitchen…Go ahead.
GORTON: We did not know the locations of the 
nineteen men who actually engaged in that hijacking. 
There are those now who think in retrospect that we 
should have known it, had all of the handful of facts 
been put together by someone with real genius, but we 
didn’t. We didn’t know where those people were who 
were here with expired visas. We had no particular way 
of checking people who were applying for visas. 
If we want a hypothetical that is far more imme-
diate than the one that our moderator here has given 
us, it was just day before yesterday, I believe, that the 
New York Times reported that the Department of 
Homeland Security, with a several hundred million 
dollar appropriation, desires that whenever someone, 
a non-citizen of the United States, applies for a visa, 
that person’s fingerprints will be taken and the visa will 
be computerized so that we know where that person is 
in the United States and be able to go after him or her 
if and when that person’s visa has expired. 
The ACLU has denounced that. I think that is 
an extreme over-reaction. Why shouldn’t we know 
more about people who have asked to be guests in the 
United States and have no constitutional right where 
they are to come here? Shouldn’t we be able to trace 
them and see whether they have outlived their right to 
be in this country?
BROSNAHAN: I would like to see the question 
of competence higher up on the food chain inside the 
Washington establishment. I don’t think we ought to 
just criticize agents because they didn’t gather stuff. 
From a policy standpoint, I assume that at the Berlin 
meeting in July of the 6 + 2, which the former ambas-
sador to Afghanistan told me all about and which is 
not classified, they discussed Afghanistan and what 
they were going to do. I assume that was part of a pol-
icy, and those who are in charge of policy should step 
forward, whether they be Democrats or Republicans, 
and say, “You know, we didn’t quite act.” 
Number two. For forty years, I’ve been investigat-
ing cases on both sides. Aren’t we going to go out and 
check where this guy lives? Aren’t we going to talk to 
his neighbors? Aren’t we going to talk to people who 
know him? Where did he come from? When did he 
come into the United States? Did he visit Afghanistan? 
By the way, he was at a camp. Do we have people on 
the ground there, the way did in Iran, as I understand 
it from reading public things? We had people on the 
ground there. 
Why don’t we go after them and not the American 
citizenry. Every time I take my shoes off to come up 
here to Idaho, they are catching me every time, but 
they don’t have Osama bin Laden.
 
GORTON: My question, however, had nothing 
to do with any citizen whatsoever. It was visa appli-
cants. 
JOHNSON: A final comment, and then I want 
to pose another quick hypothetical. 
SHEA: To me, a political leader has an obligation 
to reflect her constituency, but also at times — very 
important to the history of this country — to restrain 
that very virulent public opinion that can sweep away 
things. To my mind, it’s the restraint we’re missing 
now because the drums of war create a frenzy where 
you have to reflect the reaction rather than imposing 
some kind of civilized restraint. 
JOHNSON: Mr. Brosnahan, a new set of facts 
here. 
BROSNAHAN: Oh, good.
JOHNSON: The FBI has detained a citizen, 
a foreign national, in this country on an educational 
visa. He is studying medicine at a major research hos-
pital, and at this research hospital, there has been an 
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anthrax contamination. He is being detained as a 
suspect in that case. As a foreign national, what is 
going to happen to him?
BROSNAHAN: Well, it’s my area. Immigration 
is not really my area. I dabble in it, but I don’t really 
know. I suppose the first reaction after 9/11 was to 
deport everybody, but a terrorist being deported and 
going to Canada and having coffee in Vancouver and 
then coming back is not a foolproof plan. So there 
may be a secret hearing in the Third Circuit but not in 
the Sixth Circuit, if I have it right. That will go to the 
Supreme Court, and that will be important. What evi-
dence is there about what he did or why he should get 
crosswise with the law? What did he do?
JOHNSON: Can you get this guy’s case in front 
of Judge Duffy?
BROSNAHAN: If it’s deportation, I don’t think 
so. Habeas, maybe. 
DUFFY: Possibly habeas, but it would be a long 
reach, a very long reach. I don’t think it would fly. 
I don’t think I would have jurisdiction 
JOHNSON: Judge Trott, what’s going on here? 
What is going to happen to this foreign national? He 
is just a suspect. We don’t know that he did anything. 
TROTT: There would probably be the equivalent 
of an immigration hold put on him. He is subject to 
being held by the government until they figure out 
what they are going to do with him. People who come 
here on visas pretty much come here at our invitation 
and our pleasure, and if we decide to revoke the visa 
and send them back, that’s a reasonably simple process 
that can happen fast. They’re not going to send him 
back, but they’re going to hold him for a time until 
they can figure whether they have a problem or not. 
JOHNSON: It turns out that the local police 
have been shadowing this guy for a long time. Mr. 
Murphy, this fellow’s family has come to you as the 
city’s law enforcement ombudsman. They think he has 
been harassed because he is a foreigner. They want you 
to investigate what the police have been doing with 
their Special Intelligence Unit to harass this fellow. 
What can you do?
MURPHY: The first thing I would do would be 
to interview the family and try to find out what facts 
they have, what evidence they have, and what the basis 
is for their belief that the local police department was 
gathering intelligence…
JOHNSON: Well, there are plain clothes officers 
around the neighborhood all the time.
MURPHY: Prior to his detention?
JOHNSON: Prior to his detention. He’s just a 
medical student. 
MURPHY: Again, there would have to be, on 
the basis of the information I receive from the family, 
some specific allegation of wrongdoing on the part of 
the police.
JOHNSON: OK. The police watch him just 
because they don’t like him?
MURPHY: No, obviously, they can’t. So I think 
we talked earlier about the concept of fishing expedi-
tions. As the ombudsman, I don’t have the authority 
to go on fishing expeditions either, so the first thing I 
would need to have is some basis, offered to me by the 
complainant, to believe that there was a policy viola-
tion or constitutional violation by some member of 
local law enforcement. 
JOHNSON: They think some of his mail has 
been intercepted; maybe there has been a wiretap. 
They are very, very concerned about this.
MURPHY: As I said, that would be my first step, 
as any time a citizen approaches our office, to begin 
a preliminary review with the information that the 
complainant can provide us, just to try and assess the 
information to determine whether it provides a basis 
to believe reasonably, if it is true, that there has been 
a policy violation or that the local police might have 
overstepped their authority.
JOHNSON: Let’s say that the suspicion is that 
the local police had been sharing this information 
with Director Shea. He’s going to help you, isn’t he?
MURPHY: I don’t think so. He may want to, but 
he probably and perhaps surely is prohibited under 
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federal regulations from sharing any information with 
me. So I wouldn’t go to him, and he certainly wouldn’t 
be coming to me. 
JOHNSON: How is he prohibited under federal 
regulations?
MURPHY: Under federal regulations, my under-
standing is that I am not cleared for reception of 
intelligence information from a federally-funded intel-
ligence arm or law enforcement activity.
JOHNSON: But you’re the public advocate here.
MURPHY: With regard to the activities of 
local law enforcement, so certainly I can go to local 
law enforcement, those that I have local oversight 
jurisdiction over, and I can compel them to answer 
my questions. I can compel them to produce docu-
ments, evidence, and records, but as to the FBI or 
federal agencies, I have no authority to compel them 
to produce anything.
JOHNSON: Mr. Deutch, you could care less 
about his investigation, right? 
DEUTCH: Correct. I have two different reac-
tions here. First, if it’s known that there is a foreign 
national who is in possession of anthrax at location 
X in the country, my first concern is not an orderly 
collection of evidence to present to a court of law or 
whatever you guys do. I’m concerned about whether 
there are fifteen other places in the country in the 
same circumstances. So my first worry is to get a warn-
ing out around the country and say to people, “There 
may be many places where this anthrax is in the hands 
of a few willful men and women who may try to per-
haps poison locally.” 
So my first notion then is warning and protection, 
which is completely contrary to what you describe 
here, which is a secret collection of evidence in the 
custody of law enforcement officials, trying to hang 
this person or not. What about warning other com-
munities where this anthrax may be? 
Let me further say that if hadn’t been for the really 
quite instructive anthrax letter problem in Washington, 
nobody in the community I live in would know how 
to spell anthrax. They wouldn’t know what it is. 
Indeed, perhaps the best example of the danger of 
careful custody of information in a law enforcement-
controlled investigation is the anthrax scare. It didn’t 
say what is completely possible as a threat to America 
today: A group of determined people might bring in 
anthrax or, much worse, smallpox, and we discover it 
in Community One. How do we get possibly frag-
mentary information as to the possibility of anthrax 
out to other communities of the country? That’s my 
concern. Defend the American people from harm. 
There is a perfectly good case about how, if you 
track it as a legal problem to a particular defendant 
who deserves every protection under the law, you 
lose sight of the security threat to our communities. 
It’s not that I want to violate personal rights to get at 
that; I have to figure out ways to advance protection to 
American citizens. It’s a very real threat.
TROTT: The FBI does not see those two things 
as mutually exclusive. I was involved in umpteen 
situations where the idea was to arrest people, to stop 
crimes, and also to warn the community.
DEUTCH: It’s a fair point. I just don’t think the 
mechanisms are there. 
TROTT: They are. I was involved in them for 
seven years in the federal government and for seven-
teen in the state government. We saw it as two sides 
of the same coin. We never, ever once said, “Oh, well, 
we can just look at this criminal case and ignore the 
possible dangers to somebody else.” I never saw it hap-
pen in 23 years. Tom, did you ever see that happen?
MOSS: I never saw it happen. I prosecuted for five 
years, and I knew great FBI agents, fantastic ones.
DEUTCH: I’m not trying to speak to a particular 
special agent. I’m talking about the natural problem 
of weighing collection of evidence for a case versus the 
entirely different dissemination of information and 
warning to communities and making sure it is in place 
in different communities. I’m delighted if you’ve had 
that experience. It has not been mine — by a lot!
TROTT: One of the reasons is that there was an 
iron curtain drawn between the FBI and the CIA for a 
long time. That’s one of the things that has been taken 
down after 9/11, so the agencies can now talk to each 
other and share information. 
DEUTCH: If I can switch for a moment, certainly 
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in the area of counterintelligence, great progress has 
been made on this subject after Aldrich Ames. But if 
you look at counter terrorism — and I haven’t looked 
at it in the last couple of years in any detail — I’m 
very concerned about whether it has been bridged suf-
ficiently. But I am delighted that yours has been that it 
works smoothly. It is not mine. 
JOHNSON: Mr. Brosnahan, let’s go back for 
a moment to our detained suspect here. This guy is 
out of luck. You can’t get him in front of Judge Duffy. 
His family, who is complaining to the local authori-
ties, can’t get any satisfaction. The guy is sitting in 
detention. What happens to him? Where is the due 
process for this guy?
 
BROSNAHAN: If we bring it to the current day, 
am I allowed to actually go talk to him? That’s a big 
thing now. If I’m allowed to talk to him, at least I can 
think about legal things that I can do. 
Mr. Padia, who has been mentioned briefly here is 
the central case to keep your eye on when you hear the 
Administration talking about what they want to do. 
Padia is a U.S. citizen, reported to be a Chicago gang 
banger, arrested, and put in a jail cell. No lawyer has 
been allowed to see him. Now it’s over a year. Right? 
He is a U.S. citizen. He’s been declared an unlawful 
combatant, which in our hypothetical — to come 
back to that — is not the case. This fellow has not 
been declared an unlawful combatant. 
JOHNSON: So you might be able to get in to 
see him?
BROSNAHAN: Assuming I get in to see him, 
then I can start to think about the question of what 
evidence they have and so forth. He may not want to 
talk to me. I will ask him, “What have you been doing 
the last three months? Where have you been?” I give 
him the fishy, trial-lawyer look, and if he keeps look-
ing at the shackles on his feet, I know that we have 
serious problems here. But I will do what I can for 
him. This is not my area, but I suppose I’m going to 
go to a hearing, even if it’s in secret, and I’m going to 
argue: “You don’t have anything. What have you got? 
You’ve got his credit card. He checked into a hotel in 
Boise, Idaho and attended some kind of conference. 
What have you got?” This is a healthy thing in the 
legal system. “What have you got?” That’s what I want 
to know. Somewhere there is an immigration person 
or a prosecutor, and I’ll say, “What have you got?” 
They might tell me. 
TROTT: Judge Duffy knows more about this 
than I do, but it would seem to me that the basic writ 
of habeas corpus, which is in the Constitution and 
protected by the Constitution, is always available at 
some level or another for somebody to go into court 
and say, “You’ve got the body. Show me your authority 
for holding the body.” 
So at the very least, in the case of the Nazi sabo-
teurs, the lawyers were allowed to go into the court on 
a habeas corpus. Then you get into the question, once 
you get into the court, of the government having to 
make some kind of showing, under the Constitution 
and the law, that permits the holding of the body. 
Wouldn’t you think somebody could at least come to 
you on a habeas and that you would have to look at 
the situation?
BROSNAHAN: Up to now, it’s been the normal 
way, but then you have Padia. 
WASHBURN: What do you do if the reason for 
holding him is a sham? Twenty miles west of here, 
Sami Al Hussayen has been sitting for five months 
in the Canyon County Jail and, as far as we know, 
will continue to sit there at least until January when 
he has a court hearing. He was theoretically picked 
up because they were sure he was involved in a ter-
rorism ring, but there is no evidence of that. So he is 
being held because he had some wrong things on his 
visa application, so for that reason, he is sitting in the 
Canyon County Jail. 
TROTT: I can’t speak to a particular case, but 
theoretically, every time somebody goes into a federal 
court and says, “You’ve got a body. Show the authority 
for holding that body,” the government has to show 
some lawful authority. If the government can’t, the 
judge is empowered to say, “Let that person go.”
JOHNSON: Mr. Moss, can you talk about this 
specific case?
MOSS: In a very limited way, but I can certainly 
talk about his reason for being incarcerated. The rea-
son this man is incarcerated is that he was arrested on 
12 charges, 8 of which could get him 25 years for each 
charge, depending on what the evidence is. 
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A hearing was held on his detention, and the 
judge said, “I’m going to rule this way. Number one, 
Mr. Al Hussayen, you’ve got to resolve your issues with 
INS.” INS had put a hold on him after he was arrested 
on the felony charges. “Number two, if you get that 
straightened out, I will put you on house arrest in 
your home with all the restrictions. You can’t have a 
computer and other restrictions necessary for the 
protection of society.” 
He then had an INS hearing before a federal 
judge. He not only had his criminal attorney there, 
he had one of the best INS attorneys in the northwest 
accompany him. They had a two-day trial. The INS 
judge said, “You lied to come into this country, and 
therefore you are out of status. You no longer have 
a visa.” Given that set of circumstances, his attor-
ney agreed that he should be transferred back to the 
authority of the criminal court and be detained. That’s 
why Mr. Al Hussayen is in detention today. 
His trial is set for the 12th of January, and that’s 
not a very late date for a case as enormous as this case 
is. If you want to get into the terrorism aspects of it, go 
read the indictment. It’s all there. It’s public record. 
JOHNSON: Andy Malcolm. Back to our terror 
suspect for a moment. Are you going to editorialize 
about this guy being detained with what sounds like 
very little recourse here?
MALCOLM: This one or the previous one?
JOHNSON: The one I posited, the one Mr. Murphy 
is trying to investigate but can’t get anywhere with.
MALCOLM: Yes, eventually, but certainly not 
the night of the breaking story. A day or two later 
perhaps if we can get some independent explanation, 
assuming the reporters get it. If they don’t, we’ll go get 
it ourselves before doing an editorial. 
I also might mention the subject to the publisher.
JOHNSON: Dave Broder?
BRODER: If this fellow’s family is at all smart 
or sophisticated, when they get turned down by the 
city ombudsman, their next stop will be the newspa-
per office. They will go to you and say, “They are not 
doing right by our son. They have him locked up, we 
can’t talk to him, and we don’t know what the charges 
are. Can’t you do something about it?” I would guess 
you would assign your equivalent of George Lardner, 
who will drive them crazy with questions like, “Why 
the hell do you have this guy locked up? What is your 
justification?”
JOHNSON: What can you do, Carolyn?
WASHBURN: I think that’s right. I think we 
would be the next stop. It’s happened. We do the best 
we can to try to get to the bottom of it. In this kind 
of case, our best opportunities are interviews because 
we’ll start the process of trying to get documents, but 
we will be rebuffed at every turn. So we will start legal 
proceedings to get documents that we have a right to 
but with the full expectation that it will take months 
or years to get those. Where we can get them, they 
will help.
MALCOLM: Another editorial comes into play 
to help there as well. 
DUFFY: I have a problem with that. The prosecu-
tor doesn’t want to try the case in the newspaper. He 
wants to try it in the court. If he starts giving out inter-
views, if he starts giving out all of this evidence, then 
basically he is trying it in the newspapers. Then he 
shows up in front of a guy like me, and I say, “That’s 
very interesting. You just had your case. Why do you 
bother coming to me? I can’t get a jury here.” All right? 
Without a jury, I’m not going to be able to hear the 
case. Do you want me to move the case to Camden, 
New Jersey? By the way, I once threatened to do that 
to a group of lawyers, and they said, “Oh, no. Judge. 
We’ll withdraw the motion.”
But that’s what happens. 
JOHNSON: Carolyn, do you care about that at 
all, that you may taint the jury pool? This guy really is 
not in good shape.
WASHBURN: To be honest, I really don’t care 
about tainting the jury pool because I don’t buy that 
we’re tainting the jury pool. Every time there is a high 
profile case, somebody wants change of venue. It’s very 
rarely given, and people always seem to come out OK. 
So I think it’s mostly an excuse.
MURPHY: I just want to add that, even though 
the ombudsman’s office doesn’t have the authority 
to look into what the federal agents are doing, that 
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fact at the 11th hour when this individual is incar-
cerated wouldn’t insert itself in trying to advocate on 
his behalf. Somewhat as Carolyn said from the news-
paper’s perspective, with regard to the actions of local 
law enforcement, the complaint wouldn’t go away. 
While it might take months and maybe even years, we 
would relentlessly follow the complaint and finally get 
down to the bottom of whether local law enforcement 
followed their procedures and followed the require-
ments of the Constitution.
BROSNAHAN: From the defense viewpoint, you 
don’t want the jury to hear the defense before they get 
in there for another reason, and Judge Duffy is quite 
right. The first word we are going to tell them is, 
“Nobody has ever heard this. I know you know about 
this case, but nobody ever heard this.” 
But there are exceptions. In Lindh, we picked our 
spots. There were only two. The Attorney General had 
made statements beyond what I was used to in pend-
ing criminal cases, and a sitting federal judge in the 
Eastern District of Michigan wrote a letter to the New 
York Times, condemning what the Attorney General 
had done. So we were kind of in the paper already. 
Finally, we put out this picture. It’s a photograph of 
John, strapped to a gurney when we discussed theoret-
ical questions about interrogation. He was naked, and 
he had this bullet in his right thigh, which was there 
for fifteen days after he was apprehended. It’s a large, 
ugly bullet, which had hit metal before it hit him. 
This is about two minutes before he is interrogated by 
a single FBI agent. 
Here I join the distinguished former chairman of 
the CIA in criticizing the FBI.
DEUTCH: I wasn’t criticizing the FBI.
BROSNAHAN: OK, I withdraw it then. In any 
event, John did not want this put out because in the 
Koran, there is a discussion about modesty. You are 
not, man or woman, to expose a part of the body 
below your upper chest and above your knees. He 
didn’t want to put it out. We did put it out, and we 
began to hear from people. “I don’t care what he did; 
this is not right.” It helped us a little bit in a hopeless 
situation of public attitude.
My point is what defense lawyers do. As we sit 
here today in Idaho, I have no doubt there are crimi-
nal defense lawyers fighting like crazy to do the right 
thing for their client, but the mood in some of these 
cases is just extraordinary. It’s the mood that governs 
change of venue. 
They land prisoners at Dulles so they can try 
them in the Northern District of Virginia. It’s a scan-
dal. They pick the judges, they pick the juries, and 
it’s a scandal. Let me repeat that word. It’s a nice one, 
and you’re not going to read about it in the newspa-
pers, but it’s a legal scandal, and they do it. What is 
a defense lawyer to do except to think about how to 
try to turn public opinion a little bit to the idea that 
this defendant we’re talking about is actually a human 
being, a U.S. citizen, and has rights? Who’s interested 
in that subject? That’s the point of view from the crim-
inal defense lawyer.
TROTT: When I was there, we landed them at 
Andrews Air Force Base. When did they switch to 
Dulles?
BROSNAHAN: When several judges were 
appointed. 
JOHNSON: Senator Gorton, help us frame this 
discussion about the foreign national that’s detained. 
How would you have us think about that person’s rights 
and the responsibility of our system to that person in 
this environment of his potentially being a terrorist?
GORTON: Well, there is a continuum. Mr. 
Brosnahan has spoken about the most troubling situa-
tion, the one in which we are dealing with a citizen of 
the United States. We could be dealing with a foreign 
citizen here on a perfectly valid visa, perhaps even with 
a green card. We could deal with the situation that 
this U.S. Attorney is dealing with right now: someone 
here on an invalid visa or a visa that was presumably 
obtained by fraud. We could deal with someone who 
never had a visa at all. 
There really is a continuum, and I think that 
continuum involves the status of the person. We can 
take the foreign combatant who was taken outside the 
United States to Guantanamo or one who has never set 
foot in the United States. It’s at least valid to consider 
that different rules apply, given those different circum-
stances with obviously the greatest degree of consider-
ation having to be given, it seems to me, inevitably to 
a person who is a citizen of the United States. 
DUFFY: I tend to agree that we have to have 
something for citizens and have judicial oversight 
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of what’s going on with citizens. In fact, I feel very 
strongly about that. As to the combatants, people 
who are out in the field fighting, give them the right 
that they have under the Geneva Convention, which, 
believe it or not, is the right to be heard by a military 
tribunal and nothing else. 
I don’t think, as we have some people arguing 
from time to time, that we ought to have the activities 
of the CIA and the FBI viewed from the point of view 
of the person, “the victim,” and have that measured 
by, “Well, they didn’t give him his Fifth Amendment 
rights, or they didn’t do this or do that.” 
Let me give you an example. The Egyptian gov-
ernment arrested a defendant for a plot to kill the 
president of Egypt. They questioned and — I don’t 
think there is any doubt about it — tortured him. 
He said, “Oh, I didn’t plan to kill the president. I was 
here because I was running away because I blew up or 
attempted to blow up the World Trade Center.” They 
said, “Oh wonderful, he made a complete confession.” 
After they had the complete confession, they turned 
the matter over to the American delegation in Egypt, 
but the defense counsel, believe it or not, was heard 
to argue — and a great hullaballoo ensued over this 
— that the prosecutor could not use the confession he 
made to the Egyptians since they didn’t give him his 
Miranda rights. Interesting, but I didn’t accept it. 
JOHNSON: Mr. Murphy, is there anything 
we could do to change your ability to look into this 
case we’ve been talking about? What would it require 
to give you, as an advocate for the citizen and the 
public, more access to information relating to these 
kinds of situations? 
MURPHY: In terms of the local level, the only 
question that is still out there is the ability of the 
ombudsman’s office to look into local intelligence files. 
There has been a debate about that. We requested a 
waiver from the U.S. Attorney’s office and were denied 
that waiver. There is a city ordinance that gives me 
access to those files and that access has not yet been 
tested. If we didn’t expand the authority beyond local 
law enforcement, that would be the one area where 
there is still a question out there. 
JOHNSON: We want to open this up for some of 
your questions, but I have at least a couple more top-
ics I want to touch on briefly. Out of the realm of the 
hypothetical, John Deutch, I can’t get you here and 
not ask you about the imbroglio of the last few days 
in Washington, D.C. with the alleged outing of a CIA 
operative. Tell us your reaction to that, how serious it 
might be, etc. 
DEUTCH: I have no knowledge of the specifics 
of this case, but it strikes me as being the kind of thing 
that is invented in Washington, bruted about, and has 
no particular consequence one way or the other. It will 
go away. I don’t think it has any significance. That’s 
my own view. 
JOHNSON: Dave Broder? You guys have been 
spilling a lot of ink for a story that will go away.
BRODER: That’s our habit. I don’t think this 
one has large life, largely because I don’t think we are 
ever going to know the names of the specific people 
who were making these calls to reporters. Absent that, 
this story will go away. It reflects oddly to me on the 
purported purpose of the Administration in doing 
this. They had a public relations problem with a seem-
ingly credible, experienced diplomat coming along 
and saying, “I went there, and I told them that there 
was no evidence to support this notion that there was 
the yellow cake going from Niger to Iraq.” That was a 
public relations problem for them. 
Where in their mindset they decided they could 
minimize this story by revealing that the wife of this 
diplomat worked for the CIA is the puzzling part 
to me. It isn’t as if she worked for the Democratic 
National Committee, and even in Washington, I 
think people are capable of making that distinction. 
JOHNSON: Andy Malcolm, what’s the view 
from the left coast of this Washington story.
MALCOLM: Speaking on behalf of 35 million 
Californians, we’re a little bit busy at the moment. 
JOHNSON: Did you say dizzy or busy?
MALCOLM: Yes, dizzy and busy. I guess I’m in 
David’s camp on this one. It reminded me of the epi-
sode in “The Pirates of the Caribbean” this summer 
where Johnny Depp is a pirate, doublecrosses the good 
guy, and gets his sword back. The good guy complains 
that he was doublecrossed. Depp says, “Pirate.” It 
strikes me the same way, “Spies, hello.” 
But in terms of a manipulation through a leak 
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— and I’ve read several versions, which gives me great 
suspicion — if it happened generally that way, it’s 
extremely clumsy. It would tell me, from some lim-
ited experience — not that I’ve ever leaked anything 
— that it’s a freelancer. It’s very clumsy. 
First of all, if you had several people doing it, 
that’s too many tracks. Second, if several people called 
several people, that doubles it. So if one person called 
several people, that’s still a problem. Where is the 
exclusivity in that? You don’t call the second guy until 
the first guy doesn’t do anything. To have one or sev-
eral people call lots of people doesn’t wash. I know 
nothing about the specific case beyond that. 
I have seen similar situations where somebody is 
sitting as an aid in a meeting and hears people com-
plain about this guy. They say, “By the way, his wife is 
a CIA agent.” The aid talks to a friend at lunch, who 
goes back to the Hill and mentions it. Not that it was 
leaked intentionally to do anything, but it goes back 
and becomes the gossip in the place, which is currency. 
We all like secrets. I loved secrets on the playground 
when I was in third grade. I know something you don’t 
know. That becomes a currency that is exchanged, my 
experience suggests, in centers of government, most 
particularly in Washington.
JOHNSON: John Deutch, apparently there is a 
great deal of outrage in some sectors that they outed 
an operative, destroyed her sources, and perhaps even 
endangered her life. 
DEUTCH: I don’t understand this sheet of music 
on any one of the lines. First of all, you don’t usually 
find an important case officer in Washington. That’s 
the first thing. There is a whole set of circumstances 
here. I don’t know everything about this individual, 
but it just doesn’t strike me as being an authentic issue. 
I guess it’s part of the chatter that comes in the pub-
lic and in the press about intelligence. Everything is 
exciting and interesting, but it does not go to the core 
of any important issue that I know about. Just none. 
There is nothing about it that I think is important in 
relation to the issues we have discussed here today. 
JOHNSON: Senator Gorton? Same view?
GORTON: I don’t know that I know enough 
about it. I was just going to ask David Broder. At least 
one of the few stories I’ve read about it indicated that 
her assignment in the CIA wasn’t one that was pro-
tected in any event…
DEUTCH: That’s my point, too, sir. 
GORTON: …which means there is nothing to 
investigate. 
TROTT: I was in charge of a lot of these things, 
and the big thing to watch out for is something like 
this simply turning into a partisan political spear. 
Both parties, since the Nixon Administration and 
since Watergate, think that if you can get an indepen-
dent counsel appointed to investigate the president, 
that gives you political advantage. So it’s like a game 
back there with these things. They start demanding an 
independent counsel for political reasons and not for 
reasons really related to the law or to national security. 
I’m not saying that nothing happened here that vio-
lated the law, but too often, the independent counsel 
thing simply became a partisan political effort to try 
to overturn the person in the White House. It got very 
much out of control.
DEUTCH: That’s the reason the law was not 
extended. 
TROTT: That’s why it was knocked off. It was 
being abused rather than used properly. 
BRODER: As I said to you at lunch, that would 
be consequential if somehow this revived that inde-
pendent counsel law. Getting rid of it was one of the 
few good things that you can actually say Congress has 
done in the last few years. 
WASHBURN: The real core in all of this is how 
ready people are to be distrustful of their government, 
which is why all of this openness is so important in 
the first place. 
TROTT: Part of that is the legacy of the Watergate 
era, Richard Nixon, and the kind of stuff that the 
Church Committee uncovered. 
MALCOLM: I would suggest another aspect to 
it. Of course I went into government after 26 years 
in journalism. Governor Racicot used to always intro-
duce me as a “recovering journalist.” I found account-
ability to be the ultimate defense. That is, if you could 
be open, then it’s been there all this time. So then it’s 
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not your responsibility for hiding it; it’s somebody 
else’s responsibility for not looking or not finding or 
whatever. 
We had some disputes in the state administration 
— nothing to do with national security — over open-
ness. I went to the Governor, and I said, “Now you 
have five kids. When you go home tonight, if four 
bedroom doors are open and one is closed, what do 
you want to do?” He said, “Well, I’m going to look in 
the fifth one.” I said, “Right. Do you want to fight this 
every day for four or eight years?” He said, “No.” 
The next day, he issued an executive order and 
totally turned the presumption around. That is, you 
didn’t have to prove you had a right to get the infor-
mation. All information was open. It was up to the 
state to prove that something was proprietary and 
should be kept secret. He also opened his cabinet 
meetings, all phone calls, all of his correspondence. 
Anybody could come in. 
You know what happened? The reporters didn’t 
have — as he called it — the ”butt power” to come 
in and sit through an entire cabinet meeting. The 
only person who ever asked for a secret meeting with 
the Governor after that was a newspaper publisher. 
So there was an element of hypocrisy on both sides, 
and we get involved in these constant feuds, which 
then take on a life of their own and get away from 
the issue. 
JOHNSON: Question from the audience, John?
JOHN FREEMUTH: We have a couple, Marc. 
AUDIENCE QUESTION: A question for Judge 
Duffy. We’ve heard a lot today about conducting 
the war against terrorism as a criminal prosecution. 
I wonder if you could comment on something I’ve 
heard and read happened in your courtroom regard-
ing the first World Trade Center bombing. During 
the testimony, an expert witness was called, and he 
testified that the only way to knock down those tow-
ers would be to fly large fuel-laden aircraft into those 
buildings. Seated in the back of your courtroom that 
day were a number of friends of the Muslim extrem-
ist perpetrators, and they were copiously taking notes. 
Is that true, your honor?
DUFFY: No. The only testimony that came out 
about that was from the engineer who took the stand 
and testified that a 707, taking off from JFK, if it ran 
into the World Trade Center, the Center would with-
stand the blow. Apparently, the problem came about, 
not because of the impact of the airplane, but because 
of the fire, something that he never testified about at 
all. This was an open trial, but everybody who came 
to the trial — and I mean everybody — had to pro-
duce picture I.D. and had to sign in. Amazingly, we 
did not have too many followers of Osama bin Laden 
show up. I don’t think we will. I have a couple more 
to go. I have the U.S.S. Cole, and I have the residue 
of the embassy cases to do. I don’t think we’ll be both-
ered with them. 
At the first World Trade Center trial, we had more 
than 200 requests for press credentials. I said, “All 
right, the press can have half of the courtroom, and 
the regular folks will be in the other half.” Most of the 
trial had one or two people in back. One young lady 
was there every day, and she was the only reporter who 
was there every day. Hangers-on would come in, but 
not everybody attended every day. Most of the time, 
we played to an empty house. 
AUDIENCE QUESTION: My question is in 
regard to the administrative subpoena. Earlier, during 
the hypothetical, Tom Moss referred to the four differ-
ent areas in which they are usable currently. My ques-
tion is this: To me, a doctor is very understandable and 
easy to identify. Do you think a terrorist is that easy 
to identify?
MOSS: No, but I don’t know what that has to do 
with your question.
AUDIENCE QUESTION: Using that com-
parison, it seems like we’re comparing apples and 
oranges. 
MOSS: What I’m saying is that under the present 
law, one of the four areas of investigation that allows for 
the use of administrative subpoenas is health care fraud. 
The proposal is simply applying that same law to ter-
rorists. My point is simply this: If we’re going to keep 
the laws in place that we have, is it so bad to extend that 
law to include terrorist investigations? I agree with you 
that doctors and terrorists are a lot different, but in both 
cases, they are difficult to investigate. 
DUFFY: This has reference to the penultimate 
question. A comment was made this morning about 
the Manila bombing case, which I also tried. Ramzi 
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Yousef in the Manila bombing case had a computer, 
and we went through the computer at great length. 
In the computer was a plan of Ramzi Yousef ’s to blow 
up eleven airplanes, 727s or whatever the big ones are, 
over the Pacific Ocean, all at the same time, with the 
assumption that there would be 400 people on each 
one. Now he tried out the plan on a Japan Airlines 
plane, maybe it was Philippine Airlines. 
The plane flew. It did not blow up because Ramsey 
didn’t want it to blow up. It landed in Okinawa. That 
was part of this entire thing. Ramzi never suggested 
and never would suggest that he wanted to sacrifice 
himself. 
By the way, one of the four people who were going 
to put the bombs aboard was Wali Khan, a guy I used 
to call “Fingers” Khan because he’d blown off most of 
his fingers but still constructed bombs. Another was 
Khalid Mohammed, who shows up from time to time 
in the newspapers now, under arrest, and supposedly 
talking to our country.
There is no suggestion that any one of the four 
of them would have sacrificed themselves. I would 
almost guarantee that. Ramzi is not the type of person 
to commit suicide. I know only two others of the four. 
I don’t know Khalid Mohammed on a personal basis. 
I don’t even know Ramzi on a personal basis, but I 
watched him for about eleven months. I’ll tell you this 
much: Those fellows would not commit suicide under 
any circumstances. There was no suggestion that the 
United States knew about suicide bombers taking air-
planes into buildings, or at least not from the cases I 
tried. I don’t know whether someone else knew about 
it, but I sure didn’t.
JOHNSON: One more question, and then we’ll 
thank our panel. 
AUDIENCE QUESTION: I’d like to know 
whether anyone on the panel — this was suggested 
by our U.S. Attorney Moss, at least in my mind — 
believes that a foreign national, like the hundreds or 
thousands at Guantanamo, has any legal rights whatso-
ever for counsel, or are they subject to indefinite deten-
tion under the laws of this country or the Geneva con-
vention?
MOSS: I’ll attempt to explain it as best I can. 
The people at Guantanamo are mostly al-Qaida and 
Taliban. The way our government is treating them is 
under the terms of the Geneva Convention, which 
says that when you have enemy combatants, they can 
be detained until the hostilities subside or until they 
are determined to be no longer a threat. 
I understand that several dozen have been released 
because they have been determined to be no longer 
a threat to the security of the United States. That’s 
being done in spite of the fact that the government’s 
position has been that they do not have those rights 
because to be entitled to rights under the Geneva 
Convention, first, you have to represent a sovereign 
power. Al-Qaida does not. Number two, you have to 
have a line of authority within your ranks that takes 
you to the government. You also have to wear a uni-
form with an emblem that clearly defines who you’re 
fighting for. Most of the people at Guantanamo don’t 
satisfy those requirements. However, the government’s 
position is that we are treating them like enemy com-
batants. They’ve been allowed to contact their families 
to let them know where they are. That is as far as it has 
gone. The determination has been that hostilities are 
ongoing, and we’re not going to turn them loose so 
they can go home, get their rifles, and start fighting us 
again. That’s the status as I understand it. 
BROSNAHAN: I just want to say a couple of 
things if I might on Guantanamo. My public knowl-
edge is that the people there were taken from the field 
in Afghanistan and that they were taken there approx-
imately December or January of 2002, which means 
they don’t have any intelligence. They have been in 
cages, and they don’t know anything unless these spies 
they have just arrested have been taking things in to 
tell them. So what they know is — and I don’t work in 
the intelligence field — what they knew as of January 
of 2002. How helpful that is, I don’t know. 
Number two is an excuse for me to recommend 
that you read a book by Hugo Grotius [On the Law 
of War and Peace], who lived in the late 1500’s. The 
king of France said he was one of the brightest peo-
ple in Europe, and he wrote on war, the rights of war, 
and the law and war, which is what we’ve been talking 
about all day. He lived around the time of Vermeer, 
who did those wonderful paintings and showed the 
interiors at Delft and all of that. 
What interests me about the book — you might 
want to take a look at it. It’s out there; you can get it 
— is that in order to lay a basis for humane treating 
of prisoners in war, he examined the Bible, the same 
one that is available to all of us now. It says, among 
other things, “You will not vex your prisoners.” That is 
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God’s word. There have been over 30 attempts at sui-
cide since they were put down there. It is government 
action by the United States government. The question 
we’ve been looking at all day is: What are we becom-
ing? That’s the issue for all of us. Where are we going? 
Who is leading us? What are we becoming? What 
price are we paying?
JOHNSON: I am going to publicly beg the indul-
gence of Congressman Otter, who made a real effort 
to be here today. The press of business in Washington 
wouldn’t allow him to do that. We thought we might 
continue this discussion a little longer this afternoon 
and include him, but we’ve abused our panelists here 
for two hours, and I don’t want to take any more 
advantage of them. Please join me in thanking these 
panelists. 
APPLAUSE
Now, before you all leave, we’re going to have some 
quick closing comments from Dr. Forrest Church. 
FORREST CHURCH: We’ve all been enor-
mously privileged today to witness these thoughtful, 
committed patriotic men and women, grappling with 
the issues of such enormous importance to all of us in 
this nation. 
It was just seventy years ago that President 
Franklin Roosevelt — not always perfect as none of 
our presidents has been perfect — said, “The only 
thing we have to fear is fear itself.” The only thing 
we have to fear is fear itself. He wasn’t using fear to 
frighten us; he was trying to alert us to the danger 
of being overly frightened because our responses to 
the reality — always difficult, always challenging — 
confronting us with all of its dangers would be only 
compromised and our difficulty compounded by the 
fear we felt.
There is a golden mean somewhere between fear 
and security. In a way, liberty and security or freedom 
and safety are opposites. Somewhere in between, in 
the Aristotelian sense, there is a golden mean, which 
we will never find. We do know that it is dangerous to 
sacrifice too much of our freedom to secure our safety. 
Finally, the only time we will be safe is when we’re 
dead. That is the only thing that will bring us com-
plete safety. Safety is a chimera. It can’t be maintained; 
it can’t be secured.
How safe do we want to be? This is really the 
question we have to ask ourselves. The Greeks had 
a virtue that describes this golden mean somewhere 
between security and freedom. It seems like an 
obvious word to mention here because in our contem-
porary lingo, it has a kind of fear-laden sense to it. The 
word is “prudence.” It meant originally “to know the 
good and do it,” to exercise right thinking and bal-
ance the best we possibly can. What we really are call-
ing upon our leaders to exercise and ourselves, in our 
own responses, to exercise is a certain amount of self-
enlightened prudence. 
To obsess over threats to safety while ignoring 
threats to liberty demonstrates as little enlightened 
self-interest as would a person who thought nothing 
about borrowing logs from the walls of his home to 
replenish his supply of firewood. As the house grows 
draftier, in order to keep the fire burning brightly to 
make up for the lost heat, he must take more and more 
wood from the walls. Tending his hearth, he destroys 
his home. Since we can purchase no security whose 
warranty will not one day expire, wisdom counsels 
lavishing at least a little security in exchange for 
liberty, especially in this nation, which is founded 
upon the principle of liberty.
Once we as a nation have done all of the obvi-
ous and defensible things to protect ourselves against 
another terrorist attack, each additional fraction 
of protection will exact a proportional sacrifice of 
freedom — and not only freedom. When our alarms 
warn us only against threats that imperil our safety, 
they fail to alert us to dangers that may jeopardize 
our humanity. Whoever fights monsters should see 
to it that, in the process, he does not become a mon-
ster, wrote the philosopher Frederic Nietzsche. When 
you look into an abyss, the abyss also looks into you. 
When President Roosevelt reminded the American 
people that the only thing they had to fear was fear 
itself, he sought to make us less vulnerable to our 
enemies, not more like them. 
Thank you. 
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CECIL ANDRUS: To those of you who were 
unable to be with us all day today, we had a long, full 
day. It was exciting, very analytical, and it was a day in 
which we had the opportunity to listen to some of the 
greatest minds in America give their views on where 
we are today, particularly when it comes to the ques-
tion of freedom versus security. Do we want security? 
Absolutely. Will we do whatever is necessary? Certainly. 
But how much is enough? What is the balance? 
You’re here tonight to listen to David Broder, who 
is, without question, one of the greatest journalists that 
America has ever known. When you ask someone inside 
Washington, D.C. and the Beltway to name the most 
respected reporter in town, the answer, nine out of ten 
times, will be Dave Broder. When you ask a person 
outside the House of Mirrors, the same question elic-
its the same answer. It is Dave Broder, a man of great 
intellectual honesty, a man who tells it the way it is, a 
man who has his column in more than 300 newspa-
pers around the globe. He is also not only in the print 
media, he is very good on television. If you watch “Meet 
the Press” or “Washington Week in Review,” you find 
that he doesn’t pound on the table and shout as some 
do. He actually has something to say. His comments are 
informed, insightful, and interesting. 
I could go on a long time about all the accolades 
and honors he has received, but I’m going to read just 
one little paragraph out of Esquire magazine, in the 
intellectual part of that magazine. “Broder has few 
challengers as the most influential political journalist 
in the country.” Media critic Ron Powers on CBS-TV 
said, “Broder is not famous like Peter Jennings. He’s 
not glamorous like Tom Brokaw, but underneath that 
brown suit, there is a real superman.”
Besides that, I like his hair style. Any man that 
works hard to get it looking like that, I know what 
he does through. He’s won the Pulitzer Prize and 
has received many awards for many years. I first met 
this man when I was a greenhorn Governor back in 
the early 1970s, my first life. He gets outside of the 
Beltway to places where he can find the people and 
discuss the politics and issues of the world. 
Ladies and gentlemen, please help me welcome 
David Broder. 
DAVID BRODER: Thank you. Governor 
Andrus, I thank you very much for your willingness 
to sacrifice on my behalf whatever little credibility you 
have might built up with this crowd. 
It has been a spectacular day here. I missed the 
morning because I was flying in from Chicago, and 
I particularly regret not having heard Senator Slade 
Gorton. The parts that I heard have just been won-
derful, and I congratulate all of you who had a part 
in putting this program together. It reminds me, as I 
mentioned just moments ago to Mrs. Andrus, of a line 
that Mo Udall used to use when he was the last speaker 
on a long program. Mo would say, “Well, everything 
has been said, ladies and gentlemen, but not every-
body has said it.”
So we’re going to go on. The only difficulty with 
the program that I heard this afternoon was that 
it made me go back to the hotel and re-write these 
comments because really everything that’s important 
has been said and been said much better than I can 
possibly try to summarize it. 
I’m not going to try to summarize all of those 
wise observations that have been made. I think what 
I might try to do would be to put it into a little bit 
different context, a Washington, D.C. context, and 
then just simply try to put a framework around it that 
may or may not be of any use to you.
As all of us all day have been starting, I am starting 
with the acknowledgment that our lives, as individu-
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als and the life of this country, changed and changed 
in a fundamental way on September 11th. The oddity 
for me, in repeating that date, is that it happens to be 
my birthday. It’s a bad date to celebrate your birthday, 
but luckily, I have a daughter in San Francisco whose 
birthday is on September 12, and Lauren has gener-
ously said, “You can share my birthday with me.” So 
we celebrate together now on September 12th.
Certainly in the city where I work and have 
worked for a long time, the atmosphere, the environ-
ment — in almost every way that you can measure 
it — is very different now from what it was. Those 
of you who have been to Washington in the last 
couple of years know that all over the city now, you 
have physical barriers that were not there before. The 
security checks in your old department and other 
departments that seemingly have no direct relation-
ship to national security — all of them now have their 
own security checks. 
The whole psychology of the city has changed 
from what it was before. It’s reflected in the legisla-
tion that was passed and that we’ve been discussing 
here today. It is certainly reflected also in the way 
the administration of justice is being carried out in 
Washington and around the country. We know now 
— and it’s been the topic all day — about the Patriot 
Act. We know that it is there, but we know not nearly 
as much as we need to know in terms of information 
about the way in which that new authority is being 
used.
In June, Attorney General Ashcroft reported that 
he had asked 170 times now for what they are refer-
ring to as authority for “emergency surveillance,” which 
gives them the authority to examine the papers, records, 
and so on for up to 72 hours before a court says, “You 
are authorized to use that kind of surveillance.” 
There was a survey I read about what was done by 
the library science school at the University of Illinois 
in which they talked to 1500 major libraries around 
the country. They found that 178 of them reported 
that they had been visited for one reason or another 
by FBI members, asking them about somebody’s use 
of the library. Clearly those statistics represent only 
the tip of the iceberg of what has been going on since 
September 11th.
We have learned that there have been 215 
reported surveillances of financial and other records 
that have been reported to Congress, but again I sus-
pect that is only the tip of the iceberg. We know that 
Section 215 of the Patriot Act has allowed a number 
of broader inquiries into the records than would have 
been permissible under law before that. We know that 
immigration statutes have been used for long-term 
detention of people and for the rapid repatriation of 
people and that there has been a stinging report from 
the Justice Department’s own Inspector General about 
conditions in which some of those detainees have been 
held. We know that there has been expanded use of 
the material witness statute to detain people and to 
keep them in detention. 
My paper and George Lardner, who has been 
part of the program today, examined 44 cases of 
those material witnesses and found that in almost 
half the cases, the so-called material witnesses had 
not even been called to testify before a Grand Jury. 
Of course, during the day, we’ve had a good deal of 
discussion about the use of the “enemy combatant” 
status, including the cases the judges talked about of 
two American citizens, who have been placed in the 
hands of the military, held incommunicado, denied 
lawyers, and facing — at some point, one presumes 
— military courts. 
All of these various areas have properly caused a 
good deal of controversy and discussion. That con-
troversy has been the topic of our meeting here 
today. What strikes me is that it may be useful just to 
organize our thinking about the monitoring of this 
process by focusing on three sets of institutions that 
traditionally we have relied on in our country to keep 
the checks and balances, which the founders wanted 
to have, particularly when it came to the administra-
tion of justice. The institutions I’m thinking about are 
the courts, the Congress, and the press.
I want to try to talk briefly about each of those 
institutions, what they have attempted to do and what 
they have been able to do.
Let’s start with judicial review, which is built right 
into the Constitution as probably the most important 
of the safeguards for individual liberties. I think that, 
in the two years since September 11th, judicial review 
has not really been able to put much of a dent into 
some of the more controversial Justice Department 
activities. 
Something I was not very familiar with until 
we started covering this whole area is the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court, known by its acronym 
as FISC, made up, as I understand it, of 11 District 
Court judges, who routinely are asked to review FBI 
requests for wiretaps or electronic surveillance. Over 
the last 25 years — I couldn’t find any breakout of the 
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last two years — but over the last 25 years that court 
has been in existence, the figures show something like 
15,000 applications for that type of surveillance, and 
the stunning figure is that in all of that time, they have 
been refused only five times. Either the FBI is being 
very careful about its applications, or the courts are 
being very permissive about going along with these 
applications.
This court did, in fact, rule in one case that the 
mixing of national security surveillance with routine 
criminal prosecutions raised serious problems. But 
when that case was appealed to the appellate level of 
that FISC Court, judgment was reversed, and the gov-
ernment was allowed to go ahead with the blending 
that the Patriot Act involved and allowed the use of 
intelligence data in normal criminal prosecution.
Last May, there was a case that came to the 
District Court in Washington, D.C., a press kind of 
case, an appeal to use the Freedom of Information Act 
to disclose the names and the numbers and the types 
of cases to which the Patriot Act was being applied. 
The District Court in Washington said Freedom of 
Information Act does not apply to those cases. 
In December of last year, a district judge ruled that 
the United States, in the Padia case we talked about 
today — the American citizen who is being held some-
place in a military brig — could hold Padia under those 
conditions but that he must be given access to an attor-
ney and allowed to challenge that status. But that judg-
ment by a District Court has now been appealed and is 
still pending, at least that is my best information.
As was referred to this afternoon, two separate 
circuits in this country have given opposite judgments 
about the Constitutionality of holding deportation 
hearings in secret when the government asserts that 
there is a special security interest in the alien that is 
up for deportation. So we don’t know what the final 
judgment will be on those matters. 
On the question of keeping secret the names of 
those who are being detained as material witnesses, 
a District of Columbia circuit court has held that 
Attorney General Ashcroft is well within his rights in 
keeping those proceedings secret. So at best, it’s a mixed 
record that we have in terms of the judicial role. 
Congress obviously has a Constitutional duty to 
maintain oversight over the administration of justice 
by the Justice Department and the FBI, and it’s clear 
that Congress has run into great difficulty in trying to 
fulfill that role. The material that was obtained, finally, 
from the Justice Department and the FBI, constituted 
several hundred pages of information, but almost all 
of it was blacked out, “redacted,” to use the techni-
cal term, so that the members of Congress could only 
guess what was really being done in these cases. 
The Judiciary Committee on the Senate side sent 
about 50 questions to the Attorney General and asked 
him to respond to their queries about the use of the 
Patriot Act. When the answers came back, this is what 
the Judiciary Committee reported: 
“We are disappointed with the non-respon-
siveness of the Justice Department and the FBI. 
Although the DOJ and the FBI have sometimes 
cooperated with our oversight efforts, often legit-
imate questions went unanswered or the DOJ 
answers were delayed so long and were so incom-
plete that they were of minimal use in the over-
sight efforts of this committee.”
 As all of you in Idaho know, your member 
of Congress, Butch Otter, did succeed in getting the 
House of Representatives to delete funds for one of the 
key provisions of the Patriot Act, the one he refers to 
as the “sneak and peek” surveillance provision, which 
allows them not only to examine records of people 
that are of interest to them but to insist that those who 
have custody of the records not inform the person 
whose records were being examined of the fact that the 
surveillance had taken place. By a very large margin, 
309 to 118, Mr. Otter was able to strike the funds in 
the House Appropriations Bill that would have been 
used to carry out that provision. But there is no similar 
provision in the Senate version of that Appropriation 
bill, so we do not know, at this point, what the effect 
of this will be. 
Now we turn to the third institution, the press. 
I should say here not just the press but a wide variety 
of public interest groups that are also attempting to 
monitor the use of this new authority. What we find 
is that the private organizations have done really an 
excellent job of trying to compile information and an 
excellent job, in my judgment, in raising the kind of 
issues that were being discussed here this afternoon. 
We in the press have covered the controversy about 
those interesting provisions and, in some cases, have 
fought hard to break through the barriers, the curtain 
of secrecy behind which some of these laws are being 
administered. 
Once again, the results have been rather 
meager. I have to say, in candor, that in journalism, we 
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are facing a kind of built-in conflict of interest when 
it comes to our roles as monitors, specifically of the 
FBI, the Department of Justice, and the other parts of 
our Executive Branch that have prosecutorial author-
ity. The reporters who cover the Department of Justice 
and the FBI depend on the Department of Justice and 
the FBI for much of the information they need to 
report on the enforcement of these laws. 
We cannot blind ourselves to the fact that there 
are serious, important, and legitimate cases involv-
ing security, which those agencies are dealing with. 
In our world as reporters, having access to the people 
who can help us understand those highly publicized 
cases is of great importance to us. I suppose that a 
news organization could have a Team A, which would 
deal with the law enforcement agencies as sources of 
information about prosecution, and a Team B, which 
was dedicated to monitoring the behavior or even the 
misbehavior of those same agencies. I know of no 
news organization that has the luxury of that kind of 
staffing arrangement. So all of the reporters who are in 
part monitors are also in part dependent on those very 
same agencies for the daily information that is vital to 
their covering the beat. 
Let me try to conclude these comments by going 
back to what I began with, which is to try to empha-
size the environment in which these decisions are made 
and these actions are being carried out in Washington, 
D.C. since September 11, 2001. Washington, per-
haps, was more affected by the attacks that day than 
any other place in the country, except for New York. 
Washington saw what happened at the World Trade 
Center. We saw and heard and lived with and smelled 
what happened at the Pentagon. In my neighbor-
hood, two miles from the Pentagon, filled with mil-
itary families, we didn’t lose anyone from the neigh-
borhood, but all of my neighbors lost personal friends, 
colleagues, and comrades in that attack, and it is a 
living memory for them and for all of us who share 
that space with them.
Soon after the attack of September 11th, we of 
course had the anthrax attacks in Washington, which, 
in some ways, affected the psychology of the city much 
as — or perhaps even more — than the September 11th 
attacks because that was an unexpected and insidious 
intrusion, and we still don’t know where it came from. 
At the Washington Post, to give you a trivial example, 
we still do not bring any unopened mail onto to the 
newsroom floor of our building. If we want to open our 
mail, we go down to an isolated dark floor, one floor 
below the newsroom, and we open our mail there and 
then bring whatever we want back into the newsroom. 
We are that afraid of possible contamination. 
I ride the Metro, which you all were nice enough 
to build for us in Washington, into work every day. I 
have noticed that when the spacing on the trains in the 
Metro gets a little off and they stop your train between 
stations to get the spacing right, since September 11th, 
people look around rather nervously at each other and 
ask, with their eyes if not their voices, “What’s going 
on? Why have we stopped here? What’s happened?” 
There is this real sense that the threat of terror-
ism has not been forgotten in Washington, and as I 
travel the country, it seems to me that in most places 
in our country, most people are living their daily lives 
very much as they did before September 11th. Unless 
you happened to be going through an airport that day, 
the likelihood is that your routine is probably very 
much what it was on September 10th. That is not the 
case in Washington, and it affects the way in which 
Washington is weighing the balance between security 
and individual freedom.
There is one other aspect of the Washington envi-
ronment that I think needs to be understood. That 
is the internal environment, the mindset of the peo-
ple who are governing in Washington. The President 
always sets the tone in Washington. He sets the agenda. 
This president said explicitly in the days immediately 
after September 11th that the war on terror, to use his 
phrase, was now the priority for his Administration. In 
fact, he has remarked to people more than once that 
he believes that he now understands why he became 
president. It was not clear to him before September 
11th what his mission was, but he now understands 
that protecting this nation from terrorism is the mis-
sion that he was sent to Washington to accomplish. 
That sets the tone for the entire government. It sets 
the priorities for the budget. It sets the priorities in 
law enforcement. 
I came across something a few days ago that I 
want to read to you. It’s from a publication called 
The Presidential Studies Quarterly, published by the 
Center for the Study of the Presidency. It is written by 
a woman named Nancy Baker who is a political scien-
tist at New Mexico State University. I just want to read 
you one paragraph because I think it makes the point 
that I’m trying to make here about where the priori-
ties of Washington lie. She is talking particularly about 
Attorney General Ashcroft and she says:
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“The Administration characterizes its anti-
terrorism measures as fully consistent with civil 
liberties and denies that any of its actions con-
stitute restrictions. ‘A commitment to civil lib-
erties extends up to the President,’ according 
to Attorney General Ashcroft. ‘President Bush 
insists that our responses to evil respect the 
Constitution and value the freedoms and jus-
tice the Constitution guarantees.’ The Attorney 
General has been the most outspoken member 
of the Administration on this theme. He told 
Senators this past spring, ‘The Department of 
Justice has acted thoughtfully, carefully, and 
within the Constitution of the United States, 
that framework for freedom.’ 
Throughout the past two years, he has made 
similar assurances in press releases and public state-
ments when discussing anti-terrorist measures. For 
example, he described the plan to end the infor-
mational firewalls between federal prosecutors and 
intelligence officers as ‘rooted in our Constitutional 
liberties.’ Interrogation of thousands of foreign 
nationals he described as exhibiting ‘full respect 
for the rights and dignity of the individuals being 
interviewed.’ In a talk to FBI agents regarding 
revised guidelines that would allow them to moni-
tor public gatherings, he escribed them as as a ‘dem-
onstration to the American public that the agency 
would protect them from terrorism with a scrupu-
lous respect for civil rights and personal freedoms.’”
 And there are other examples. The comment 
about this that I want to leave you with comes from a 
former dean of the Washington and Lee Law School 
in Virginia, who was running a forum at the opening 
this past summer of the Center for the Constitution, 
which is open now in Philadelphia. The former dean 
told me this story. He said, “I wish that it were pos-
sible for the press to have been in this session. I didn’t 
see any reporters in the room when we were having 
this discussion. A recently-retired Justice Department 
official, who was there in effect representing the Bush 
Administration, made this comment to the forum: 
“You need to understand that President 
Bush today, in his role as the leader of the war 
on terrorism, is in very much the same position 
as President Lincoln during the Civil War. Like 
Lincoln, he will try to preserve the Constitution, 
but he is determined to preserve the Union.”
Thank you very much. 
ANDRUS: Ladies and gentlemen, you’ve just 
heard from the best of the best in the area of journal-
ism in America. David, thank you very much. Now 
we’re going to have some questions. We have Dr. 
Freemuth and Marc Johnson here with microphones. 
But remember what I said earlier today: questions, yes; 
speeches, no way. 
AUDIENCE QUESTION: All day we’ve been 
talking about preventive measures and the conse-
quences of all that. I’m just curious. What are we 
doing to deal with the root of the problem so we are 
not creating enemies faster than we can kill them. 
BRODER: The root of the problem? Can you 
spell it out a little bit?
AUDIENCE: Why do people hate us? What is it 
that we are doing that causes such great animosity? 
BRODER: Well, that’s a question that is way 
above my pay grade. I think to the extent that the 
problem is rooted in Middle East, we know some of 
the causes, the historic causes of the conflict in that 
part of the world. The difficulty — I almost used 
the word futility, but I don’t want to say futility — 
the extraordinary difficulty that successive American 
administrations have had in trying to find a path-
way to peace and ending the struggle between the 
Palestinian people and Israel. That’s part of the story. 
Part of the story, which frankly I do not under-
stand very well — and I’m sure there are others in 
this room that could speak to it much more clearly 
than I can — is in the nation of Saudi Arabia and our 
checkered relationship with them, our dependence on 
their oil, and our difficulty in finding a way to express 
American values to the rulers of that country. But 
those are just two of the elements of something that is 
a very large question. 
I have to say for myself that I think we need, in 
our policy, to be addressing both the symptoms and the 
causes of terrorism. I don’t think we can give ourselves 
the luxury of saying, “If we can just get to the roots of 
this, there would be no problem.” There are people who 
are products of these forces who do intend us evil. We 
have to be prepared to confront that evil. But if we stop 
at that point, we have simply consigned ourselves, our 
children, and our grandchildren to living perpetually  in 
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a land that is less free and has fewer resources to deal 
with its other needs than would otherwise be the case. 
AUDIENCE QUESTION: If I may, I’d like to 
ask a question about the recent allegation of a leak 
identifying a CIA operative. The Statesman had a 
front page article today with a Washington Post byline, 
I believe, indicating a very recent poll suggesting that 
over 80% felt that was a very serious issue, and over 
70% felt there should be independent investigation of 
those allegations. I thought I heard you suggest this 
afternoon that that was an issue that would soon blow 
over. Can you tell me what you know about the issue 
that perhaps I don’t? I happen to be in the majority 
reflected by that poll.
BRODER: Thank you for the question. I’m 
unclear in my mind as to what degree, if any, the life 
and work of the operative in the CIA was put in jeop-
ardy by the publication of her name. This is a diffi-
cult area for a journalist, but I think it behooves us to 
give great heed to the plea that was made to my friend 
Bob Novak to withhold the name. I don’t think that 
the name added any great value to the public, and I 
do think that if it is at all a serious jeopardy for the 
woman, the name should not have been published. 
When I said that I don’t think this is likely to be a 
major continuing controversy, I did so because the life 
cycle of “scandals” in Washington tends to be rather 
brief, particularly when they run into a dead end in 
terms of adding names or information to it. I will be 
very surprised if we ever learn the names of the peo-
ple who leaked this information, and I will be very 
surprised if this story continues indefinitely without 
names attached to it. I hope I did not suggest that 
I thought that outing a CIA operative was, in itself, 
unimportant. If this puts the woman in jeopardy, it 
is a very important thing, and it is something that 
should not have happened.
AUDIENCE QUESTION: If it is a serious mat-
ter, do you fault Robert Novak for publishing it?
BRODER: I will give you a longer answer than 
you probably want. The view at our paper, George 
Lardner’s and mine, is very simple. It is the govern-
ment’s responsibility to keep the government’s secrets 
secret. That is not our job in the press. When people 
in the government start talking about subjects that 
others in government wish they would not talk about, 
that is an internal problem for the government. It is 
not, in itself, a press problem. 
What we routinely do, when we are dealing in 
an area of national security, once information comes 
to us that we believe is credible — and we will make 
every effort to test its credibility — a conversation 
takes place between some official at some level at the 
Washington Post and some official at some level — 
including sometimes, as in the past, the President of 
the United States — about what we are about to do. 
The conversation goes something like this: 
“This is what we have learned. This is how 
far we have come in our reporting. If our report-
ing is wrong and you can prove to us that it’s 
wrong, we would like you to give us that proof. 
Second, if our reporting is incomplete and you 
can supplement what we know, we would like 
you to provide that additional information, con-
text, or background so that we can be as accu-
rate as possible. Now, this information is in our 
hands. It is out of your hands. Now you have 
an opportunity to persuade us to do something 
that is contrary to our nature, which is not to 
share what we know with the people who read 
the newspaper. Our inclination and our likely 
judgment is that we will publish what we have 
found out, but you have an opportunity now to 
persuade us that we should not, in this instance, 
publish it.” 
That conversation takes place. There have been 
instances, which have since become public, where the 
persuasion worked.. The Post learned about a ship 
called the Glomar Explorer, which was going to try 
to try to retrieve a Soviet submarine. The people in 
the government said, “We would like you to with-
hold that story until we have a chance to try to lift 
the submarine. We don’t want to have an incident on 
the high seas with the Soviet Navy about whether or 
not we can try to lift that ship of theirs.” We did what 
they asked us to do. Other publications did not, so it 
became public. So there is that kind of dialogue that 
takes place.
From what I know about the case Bob has writ-
ten about, Bob talked to the CIA, and they made a 
representation to him that it would be contrary to 
the interests of the agency and of the woman for 
her name to become public. He decided it was not a 
serious enough case that he wanted to withhold the 
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information. Whether he made the right judgment or 
not, in my view, depends very much on what, in fact, 
this woman’s job was at the CIA, and I’m not clear 
what that job really entailed. If she has been put in 
jeopardy, as I said before, or if her contacts have been 
put in jeopardy, I think he made the wrong call. 
But the basic fact is that it is the government’s job 
to protect its secrets. We do not have an official secrets 
act in this country. Thank goodness. It’s the govern-
ment’s job to protect the government’s secrets.
AUDIENCE QUESTION: With the recent 
changes in the FCC rulings on how many papers 
and radio stations a person or corporation can own, 
in your opinion, could this jeopardize a journalist’s 
ability to get the truth and information to the public?
BRODER: Thank you. I think the FCC should 
proceed with great caution in this deregulation. What 
happened in radio after they deregulated radio has 
resulted in a concentration of ownership that has been 
well publicized in that field, one that is inimical to 
broad public discussion in that medium. I think they 
would have been well advised to proceed with great 
caution in applying the same rules to other media. 
There is a reality, which they cite, which is that 
we now have, all of us, access to a far greater variety of 
sources of information than any previous generation 
of Americans had. Wherever you live in this coun-
try now, in addition to all your local media options, 
you have three national newspapers, two of which 
are among the very best in the country: The New 
York Times and the Wall Street Journal. The third, 
U.S.A. Today, is rapidly becoming a more serious and 
substantive newspaper. You have all of the resources 
of National Public Radio, to which I am addicted. 
You have the cable news channels in all of their 
varieties, and of course now you have the wonders of 
the Internet.
I see the change in my reporting as a political 
reporter. You now can go into any community of any 
size anywhere in this country, and you will find a group 
of people, self-selected, who are every bit as engaged in 
public affairs, every bit as knowledgeable as any group 
that you would find at the Brookings Institution or 
Cato or AEI or any of those Washington policy think 
tanks. They get it. They have made it their business to 
exploit these information sources. 
Even so, I would still think that we would be 
better off with additional owners and additional 
enterprises rather than allowing what happened in 
radio to happen in other media. 
AUDIENCE QUESTION: Mr. Broder, prior to 
your birthday, German visitors to this country used 
to express amazement at our freedom to travel, our 
freedom to be left alone. They were just in awe of this 
because it was something unknown to them. Given 
the direction in which we’re going now, isn’t there a 
very real danger that we might be facing a re-run of an 
old World War II movie whereby, if we want to travel 
from New York to Philadelphia or Boise to Mountain 
Home, we might be faced with checkpoints where 
someone in uniform says, “Your papers, please”?
BRODER: My instinct is to say that’s probably 
not in our future, and it’s certainly not inevitable. 
But as soon as I say that, I have to say that what you 
are describing is daily life within the borders of the 
District of Columbia. You can’t go anywhere in the 
District of Columbia, you can’t enter a single building 
of any size in the District without producing an iden-
tification for yourself, whether you are talking about 
the Washington Post or any other office building in 
the city or any government building in the city. So it’s 
happening already within the borders of the District of 
Columbia. So I should not be so quick to say it can’t 
happen in the broader range of the country. 
We are sacrificing freedom. There is no question 
about that. All you have to do is watch, as I did this 
morning, the people lining up at the checkpoint, duti-
fully removing their shoes and putting them in the lit-
tle bin, then hopping on one foot and the other to put 
their shoes back on. That is an infringement on free-
dom. You didn’t have to do that to go an airplane flight 
until now. Yes, it’s possible. I don’t think — fingers 
crossed — it’s going to happen to us very soon. 
AUDIENCE QUESTION: I was wondering 
why this big deal in Iraq, which evidently was false 
information, about weapons of mass destruction. It’s 
so scary to the United States when we have a man 
over in North Korea who says he is making them and 
will send them to other rogue nations. I don’t get the 
connection. 
BRODER: You will understand that I am not 
a State Department or Pentagon spokesman. They 
would not accept me in their wildest dreams in that 
role. Why was it scary? Well, two reasons. First, Iraq 
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is a large country sitting on top of a vital resource and 
located in the heart of a strategic part of the world. 
So what happens in that country is of consequence to 
the region and therefore of consequence to the United 
States. The man who was running that country was 
a thoroughly bad actor, and if he had access to those 
weapons of mass destruction, I think it would be a safe 
presumption that our security would be, by that fact, 
somewhat more jeopardized. 
Could we have done it by continuing contain-
ment and the embargo, etc.? That is an argument that 
people made seriously and that can be made seriously. 
But I don’t think it was hallucinatory to think that 
we had security stakes in Iraq. Does that excuse what 
appears to be faulty intelligence? Absolutely not. 
The question of why we so badly misjudged, 
apparently, what he had available and how quickly he 
could have used it is a terribly serious question, which 
we are still in the very early stages of unraveling. I don’t 
pretend to know why that intelligence appears to have 
been as faulty as it was. 
North Korea is a different country in a different 
part of the world, also important but also one that pres-
ents a totally different strategic challenge. They have a 
huge army that jeopardizes their immediate neighbor, 
South Korea, and could cause problems in the wider 
area. So it is perfectly logical to think, yes, we’re going 
to deal with that situation but in a different approach 
and method. I think, fingers crossed, that the situa-
tion in North Korea may still be manageable without 
the kind of direct military confrontation that we saw 
in Iraq. But will it be an easy proposition to bring that 
about? Clearly not. There were false starts at the begin-
ning of this administration that probably have delayed 
and perhaps ultimately made it more difficult to deal 
with the North Korean situation. 
AUDIENCE QUESTION: Bill Clinton report-
edly learned about the massacres in Rawanda by read-
ing a news magazine. Do you have any sense about 
how much information and breadth of opinion the 
President actually has access to on a day-to-day basis? 
BRODER: I don’t know the answer to that. He 
has access to everything in the American govern-
ment and a good many things that come from allied 
governments. How he uses that information is a ques-
tion that I cannot give you any firsthand information 
about. What we are told is that the President begins 
each day with a rather lengthy security briefing, 
overnight intelligence, and discussion of both the inter-
national and the domestic intelligence as to what may 
be taking place that might require a response from the 
American government. Beyond that, I can’t really give 
you much in the way of definitive information. 
AUDIENCE QUESTION: Regarding the war 
in Iraq, if the President was wrong — I’m not saying 
he is — if he was wrong about the weapons of mass 
destruction and the connections to al-Qaida, consid-
ering the resources and lives we have expended, is it 
possible we have already lost the chance to win the war 
against international terrorism?
BRODER: Well, what I can understand about 
the war on international terrorism is that it is not a 
single struggle taking place in a single location but 
rather an effort to discover and then to counter efforts 
that are probably being fostered by loosely-linked 
organizations, exploiting local and international griev-
ances and using a whole variety of tools. So while Iraq 
represents obviously a huge policy gamble on the part 
of the United States and this administration, a huge 
investment of lives and dollars, I don’t think that it 
probably is the definitive or ultimate battle in the war 
on terrorism. 
I’m inclined to think that those who say we are 
looking at something analogous to the Cold War in 
terms of the variety of forms it will take, the vari-
ety of places where the engagements will be found, 
the length of time it will require, and the tenacity it 
will take on our part and our allies’ part are probably 
correct. So I would not think that this is, in any realis-
tic sense, the definitive battle that has determined the 
outcome of the war on terrorism. 
Thank you all very much. 
ANDRUS: Ladies and gentlemen, you’ve just 
been treated to an evening with one of the fairest 
analytical minds in America, and we appreciate your 
being here with us. I say that on behalf of my col-
leagues, fellow sponsors, the Frank Church Institute, 
the Idaho Statesman. The three of us banded together 
this time to put together the conference today. 
I’ve been asked by the press several times, “What 
did you hope to achieve?” What we would like to 
see is an enlightened citizenry who will take it upon 
themselves to help make the determination on how 
much of our freedom we must sacrifice, how much is 
necessary? It’s not necessarily what the governmental 
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entity says it’s what they need. I’m not convinced that 
they need everything I hear about. 
I’m a veteran of Korea, and I’m as patriotic as any-
one else, but I also want to know that my government 
is the same government it was when I went to Korea 
some fifty years ago. 
Ladies and gentlemen, we’re not asking that 
anybody accept our viewpoint. We’re asking that 
we share viewpoints with one another and come up 
collectively with the right answer. Do I know what 
that is? No. Does Bethine know? No. Do the people at 
the Statesman know? No. But it’s someplace short of 
what I think they’re asking for.
We hope you have been enlightened, and once 
again, I’d like to express our collective appreciation to 
the outstanding group of individuals who joined with 
us today to discuss this issue. Many are still here this 
evening. I would hope you have a safe journey back to 
your homes, and we’re pleased to have had the chance 
to spend the day with you.
Thank you again, Mr. Broder. 
* * * * *
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Conference Participant Biographies
Governor Cecil D. Andrus: Chairman, Andrus 
Center for Public Policy; Governor of Idaho, 1987 to 
1995; Secretary of Interior, 1977 to 1981; Governor 
of Idaho, 1971 to 1977. During his four terms as 
Governor of Idaho and his four years as Secretary of 
Interior, Cecil Andrus earned a national reputation as 
a “common-sense conservationist,” one who could 
strike a wise balance between conflicting conservation 
and development positions. He played a pivotal role in 
the passage of the Alaska Lands Act and the National 
Surface Mining Act of 1977 and in the creation of the 
Frank Church River of No Return Wilderness Area, 
the Snake River Birds of Prey Area, and the Hell’s 
Canyon National Recreation Area. Governor Andrus 
elected not to run again in 1994 and subsequently 
established the Andrus Center for Public Policy to 
which he donates his service as chairman. His awards 
include seven honorary degrees, the William Penn 
Mott Park Leadership Award from the National 
Parks Conservation Association, Conservationist of 
the Year from the National Wildlife Federation, the 
Ansel Adams Award from the Wilderness Society, the 
Audubon Medal, and the Torch of Liberty award from 
B’Nai Brith. In 1998, he authored with Joel Connelly 
a book about his years in public service: Cecil Andrus: 
Politics Western Style. He and his wife, Carol, have 
three daughters and three grandchildren.
LeRoy Ashby, Ph.D.: Professor of History, 
Washington State University. Dr. Ashby received his 
doctorate from the University of Maryland in 1966 
and has enjoyed a distinguished career as an author 
and professor of 20th Century American History 
and Popular Culture. He was awarded the WSU 
President’s Faculty Excellence Award and honored as 
the 1990 and 1993 CASE Professor of the Year for the 
State of Washington. His books include The Spearless 
Leader: Senator Borah and the Progressive Movement in 
the 1920’s (University of Illinois Press, 1972); Saving 
the Waifs: Reformers and Dependent Children (Temple 
University Press, 1984); William Jennings Bryan: 
Champion of Democracy (Twayne 1987); Fighting the 
Odds: The Life of Senator Frank Church (WSU Press 
1994); and Endangered Children: Dependency, Neglect, 
and Abuse in American History (Twayne, 1997). 
David Broder: National political correspondent for 
The Washington Post. Broder writes a twice-weekly 
column that is carried by more than 300 newspapers 
around the globe. He was awarded the Pulitzer Price 
in 1973 for distinguished commentary and named 
“Best Newspaper Political Reporter” by Washington 
Journalism Review. A survey for Washingtonian 
magazine found that Broder was rated “Washington’s 
most highly regarded columnist” by both editorial 
page editors and members of Congress, leading 16 
others in ratings for “overall integrity, factual accuracy, 
and insight.” Broder won the White Burkett Miller 
Presidential Award in 1989 and the prestigious 4th 
Estate Award from the National Press Foundation in 
1990, which also honored him with the Distinguished 
Contributions to Journalism Award in 1993. In 
addition, he won the 1997 William Allen White 
Foundation’s award for distinguished achievement 
in journalism and, in the same year, was given the 
National Society of Newspaper Columnists Lifetime 
Achievement Award. Before joining the Post in 1966, 
Broder covered national politics for The New York 
Times, The Washington Star, and the Congressional 
Quarterly. He has covered every national campaign and 
convention since 1960, traveling up to 100,000 miles 
a year to interview voters and report on the candidates. 
He is the author of seven books, the most recent of 
which are: Democracy Derailed: Initiative Campaigns 
and the Power of Money (Harcourt 2000); The System: 
The American Way of Politics at the Breaking Point with 
Washington Post alumnus Haynes Johnson (Little, 
Brown & Company, 1996); and Behind the Front Page: 
A Candid Look at How the News is Made (Simon & 
Schuster, 1987) Broder was born in Chicago Heights, 
Illinois. He received his bachelor’s degree and an M.A. 
in political science from the University of Chicago, 
served two years in the U.S. Army, and began his 
newspaper career at the Bloomington, Ill. Pantagraph. 
He has been a Fellow of the Institute of Politics of the 
John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard 
University and a Fellow of the Institute of Policy 
Sciences and Public Affairs at Duke University. Broder 
and his wife (the former Ann Creighton Collar) have 
four grown sons and make their home in Arlington, 
Virginia.  
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James J. Brosnahan: Senior Partner with Morrison & 
Foerster of San Francisco and a much-sought-after 
public speaker. Mr. Brosnahan received his B.S.B.A. 
degree in 1956 from Boston College and went on to 
attend Harvard Law School. His post-law school 
career led to five years as an Assistant U.S. Attorney, 
prosecuting federal cases in Phoenix and San Francisco. 
He has particular expertise in civil and criminal trial 
work and continues to be regularly engaged in civil 
and criminal trials, having tried more than 130 jury 
cases on issues including patents, money laundering, 
libel, murder, manslaughter, mail fraud, insurance bad 
faith, environment, property damage, divorce, child 
custody, tax evasion, bank embezzlement, theft of 
government property, real estate fraud, narcotics, 
obstruction of justice, perjury, conspiracy, interstate 
transportation of wagering information, antitrust, 
wrongful death, maritime personal injury, product 
liability, professional misconduct, immigration and 
other miscellaneous civil and criminal cases. Most 
recently, he is best known for his defense of the 
“American Taliban,” John Walker Lindh. Mr. 
Brosnahan has argued both civil and criminal cases in 
state and federal court, including two cases in the U.S. 
Supreme Court: United States v. Caceres, 440 
U.S.741(1979), and Eu v. San Francisco County 
Democratic Central Committee, 109 S.Ct. 1013 (1989). 
His honors include induction into the State Bar of 
California’s Trial Lawyers Hall of Fame in 1996 and 
selection as Trial Lawyer of the Year by the American 
Board of Trial Advocates in 2001 and as “Legend of 
the Law” by the Lawyers’ Club of San Francisco in 
2002. His lecture series, “Great Trials and Great 
Lawyers,” was featured in The Teaching Company’s 
America’s Superstar Teachers. 
Bethine Church: Chair of The Frank Church 
Institute, President and Founder of the Sawtooth 
Society. Bethine Church, widow of Senator Frank 
Church, returned to Idaho following his death in 1984 
and is best known now for her own achievements. In 
addition to chairing the many Frank Church Seminars 
at Boise State University in the intervening years, she 
has spearheaded the movement to save Idaho’s scenic 
Stanley Basin in Idaho through her inspired leadership 
of the Sawtooth Society. She is the daughter of Idaho 
Governor Chase Clark, who later served as a federal 
judge; the niece of another governor, Barzilla; and the 
cousin of a United States Senator, D. Worth Clark. 
During Senator Church’s three terms in the Senate, 
Bethine was active in many civic organizations in 
the Washington, D.C. area, including the Kennedy 
Center for the Performing Arts, the U.S. Capitol 
Historical Society, Meridian House, and the Center 
for Responsive Politics. She has contributed energy, 
time, and treasure to many of Idaho’s most worthwhile 
charities: the Anne Frank Human Rights Memorial, 
the Terry Reilly Health Services, the Basque Museum 
and Cultural Center, the Martin Institute for Peace 
Studies, and the Governor’s Task Force on Home 
Care. Her awards include an honorary degree from 
Lewis Clark State College, Boise State University’s 
Silver Medallion Award for Public Service, and the 
Lifetime Achievement Award from the Silver Sage Girl 
Scout Council. Her special interests are senior citizen 
advocacy, environmental protection, home health 
care issues, and children’s programs. She enjoys the 
company of her two sons, Chase and Forrest, and of 
her grandchildren. Her memoir, A Lifelong Affair: My 
Passion for People and Politics, has just been published 
by Frances Press, Washington, D.C. 
Forrest Church, Ph.D.: Rev. Church is currently 
serving his twenty-sixth year as Senior Minister 
of All Souls Church (Unitarian) in Manhattan. 
He was educated at Stanford University, Harvard 
Divinity School, and Harvard University, where he 
received his Ph.D. in Early Church History in 1978. 
Dr. Church, who is 55 years old, has written or 
edited 20 books, including Father and Son: A 
Personal Biography of Senator Frank Church of Idaho; 
Our Chosen Faith: An Introduction to Unitarian 
Universalism; God and Other Famous Liberals; Life 
Lines; Lifecraft; Bringing God Home; and The American 
Creed. His is the editor of The Essential Tillich 
(University of Chicago, 1999); The Macmillan Book 
of Earliest Christian Prayers (1988), a new edition of 
Thomas Jefferson’s Bible (Beacon, 1989): and Restoring 
Faith: America’s Religious Leaders Answer Terror with 
Hope (2001). Eight of his addresses have been selected 
for inclusion in the annual anthology, Representative 
American Speeches (Wilson & Co.). Dr. Church is a 
member of the Executive Board at the Franklin and 
Eleanor Roosevelt Institute. Mayor Giuliani appointed 
him Chairman of the Council on the Environment of 
New York City in 1995. Now serving in his eighth 
year as chair, he directs, among other programs, 32 
green markets in the city. He is married to Carolyn 
Buck Luce and has four children: Frank (25), Nina 
(22), Jacob (19), and Nathan (16). 
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John M. Deutch, Ph.D.: Institute Professor at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He served as 
Director of Central Intelligence from May 1995 to 
December 1996. From 1994 to 1995, he served as 
Deputy Secretary of Defense and as Undersecretary 
of Defense for Acquisition and Technology during 
1993-1994. Dr. Deutch also served as Director of 
Energy Research, Acting Assistant Secretary for 
Energy Technology, and Undersecretary in the U.S. 
Department of Energy. In addition, he served on 
the President’s Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee 
(1980-81; the President’s Commission on Strategic 
Forces (1983); the White House Science Council 
(1985-89); the President’s Intelligence Advisory 
Board (1990-93); the President’s Commission 
on Aviation Safety and Security (1996); the 
President’s Commission on Reducing and Protecting 
Government Secrecy (1996-970; and as Chairman 
of the Commission to Assess the Organization of 
the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation 
of Weapons of Mass Destruction (1998-99). Dr. 
Deutch serves as director of the following publicly-
held companies: Citigroup, Cummins, Raytheon, and 
Schlumberger Ltd. He is a director of the Council on 
Foreign Relations, Resources for the Future, and the 
Urban Institute and an overseer of the Museum of 
Fine Art in Boston. Dr. Deutch has been a member of 
the MIT faculty since 1970 and served as Chairman 
of the Department of Chemistry, Dean of Science, 
and Provost. He has authored over 160 technical 
publications in physical chemistry as well as numerous 
articles on technology, energy, international security, 
and public policy issues. 
Judge Kevin Thomas Duffy: Judge, U.S. District 
Court, New York. Judge Duffy received his LL.B 
from Fordham University School of Law in 1958 and 
began his distinguished legal career as clerk for Judge 
Edward Lumbard, U.S. Court of Appeals, Second 
Circuit. From there he moved to the U.S. Attorney’s 
Office for the Southern District of New York and 
became Assistant Chief of the Criminal Division. In 
1961, he joined the firm of Whitman, Ransom & 
Coulson and subsequently Gordon & Gordon. In 
1969, he was named Administrator of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission in the New York Regional 
Office and was appointed to the federal bench by 
President Nixon in 1972. He has served as Adjunct 
Professor of Trial Advocacy in the Fordham University, 
Pace University, and New York University Schools of 
Law. His many honors include Honorary Doctor of 
Humane Letters from the College of New Rochelle in 
1998, the Dean’s Medal from Fordham Law School 
in 1997, Community Leadership Award from the 
Federal Law Enforcement Foundation in 1995, the 
Lifetime Achievement Award (Justice William O. 
Douglas Award) from the Association of Securities 
and Exchange Commission Alumni in 1995, the 
Distinguished Public Service Award from the New 
York County Lawyers’ Association, and numerous 
others. Judge Duffy is a prolific writer, and a sampling 
of his articles includes: “The Civil Rights Act: A 
Need for Re-Evaluation of Non-Exhaustion Doctrine 
Applied to Prison Section 1983 Lawsuits,” Pace Law 
Review, 1983; “Amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure: How Go the Best Laid Plans? The 
Actual Operation of Amended Rule 11,” 54 Fordham 
Law Review (1985); and “Cross-Examination of 
Witnesses: The Litigator’s Puzzle” (with Aron and 
Rosner), Shepard’s McGraw-Hill, 1989. The long list 
of his notable decisions includes: USA v. Mohammad 
Salameh et al., 1993-1994 (The World Trade Center 
Bombing Case); National Basketball Association et al 
v. Charles L. Williams et al., 1994; USA ex rel Israel v. 
Mkousa Mohammed Abu Marzook 1996 (extradition of 
Hamas Chief for murders); USA v. Yousef, et al, 1997 
(Manila Bombing Case); USA v. Yousef and Ismoil, 
1997 (The World Trade Center Bombing Case II). Judge 
Duffy and his wife of 46 years, Judge Irene Duffy, who 
is retired from the New York Supreme Court, have 
four children: Kevin Thomas Jr, Irene Moira, Gavin 
Edward, and Patrick Giles. 
Mark H. Gitenstein: Attorney, Mayer, Brown, Rowe, 
& Maw, Washington, D.C. Mr. Gitenstein was 
counsel to the Senate Intelligence Committee (1975-
1981). He was deeply involved in the Committee’s 
investigation of domestic security matters at the 
Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation. He served as Minority Chief Counsel 
of the Senate Judiciary Committee (1981-86) and 
as Chief Counsel of the Committee (1987-89). In 
those positions, he directed the Democratic staff ’s 
substantive work on all matters before the Committee. 
Among his responsibilities was overseeing the 
Committee’s review of all judicial nominations. Mr. 
Gitenstein led the Democratic staff in 1987 when the 
Committee rejected the nomination of Robert Bork to 
the Supreme Court. His book on the subject, Matters 
of Principle: An Insider’s Account of America’s Rejection 
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of Robert Bork’s Nomination to the Supreme Court, 
was the recipient of the American Bar Association’s 
1993 Silver Gavel Award. He became a partner in the 
Washington, D.C. office of Mayer, Brown, Rowe & 
Maw in 1990 and founded the Government Practice 
Group at the firm. Mark is a 1968 graduate of Duke 
University, and he received his law degree from 
Georgetown University Law Center in 1972. 
Senator Slade Gorton: Three-term U.S. Senator 
from Washington State, now a member of the 
Seattle law firm of Preston Gates & Ellis LLP and a 
member of the 9/11 Commission. Gorton’s years in 
the Senate saw him appointed to powerful committee 
posts, including Appropriations, Budget, Commerce, 
Science and Transportation, and Energy and Natural 
Resources. Gorton served as the Chairman of the 
Interior Appropriations Subcommittee (1995-2001), 
the Commerce Subcommittees on Consumer Affairs 
(1995-99) and Aviation (1999-2000). He was a 
member of the Republican leadership as counsel to 
the Majority Leader (1996-2000). Senator Gorton 
began his political career in 1958 as a Washington 
state representative; he went on to serve as State 
House Majority Leader. In 1968, he was elected 
Attorney General of Washington state where he 
argued 14 cases before the Supreme Court. His most 
popular achievement as Attorney General came when 
he sued the American League in 1970 to keep baseball 
in Seattle. To this day, Slade Gorton is remembered by 
fans across the state for “saving the Mariners.” In June 
1980, he received the Wyman Award as “Outstanding 
Attorney General in the United States.” He also served 
on the President’s Consumer Advisory Council (1975-
77) and on the Washington State Criminal Justice 
Training Commission from 1969-1981. He has 
served on the board of the Fred Hutchinson Cancer 
Research Center since 1987. In April, 2003, Senator 
Gorton became the first non-Estonian to receive the 
1st Class Order of the Cross of Terra Mariana, the 
country’s highest national award. The honor was the 
culmination of Gorton’s many years of interest in and 
support of Estonia and the other Baltic states, Latvia 
and Lithuania. 
Leslie Hurst: President and Publisher of The Idaho 
Statesman, she was named to her present position 
in May of this year. She relocated to Boise from 
Huntington, West Virginia where she was president 
and publisher of the Herald Dispatch and served 
previously in that role for the Hattiesburg American 
in Hattiesburg, Mississippi. Ms. Hurst has extensive 
experience in both the reporting and marketing sides 
of journalism, having reported for the Shreveport 
Journal and the Columbia Missourian. She was 
director of marketing for the News-Press, Fort Myers, 
Florida; the Pensacola News Journal, Pensacola, 
Florida; and The Times, Shreveport, Louisiana. Leslie 
is a recipient from the Gannett Company of the 
president’s rings for excellence as both a marketing 
director and a publisher. Her civic involvement 
includes the West Virginia Roundtable; the Executive 
Committee of the Huntington Area Development 
Council, the Board of Directors of the Shreveport 
Economic Development Foundation, the Chambers 
of Commerce in Huntington, Hattiesbureg, and 
Shreveport, and a guardian ad litem in Fort Myers. She 
is active on the Diversity Committee of the Southern 
Newspaper Publishers Association as well as the Board 
Diversity Committee for the Newspaper Association 
of America. Leslie was born in Turkey into an Air 
Force family and grew up all over the world, living in 
such diverse places as Taiwan, France, and Germany. 
She is a graduate of the University of Missouri with a 
bachelor’s degree in journalism. She is married to John 
Severson, a photojournalist with The Indianapolis 
Star. Her enjoyments include reading, traveling, and 
contemporary visual art. 
Loch K. Johnson: Regents Professor of Political 
Science at the University of Georgia, author of several 
books on U.S. national security, and editor of the 
journal Intelligence and National Security. He has 
won the Certificate of Distinction from the National 
Intelligence Center and the V. O. Key Prize from 
the Southern Political Science Association. He has 
served as secretary of the American Political Science 
Association and president of the International Studies 
Association, South. Johnson was special assistant 
to the Chair of the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence in 1975-76, staff director of the House 
Subcommittee on Intelligence Oversight in 1977-79, 
and special assistant to the chair of the Aspin-Brown 
Commission on Intelligence in 1995-96. Born in 
Auckland, New Zealand, Professor Johnson received 
his Ph.D. in political science from the University of 
California, Riverside. At the University of Georgia, 
he has won the Josiah Meigs Prize, the University’s 
highest teaching honor, as well as the Owens Award, 
its highest research honor. 
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Marc C. Johnson: Boise partner of the Gallatin 
Group, a Pacific Northwest public affairs/issues 
management firm with offices in Boise, Seattle, 
Portland, Spokane, Helena, and Washington, D.C. 
He serves in a volunteer capacity as President of the 
Andrus Center. Mr. Johnson served on the staff of 
Governor Cecil D. Andrus from 1987 to 1995, first 
as press secretary and later as chief of staff. He has a 
varied mass communications background, including 
experience in radio, television, and newspaper 
journalism. He has written political columns and 
done extensive broadcast reporting and producing. 
Prior to joining Governor Andrus, Mr. Johnson 
served as managing editor for Idaho Public Television’s 
award-winning program, Idaho Reports. He has 
produced numerous documentaries and hosted 
political debates. Several of his programs have been 
aired regionally and nationally on public television. 
He is currently at work on a biography of progressive 
era Senator Burton K. Wheeler of Montana. Johnson 
is a native of South Dakota and received a B.S. degree 
in journalism from South Dakota State University. 
His community involvement includes a past 
presidency of the Idaho Press Club and the Bishop 
Kelly High School Foundation. He is a past board 
member of the St. Vincent De Paul Society and the 
Ada County Historic Preservation Council. Currently, 
he is chairman of the Idaho Humanities Council and 
a member of the boards of the Federation of State 
Humanities Councils, the City Club of Boise, and the 
Idaho Housing Company, a non-profit corporation 
devoted to developing low-income housing projects 
in Idaho. Mr. Johnson is married to Patricia L. 
Johnson, Ph.D., a senior planner with the Idaho 
Department of Health and Welfare. Their two sons, 
Rob and Nathan, both attend college in Idaho. 
George Lardner Jr.: Staff writer for the Washington 
Post since 1963, working for most of those years as an 
investigative reporter on the newspaper’s national staff. 
He has covered presidential campaigns, major court trials, 
and beats ranging from the White House and Congress 
to the CIA and the FBI. He won a Pulitzer Prize in 
1993 for stories about the 1992 murder of his youngest 
daughter, Kristin, in Boston by a young man under court 
order to stay away from her. He later expanded that 
work into a book, The Stalking of Kristin. He has written 
numerous articles for national magazines and is chairman 
of the Fund for Investigative Journalism, which provides 
grants to free-lance journalists to expose governmental, 
corporate, and institutional wrongdoing and failings.
Andrew H. Malcolm: Member of the Editorial 
Board of the Los Angeles Times. Previous to joining 
the Los Angeles Times, Mr. Malcolm served as 
Deputy Communications Manager for Bush 2000, 
as press secretary to Laura Bush, and as a member of 
the transition team, Washington, D.C., July 1999-
January 2001. Mr. Malcolm has roots in Canada 
but was educated at Culver Military Academy and 
Northwestern University, where he earned a B.S. and 
an M.S. in journalism. He is the author of ten books, 
including The Canadians and Fury: Inside the Life 
of Theoren Fleury, the true story of Theoren Fleury, 
the smallest player in the National Hockey League 
(McClelland & Stewart, Canada, November 1997). 
Malcolm’s awards include the American Society 
of Newspaper Editors Award for Editorial Writing 
(2003); the Los Angeles Times Editorial Award (2002 
and 2001); New York Page One Award from the New 
York Newspaper Guild (1975 and 1985), the New 
York Times Publisher’s Award, 18 times; the George 
Polk Memorial Award for National Reporting (1975), 
and the Peter Lisagor Award for Reporting, Chicago 
Newspaper Guild (1983). 
Walter F. Mondale: Vice President of the United 
States, U.S. Ambassador to Japan, U.S. Senator, and 
Minnesota’s Attorney General. In addition to those 
offices, Fritz Mondale was also the Democratic Party’s 
nominee for President in 1984. He is currently a 
partner with the law firm of Dorsey & Whitney LLP, 
headquartered in Minneapolis with 16 offices 
worldwide. He serves as chair of the firm’s Asia Law 
Practice Group. Vice President Mondale is the product 
of the small towns of southern Minnesota where he 
attended public schools. In 1951, he earned his B.A. 
in political science from the University of Minnesota 
and, after completing service as a corporal in the U.S. 
Army, he received his LL.B (cum laude) from the 
University of Minnesota Law School. In 1960, he was 
appointed by Minnesota Governor Orville Freeman to 
the position of State Attorney General. Mondale was 
then elected to the office in 1962 and 1964 when he 
was appointed to fill the U.S. Senate vacancy created 
by Hubert Humphrey’s election to the Vice Presidency. 
The voters of Minnesota returned Mondale to the 
Senate in 1966 and 1972. Jimmy Carter and Walter 
Mondale were elected President and Vice President of 
the United States on November 2, 1976. He was the 
first Vice President to have an office in the White 
House, and he served as a full-time participant, 
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advisor, and troubleshooter for the Administration. 
During this period, Joan Mondale served as a national 
advocate for the arts and Honorary Chairman of the 
Federal Council on the Arts and Humanities. He ran 
unsuccessfully as the Democratic candidate for 
President in 1984, returned to Minnesota where he 
practiced law, and was appointed in 1993 by President 
Clinton as Ambassador to Japan. During that period, 
he helped negotiate several U.S.-Japan security 
agreements, including a resolution to the controversy 
about the U.S. military presence in Okinawa. He also 
helped to negotiate numerous trade agreements 
between the United States and Japan, and he promoted 
the expansion of educational exchanges between the 
two nations. Mondale has authored the book The 
Accountability of Power: Toward a Responsible Presidency 
and has written numerous articles on domestic and 
international issues. Mondale is married to the former 
Joan Adams. They have three children - Theodore, 
Eleanor Jane, and William - and three grandchildren. 
Thomas E. Moss: United States Attorney for the 
District of Idaho. Tom Moss graduated from the 
University of Idaho College of Law with a Juris Doctor 
in 1965. He practiced law in Blackfoot and served as 
Prosecuting Attorney for Bingham County for 25 
years. From February 2000 until his appointment as 
United States Attorney in August, 2001, he served 
as member of the Idaho House of Representatives. 
Mr. Moss has been a presenter to Idaho attorneys 
on behalf of the Idaho State Bar Association and the 
Idaho Prosecuting Attorneys’ Association in the area 
of trial advocacy, media relations, and legal ethics. 
He has also served on the faculty for the National 
Advocacy Center in Columbia, South Carolina. 
Moss has presented many lectures and training 
sessions to law enforcement officers on preparing 
and presenting a criminal case, including crime scene 
investigation, preserving evidence, writing reports, 
and testifying in court. Mr. Moss is past president of 
the Idaho State Bar Association and currently serves 
on two subcommittees of the U.S. Attorney General’s 
Advisory Committee concerning Native American 
issues and Borders and Immigration. He also serves on 
the Executive Working Group, whose objective is to 
maintain and improve working relationships among 
federal, state, and local law enforcement. Tom and his 
wife, Bonny, have raised seven children. 
Pierce Murphy: Boise’s Community Ombudsman. 
Murphy was appointed by the Mayor and the City 
Council on March 2, 1999 and began work on 
April 5, 1999. Mr. Murphy has extensive experience in 
human resource management, facilitation, mediation 
and investigation. He earned a Master of Pastoral 
Studies degree from Loyola University of New 
Orleans, a Master of Arts degree in Counseling 
Psychology from Gonzaga University in Spokane, 
Washington, and a Bachelor of Science degree in 
Commerce from Santa Clara University in Santa 
Clara, California. Mr. Murphy began his career in 
1972 as a law enforcement officer with the City of 
Menlo Park in California. Following his graduate 
studies and from 1986 until 1994, Mr. Murphy 
maintained an active Human Resource Management 
consulting practice with clients throughout the United 
States, Europe, Asia, and Latin America. In 1994, Mr. 
Murphy joined the Paper Division of the Boise 
Cascade Corporation as Manager of Human Resource 
Development. Mr. Murphy is married, and he and his 
wife have seven children. 
Patrick A. Shea: Attorney, Ballard Spahr Andrews 
& Ingersoll, Salt Lake City, former Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of the Interior for Land and Minerals 
Management. In that role, he oversaw the Bureau 
of Land Management, Minerals Management 
Services, and the Office of Surface Mining – agencies 
responsible for the management of over 270 million 
acres of land and for all offshore drilling for oil and 
gas production in the United States. Before entering 
government service, Mr. Shea was a lawyer, educator, 
and businessman in the Intermountain West. Along 
with practicing law in Salt Lake City and the District 
of Columbia, Shea was an Adjunct Professor of 
Political Science at the University of Utah and taught 
at the Brigham Young Law School. In September 
1996, he was appointed by President Clinton to 
serve on the White House Commission on Aviation 
Safety and Security. Mr. Shea teaches seminars on 
Land Use Management and Biotechnology for Federal 
judges. Prior to his private law practice, he served as 
General Counsel and Assistant Secretary to a private 
communications company, operating television, 
radio, and newspapers. He also served as counsel to 
the Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Senate. 
Shea is a native of Salt Lake City and received his 
70
undergraduate degree from Stanford University in 1970, 
a master’s degree from Oxford University in 1972, and a 
law degree from Harvard University in 1975. 
Judge Stephen S. Trott: Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals, 
9th Circuit. Judge Trott was nominated by President 
Reagan and sworn in on April 19, 1988. From 1983 
until April 1988, he served in the Justice Department. 
During that time, he had primary responsibility for 
the Department’s initiatives against international 
terrorism, drug trafficking, and money laundering, and 
he was required to approve personally all applications 
to the federal courts for electronic surveillance. From 
1986 until 1988, he was the Department’s Associate 
Attorney General, the third ranking position in 
the Department of Justice. He also served as U.S. 
Attorney for the Central District of California and 
as prosecutor for the District Attorney’s Office of Los 
Angeles County. Judge Trott has been on the faculty of 
the National College of District Attorneys at Houston 
and is a member of the American College of Trial 
Lawyers. Born in Glen Ridge, New Jersey, he holds a 
degree in French literature from Wesleyan University, 
a law degree from Harvard Law School and honorary 
Doctor of Laws degrees from Santa Clara University 
and the University of Idaho. Judge Trott is an active 
member of “The Highwaymen,” a folk music group 
best remembered for its gold 1960’s record hit, 
“Michael Row the Boat Ashore” and “Cottonfields.” 
He is past President of the Boise Philharmonic 
Association and is on the board of Directors for the 
Children’s Home Society in Boise.
Carolyn Washburn: Executive Editor of The Idaho 
Statesman. Washburn has held the position of 
executive editor of The Idaho Statesman since March 
1999. A Cincinnati native, Carolyn holds a bachelor 
of arts in political science and journalism from Indiana 
University at Bloomington. She started her journalism 
career at the Lansing State Journal in Michigan as a 
business reporter covering Oldsmobile and General 
Motors. She worked for ten years at the Gannett 
newspapers in Rochester, NY, a community of about 
1 million people on the shores of Lake Ontario, from 
1987-1993. She was a business reporter covering 
Eastman Kodak Co., business editor and AME/metro. 
She returned to Rochester as managing editor of The 
Democrat Chronicle, after serving as managing editor 
in Boise from 1993 to 1995, and held that position 
from 1995 until her return to Boise in 1999. Carolyn 
served for two years as the chair of the Reporting, 
Writing and Editing Committee of the Associated 
Press Managing Editors Conference. Carolyn, an avid 
reader, is married to Perry, a journalist by trade and 
now a stay-at-home dad. She has three children—a 13-
year-old son and daughters 6 and 5. The entire family 
enjoys hiking and camping in Idaho’s mountains. 
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